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Do you realize that what you are bringing up is 
the trick argument that a man cannot try to 
discover either what he knows or what he does not 
know? He would not seek what he knows~ for since 
he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor 
what he does not know, for in that case he does 
not even know what he is to look for. 
Socrates <in Guthrie"s translation of Plato's Meno> can 
afford to call this paradox a 'trick argument•. He is 
satisfied that it does not seriously obscure the impulse to 
learn since his famous theory of anamnesis dissolves it at 
least in part : all learning is only re-cogn ition. And yet, 
he has only shifted the issue from epistemological to 
ontological grounds: now one ~as to discern the narrow 
confines of true re-cognition~ and has to distinguish it 
from the mere illusion that one has actually succeeded in 
learning something. Thus, regardless of whether Socrates"s 
elegant maneuver is adopted, all learned and learning 
scholarship has to intermittently reassure itself of its own 
sincerity in the face of the paradox: to what extent is the 
result of so-called learning nothing but a reflection of 
what one was looking for in the first place? 
In this respect not unl·ike theories of art and literature, 
the science of science represents a consolidated 
interdisciplinary effort at learning from the workings and 
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products of a socially instituted human activity. While the 
philosophy of science is one of the tributaries to that (as 
of yet) hardly autonomous discipline~ learning from science 
is not and has not traditionally been the exclusive aim of 
the philosophy of science. In the tradition of natural 
phi 1 osophy ~ sofTfe phi 1 osophers of science interpret the ttmr-1 d 
and relate on scientific principles the human being to the 
world~ elaborating~ in effect~ a scientific Heltbild. And 
fr-om a commitment to epistemology stems the ambition of 
others to guide and inspire~ judge and advance the cause of 
science itself. In contrast~ the following study belongs to 
that group of wor-ks which merely seeks to understand the 
institution~ to learn in a philosophical as well as 
empirical manner- about the ways in which the scientific 
community operates. 
To ensure against the pitfalls and paradoxes of learning~ 
a programme in the science of science may begin by analyzing 
into component par-ts the resolve to learn in any domain~ 
including science. At the outset stands the conviction that 
there is something to be learned here: one starts on the 
presumption that somehow science makes a worthwhile subject 
of learning, for instance~ that science represents a model 
of particularly efficient, successful, rational~ and 
transparent collective r-easoning. Secondly, since 
understanding science as a historical artifact r-equires a 
fair degree of descriptive accuracy, the intuitive 
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p~econceptions going along with the presumption of 
worthiness have to be tempe~ed by cautious open-mindedness~ 
sensitivity~ if not humility. It seems thirdly that to 
strike the balance between preconception and caution~ a plan 
of inquiry or principle of learning has to be adopted: while 
some unrevisable preconceptions are indispensable 
preconditions of learning, the explicit adoption of a plan 
puts them into a long-range perspective which may ultimately 
allow the recognition of their merits and defects. For 
instance~ if that plan somewhat boldly assigns a firm role 
in the course of inquiry to the presumption of worthiness~ 
intuitive preconceptions about science can be transformed 
into comparable hypotheses as variations on the adopted 
principle of learning are tried out. Thus~ the presumption 
of worthiness with its preconceptions about the 
subject-matter is tempered by caution as a bold and 
tentative principle of learning is adopted. And yet, the 
impulse to learn is not aiming for tentative and cautious 
results: it is confidently based on the expectation that the 
presumption of worthiness pays off by providing insights 
which are generalizable to other domains of human activity 
and thus of universal value. Learning from and about science 
should be, as the famous dictum has it, learning for life. 
I believe that -the desire to learn <though not the process 
of learning) characteristically combines these four 
components. Awareness of them does not dissolve or avoid the 
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paradox of learning so much as it provides a way of taking 
it into account. Philosophical temperament ultimately 
decides how this awareness should be incorporated within the 
inquiry into science and at what point one can be satisfied 
that the competing components are taken into account 
sufficiently well. As a matter of temperament~ the ensueing 
investigation does not first resolve the friction between 
hard and fast preconceptions~ humble caution~ tentative 
boldness~ and envisioned universal validity . Instead it 
tries to preserve that friction throughout the 
investigation. On the conviction that sensitivity to the 
deep problems underlying all inquiry should not stifle but 
inspire inquiry itself~ the investigation sails forth with 
somewhat blue-eyed optimism into the domain of what (equally 
optimistically> is called the 'science of science'. The 
first chapter constructs a plan of inquiry by adopting a 
principle of learning. That plan emerges from a discussion 
of the competing demands for descriptive accuracy and 
normative validity on philosophical theories of sci e nce. In 
accordance with the plan of inquiry ~ the second chapter 
provides a conceptual framework which appropriately 
structures 'scientific activity·~ the subject-matter at 
hand. In the third chapter, the conceptual fr a mework <a 
theory of alternatives in science) is projected upon a 
historical case. After the test-case has been thus prepared, 
the fourth and final chapter brings the plan of inquiry to 
bear on that episode in the history of science. Due to the 
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foundational character of the ' argument~ all this is much 
sketchier than it should be and hardly more than the outline 
of a comprehensive research programme in the science of 
science. Since that programme stands and falls with its 
usefulness for the inquiry into science~ that sketchiness is 
surely both helpful and regrettable: helpful~ if the 
programme's heuristic power can be judged by seeing whether 
overall a fortunate balance between caution and boldness has 
been struck~ and regrettable as only meticulous study of 
various historical cases can bear out its heuristic power 
and allow for a judgement of its soundness. While the last 
two chapters discuss an episode from the history of biology 
<Darwin and 'Natural Selection')~ more detailed further 
case-studies will have to supplement the present effort 
<e.g. on Newton and 'Universal Gravitation·~ or on Max Weber 
and the 'Spirit of Capitalism'). 
As a foundational reflection on the science of science~ 
this study is most closely related to previous work by 
members of the so-called Starnberg-Group <Gernot Bbhme~ 
Wolfgang van den Daele~ Wolfgang Krohn). To my mind~ they 
originated the first research programme in the science of 
science which in a detailed~ sophisticated~ and (as of yet) 
not nearly sufficiently appreciated manner unites the 
history~ philosophy~ and sociology of science. Owing to this 
proximity~ the relation between my enterprise and their 
theories is hardly documented in the course of the following 
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investigation itself. However, the four chapters amply 
testify to the influence of all the other works which have 
deeply impressed me in one way or another. As those works 
are customarily held to express the views of schools that 
are profoundly at odds with one another, my attempt to 
assemble Carnap and Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, Peirce and 
Feyerabend, and many more under the umbrella of a unified 
programme in the science of science may not do justice to 
any of them. I hold accountable for this seemingly 
undisciplined eclecticism my own learning experience at 
Hamburg and Columbia Universities where I was exposed to 
teachers who themselves came from·vastly different 
traditions and yet encouraged through their work <thoug h all 
in their own styles) more integrative, non-factional, 
pluralistic persp~ctives . To them, I am most indebted. First 
and foremost, Lothar Schafer and Robert K. Merton 
influenced me in many more ways than they can possibly 
imagine. Here I can thank them only for their encouragement, 
support, and almost uncanny confidence in my work. I am 
afraid that I have squandered their credit too liberally. 
Isaac Levi hopefully appreciates the transplantation of some 
of his thought into a line of reasoning which possibly 
appears quite alien to him. Either way, I am grateful for 
his extensive comments on early versions of chapters 2 and 
4. Comments and suggestions by Kathrin Kaiser , J6rg 
Zimmermann, Wolfgang Detel, and Harriet Zuckerman also 
helped me at various stages of the work. I owe apologies to 
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two persons whom I am not giving enough in return for their 
inspiration: instead of a case-study on Darwin <which I 
promised Howard Gruber), there is only a brief discussion of 
a case-study which remains essentially unwritten; and that I 
do not live up to Harald Wohlrapp"s expectations is plain by 
the lack of concreteness in thought and style which one 
finds so much in current philosophy of science and for which 
a more or less generous use of examples and illustrations is 
no substitute. Finally, I thank Janis Vieland for acting in 
critical distance as my philosophical as well as political 
conscience. If this work has any integrity at all, she 
shares all the credi t for that. 
R final note: The body of the text is strewn or littered 
with substantive footnotes - which, I hope, are 
insubstantial as far as the intelligibility of the main 
argument is concerned. They are generally tangential, 
anticipate upcoming results or remind the reader of previous 
phases in the argument, and they are often designed to 
clarify and avoid misunderstanding. Like all substantive 
footnotes, they have a jarring and complicating effect on 
the reading experience and one should perhaps consult them 
only as questions arise. 
vii 
According to Imre Lakatos~ any philosophical theory of 
science provides the hard core for a research programme in 
the history of science. Given that the goal of such a 
research programme is to account in methodological terms for 
what scientists consider good scientific gambits 1 ~ the 
competing theories can be compared and judged by their 
explanatory power. Similarly~ one can treat theories of 
science as candidates for or test cases of normative 
theories of rationality. In this respect~ they are primarily 
judged by their ability to withstand epistemological 
criticism. And thirdly~ theories of science serve a social 
goal insofar as they contribute towards a justification of 
the <relative> autonomy of the scientific enterprise. In 
this context~ they are best evaluated in terms of their 
expediency. These are three goals which philosophies of 
science can be expected to meet. There may well be more. It 
is readily apparent~ however~ that conflict between just 
these three goals could easily arise. For instance~ Popper's 
methodology of critical rationalism performs very badly as a 
historiographical research programme while it provides a 
compelling epistemological theory which also offers a clear 
demarcation between science and any other social enterprise. 
The reverse holds true for Lakatos's methodology of 
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scientific research programmes. While it presents a superior 
theory far the purpose of rational reconstruction in the 
history of science~ it represents a weak test case far any 
theory of rationality and does not contribute much to the 
problem of haw to distinguish science from non-scientific 
activities2 • Which theory is to be preferred? 
Far the resolution of such conflict and thus far the 
passibility of adjudicating once and far all the merits of 
competing theories of science~ a number of conditions would 
have to be satisfied. That is~ a meta-theory is needed which 
lists and ranks all of the relevant goals to be satisfied by 
a theory of science. But such a meta-theory can resolve the 
conflict between~ say~ Popper's and Lakatos"s methodologies 
only if it also provides operational cri~eria by which one 
can determine to what extent a given theory does indeed meet 
any such goal. None of these conditions are satisfied as of 
yet and it seems fair to say that no such meta-theary is in 
sight. None will be provided here. The remainder of this 
chapter exemplifies rather than elaborates or derives a 
tentative strategy concerning this meta-thearetical matter. 
That strategy really consists of hardly more than the 
resolve to be sensitive to the issue of the competing goals. 
In the context of a largely historiagraphic enterprise such 
as this~ that resolve amounts to this: the theory of science 
which will be developed here is to be kept open to future 
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Chapt•r 1 - On Rationa1 R•conwtruction 
qualifications arising from the fulfillment of the other two 
desiderata . More concretely~ while the theory of science 
that will best meet the goal of the historiographical 
research programme will not be very restrictive~ it has to 
allow for an ensueing trade-off between the merits of 
inclusiveness and the application of minimal restrictions 
that will distinguish it socially and epistemologically as a 
theory specifically of science. To this end~ the following 
argument aims at establishing a methodological framework 
that is compatible with any more restrictive theory of 
science . The issue of rationality in science will then be 
raised in a way that preserves this compat ibility : by 
representing various theories of science as providing 
optional methodological postures which scientists can choose 
to adopt under various circumstances. 
i . 
The problem of competing cognitive goals that a theory of 
science might be expected to meet has been circumvented for 
now. But Lakatos's contention that methodologies function as 
research programmes in the history of science poses rather 
complex problems of its own. The following discussion of 
these problems will lead to the formulation of some general 
constraints on philosophical theories of science in respect 
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to rational reconstructions of the history of science. While 
disagreeing with its particular conclusions, it attempts to 
take seriously and to preserve the intuitions underlying 
Lakatos"s article "History of Science and i ts Rational 
Rc-:constrLict ions": 
the methodology of historiogra phical research 
programmes implies a pluralistic system of 
authority, partly because the wisdom of the 
scientific jury and its case law has not been, and 
cannot be, fully articulated by the philosopher's 
statute law, and partly because the philosopher's 
statute law may occasionally be right when the 
scientists" judgment fails. I disagree, therefore, 
both with those philosophers of science who have 
taken it for granted that general scientific 
standards are immutable and reason can recognise 
them a priori, and with those who have thought 
that the light of reason illuminates only 
particular cases . The methodology of 
historiographical research programmes specifies 
ways both for the philosopher of science to learn 
from the historian of science and vice 
vt?rsa . 3 
The main argument of Lakatos's article consists of two 
parts . First, he shows that if one takes falsificationism as 
a meta-criterion for appraising historical research 
programmes, one will find any such programme 
falsified 4 • This is true, regardless of whether the 
historical research programme rests on a falsificationist, 
inductivist, or conventionalist methodology, or on Lakatos" s 
own methodology . This finding is well in tune with the 
passage just cited : the relationship between history and 
methodol ogy is simply such, that history 'falsifies' any 
methodology . But what if one uses Lakatos's methodology of 
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research programmes as a meta-criterion? In the second part 
of his argument, Lakatos shows that on this criterion 
history corroborates any theory of science - to varying 
degrees, however~. The one theory to be chosen is then 
the one that is best corroborated by the history of science. 
"In the light of better ration.:1l reconstrLICtions of science 
one can always reconstruct more of actual great science as 
r··ational. " 6 On these terms, Popper's falsificationism 
outperforms inductivism and Lakatos's methodology of 
research programmes fares still better. 
The two parts of Lakatos•s argument show that a 
methodology of research programmes is to be preferred over 
falsificationism as a historiographical meta-criterion, but 
no more: the failure of falsificationism as a 
historiographical meta-criterion does not entail anything 
about its performance as a methodology for (natural) 
science. On the contrary, that failure can be predicted by 
falsificationism itself by contrasting historiogrpahy and 
(natural) science in precisely this respect: historiography 
of science is not properly a scientific discipline, and in 
Popperian terms that assertion is equivalent to saying that 
falsifications do not play a decisive role in the 
historian•s work 7 • And concerning the second part of 
Lakatos•s argument as presented so far, a falsificationist 
is not at all compelled to accept that a rational 
5 
reconstruction is better if it rationally reconstructs more 
of science. In view of the normative character of 
falsifiability as a criterion~ falsificationists do not have 
to rationally reconstruct anything but what according to 
their methodology qualifies as rational scientific behavior 
in the first placee. 
Lakatos does not let the falsificationist get away quite 
so easily. The question is not just how much of science can 
be rationally reconstructed~ but rather how much of great 
science. By introducing the notion of "great science•, 
Lakatos appeals to the intuition that much of science is 
rational - an intuition that is entirely independent of any 
a priori criteria demarcating rational from irrational, 
scientific from non-scientific behavior. That is~ scientific 
rationality is a historical given. Therefore~ normative 
theories of scientific rationality should also be expected 
<though they cannot be forced) to conform to thi$ antecedent 
intuition. 
After all, one must admit (pace Popp~r) that 
until now all the "laws" proposed by the apriorist 
philosophers of science have turned out to be 
wrong in the verdicts of the best scientists. Up 
to the present day it has been the scientific 
standards~ as applied 'instinctively" by the 
scientific elite in particular cases~ which have 
constituted the main - although not the exclusive 
- yardstick of the philosopher's universal 
laws. 9 
Thus~ history provides an explanandum which is sufficiently 
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well described as 'great science·~ 'the verdicts of the best 
scientists', and 'the scientific standards as applied 
instinctively by the scientific elite'. Philosophers of 
science are not compelled to devise an explanans for this 
explanandum, but so much the better if they do 10 • The 
argument against apriorism is no more and no less than a 
persuasive appeal. Lakatos can conclude only on the basis of 
this appeal that the methodology of research programmes 
allows for the better rational reconstruction of history and 
that therefore it is to be pre~erred as a theory of science. 
At this point, however, a somewhat frivolous suggestion 
may be introduced. It comes from quite a different - namely 
the 'anti-theoretical' - camp 11 : once it is 
acknowledged that scientific rationality is independently 
given and, so to speak, embodied in 'great science" and the 
verdicts of the scientific elite, why bother to construct a 
methodology at all which posits what scientific rati~nality 
is? Thomas Kuhn e~emplifies the attitude underlying this 
suggestion. He makes this point in his response to Lakatos"s 
article on history and its rational reconstructions. Kuhn is 
startled that Lakatos imputes to him the heretical view that 
science is irrational, while he, Kuhn, finds Lakatos"s work 
so congenial to his own. Attempting to resolve this 
asymmetry, Kuhn identifies a sentiment shared by him and 
Lakatos: 
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Scientific behavior~ taken as a whole, is the 
best example we have of rationality. Our view of 
what is to be rational depends in significant 
ways, though of course not exclusively, on what we 
take to be the essential aspects of scientific 
behavior. That is not to say that any scientist 
behaves rationally at all times~ or even that many 
behave rationally very m~ch of the time. What it 
does assert is that, if history or any other 
empirical discipline leads us to believe that the 
development of science depends essentially on 
behavior that we have previously thought to be 
irrational ~ then we should conclude not that 
science is irrational but that our notion of 
rationality needs adjustment here and 
there. 12 
On the basis of this shared intuition concerning the 
rationality of science, l<uhn (as opposed to. Lakatos) does 
not feel compelled to deal with the iss~e of rationality. 
His historical theses simply cannot seriously call into 
question scientific rationality. They will at most challenge 
some untenable limitations imposed by philosophical notions 
of rationality. The scientist is not obliged to live up to a 
philosophical idea of rationality. On the contrary, it is 
the philosopher"s responsibility to keep up with the 
scientist"s behavior 1 ~. In an article about causality 
in social science, Alasdair Mac!ntyre elucidates the 
approach which - on this view - a philosopher of science 
would have to adopt: following Aristotle, action is to be 
considered clS the conclusion of a practical syllogism. 
The action ( .•• ]follows from the premises in 
just the way in which a proposition follows from 
the premises of a theoretical syllogism. We can 
bring out the force of the "follows from• in the 
last sentence by considering a close parallel with 
the theoretical syllogism. This is the case when a 
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speaker appears to accept the premises of a valid 
syllogism and yet to resist the conclusion. He 
allows that a warm front brings rain and also that 
a warm front is approaching~ but he refuses to say 
'So it's going to rain'. There are onl y two 
possibilities open in such -a case. Either the 
speaker thinks that an additional premise needs to 
be added to the argument~ or he does not realize 
to what he has committed himself. If the latter is 
ruled out~ then we can infer what kind of 
additional beliefs the speaker has~ e . g. that he 
thinks the warm front may well be intercepted in 
its course by some other meteorologically relevant 
factor. In precisely the same way~ where a speaker 
affirms premises and fails to act on them~ we can 
make inferences as to his additional beliefs. 
[ ••• J it has therefore emerged that to look for 
the antecedents of an action is not to search for 
an invariant causal connexion~ but to look for the 
available alternatives and to ask why the agent 
actualized one rather than another. ( . . • J The 
explanation of a choice between alternatives is a 
matter of making clear what the agent's criterion 
was and why he made use of this criterion rather 
than another and to explain why the use of this 
criterion appears rational to those who invoke it. 
In other words~ the internal relation of beliefs 
to action is such that in explaining the rules and 
conventions to which action in a given social 
order conform we cannot omit reference to the 
rationality or otherwise of those rules and 
conventions. Explaining actions is explaining 
choices; and explaining choices is exhibiting why 
certain criteria define rational behaviour for a 
given society. To this we must now add that the 
beginning of an explanation of why certain 
criteria are taken to be rational in some 
societies is that they are rational. 14 
Lakatos considers the anti-theoretical approach as the 
extreme antithesis to apriorism - and equally undesirable at 
that. Where apriorism was not informed at all by the history 
of science~ the anti-theoretical stance appears not at all 
informed by epistemology. Both run counter to his intuition 
that the two modes of inquiry into science should complement 
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each other 1 e. The following two objections to the 
anti-theoretical approach can be identified in Lakatos's 
argument: 
A> If methodologies stop providing normative 
standards of rationality~ the ability to 
systematically compare them relative to 
scientific practice will get lost. 
B) If not complemented by normative considerations. 
the anti-theoretical approach leads to an undue· 
generalization that implies counter-intuitive 
results. 
As each of these two objections is scrutinized quite 
extensively~ the contours of a conceptual framework for a 
theory of science provided by scientific practice will 
emerge as a significant modification of Lakatos's 
methodology of research programmes. 
In regard to objection A>~ the disagreement between 
Lakatos and Kuhn does not concern the role of rationality in 
the scientific enterprise~ but Kuhn's apparent renunciation 
of the desire to systematically investigate that 
role 1 •. Lakatos argues that comparing theories of 
science in terms of their historiographical power hinges on 
the comparability of th~ historiographical research 
programmes relative to a partially standardized explanandum. 
That is~ it hinges on the explanatory relation of normative 
theories of rationality to behavior that is <antecedently> 
identified as rational. Given that a historical event can be 
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described in many ways and that explanation and prediction 
pertain to events under particular descriptions, a 
comparison of predictive or explanatory success presupposes 
a certain degree of uniformity in the description of events 
across the various theoretical approaches. This view rests 
on two separate suppositions~ both requiring justification: 
(a) Uniformity in the description of the events can 
be established by taking the judgement of the 
scientific community on what is or was good and 
rational science for the purpose of determining, 
focussing, or standardizing the explanandum. 
(b) This uniformity is not only a nece r y , but 
also a sufficient cor : ion for ensuring 
meaningfL ~ omparability of various theories of 
science in terms of their explanatory power. 
While Lakatos has an <implicit) argument for (a), he 
apparently takes (b) for granted - thus jeopardizing his 
entire project. 
Objection A> to the anti-theoretical approach has to be 
scrutinized first in respect to supposition a). A suitable 
starting-point is Lakatos's characterization of his theory 
of science in terms of its explanatory power : 
Where Kuhn and Feyerabend see irrational change, 
I predict that the historian will be able to show 
that there has been rational change. The 
methodology of research programmes thus predicts 
<or , if you wish "postdicts"> novel historical 
facts~ unexpected in the light of extant <internal 
of external) historiographies 17 
Surely, for an historical fact to be novel it need not 
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designate an event which is discovered only now. A novel 
fact may well be an event under a new or different 
description. Take this event: 
Cl> 1800~ Priestley publishes The Doctrine of 
Phlogiston established and that of the 
Composition of Uater refuted. 
Let it also be known as context for Cl> that a far-reaching 
consensus concerning the rejection of phlogiston theory and 
the acceptance of Lavoisier's theory <maintaining inter alia 
the composition of water> emerged in the late 1780s. 
Further~ that Priestley~s book did nothing to erode this 
consensus 1 e. The event described in Cl> therefore 
signifies a particularly tenacious hold on a (for all 
practical purposes) obsolete theory. Accordingly~ it can be 
redescribed as 
Cla) 1800~ Priestley expresses his tenacious hold 
on phlogiston theory by publishing The 
Doctrine of Phlogiston established and that 
of the Composition of #ater refuted. 
Both~ Cl) and (la> state common historical ~nowledge. And 
yet~ the words chosen in (la> are arbitrary in view of a 
multitude of legitimate redescriptions of (1). Consider 
(lb) 1800~ Priestley expresses his tenacious hold 
on a (for all practical purposes) obsolete 
theory. 
(le) 1800~ Priestley does not acknowledge the 
falsification of phlogiston theory. 
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C1d> 1800~ Priestley reminds the scientific 
community of some unresolved questions 
concerning the conflict of the two 
chemistries. 
(le> 1800~ Priestley still believes that 
phlogiston theory is true. 
C1f) 1800~ on the subject of chemistry Priestley 
reasserts his francophobia. 
One can easily imagine explanatory theories for any one of 
these redescriptions of event ( 1). A historian working in 
Popper"s spirit will not consider Priestley"s tenacity as 
properly scientific and might provide an explanation of C1c> 
in terms of extrascientific factors 1 •. Another 
historian ( in the tradition~ say~ of Bernal> will take C1f) 
as a typical expression of the interplay between science and 
ideology~ and will explain <1> as the erection of a 
scientific superstructure on the base of national and class 
interests. The historian who turns to Cld> will view 
Priestley"s action as an ordinary contribution in the course 
of the communal search for certified public knowledge. Those 
three historians have entirely incompatible views on 
science~ but their theories cannot be compared in terms of 
whether they explain (1). For~ any historiographic research 
programme can explain Cl) under some redescription. And each 
redescription of (1) is a novel Cbut not unexpected or 
forbidden) fact relative to all those other research 
programmes which do not explain it . In reference to <1>, no 
research programme can thus be said to explain more than any 
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other. If the prediction of novel facts is to serve as a 
criterion for comparing rivaling theories of science~ some 
sort of ceteris paribus condition is needed in order to 
establish a standard of comparison. Lakatos himself provides 
one when he states his criteria for "falsification': 
For the sophisticated falsificationist a 
scientific theory T is falsified if and only if 
another theory r~ has been proposed with the 
following characteristics: <1> r~ has excess 
empirical content over r: that is~ it predicts 
no vel facts~ that is~ facts improbable in the 
light of~ or even forbidden by 7; C2> T' explains 
the previous success of T~ that is, all the 
unrefuted content of T is included <within the 
limits of observational error) in the content of 
r~; and (3) some of the e xcess content of r~ is 
corroborated. 20 
It is condition <2> which functions as a ceteris paribus 
condition here: everything else being equal~ the prediction 
of a <corroborated) novel fact by T' makes T' preferable 
over T. That is, the prediction of a novel fact helps decide 
between two theories if in principle both are answerable to 
the prediction of that particular fact under roughly the 
same description. <2> is designed to ensure that both T and 
r~ explain subsets S and s~ of more or less the same class 
of facts such that S is contained in 5' 21 • Lakatos's 
approach thus requires that the class of facts under 
consideration can be identified by some shared 
characteristic. For this purpose, he rather ingeniously 
suggests that the predicate •rational' should invariably be 
added to the explanandum. Accordingly one arrives at inter 
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alia 
Cl' ) 1800~ Priestley publishes The Doctrine of 
Phlogiston established and that of the 
Composition of Hater refuted: a rational act. 
(la') 1800~ Priestley expresses his rationally 
tenacious hold on phlogiston theory by 
publishing his The Doctrine of Phlogiston 
established and that of the Composition of 
Hater refuted. 
<le') 1800~ Priestley rationally does not 
acknowledge the falsification of phlogiston 
theory. 
Clf') 1800, on the subject of chemistry Priestley 
rationally reasserts his francophobia. 22 
There are still any number of redescriptions for Cl">~ all 
of them containing the predicate 'rational". But they have 
been standardized in such a way that the proposed 
explanation have to be of quite a different character than 
before. All of the explananda are now focussed towards that 
predicate and each now requires an appropriately focussed 
explanans. Using an example of Arthur Danto's~ one might say 
that adding 'rational' to the above listed redescriptions of 
(1) has very much the same effect as adding 'unpopular• to 
the explanandum "Louis XIV died": 
you cannot say that Louis XIV died unpopular 
because he ate poisoned lobster: for that only 
explains why he died. Indeed, it would ~ot even 
enter into an explanation of why he dies 
unpopular. 2~ 
The partial standardization of the explananda pays off right 
away. Any redescription of Cl") is a novel and unexpected~ 
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indeed forbidden~ fact for Popperians24 • The 
redescriptions of Cl"> therefore have less variability (and 
are less arbitrary> than the redescriptions of <1>. The 
redescriptions of (1') all belong to 'more or less the same 
class of facts"~ namely the class of rational actions. While 
Popperians had no trouble explaining (le>, all 
redescriptions of <1"> <and particularly (le")> present 
anomalous facts in the context of their inquiry2 e. As 
long as a non-apriorist stance is maintained (as argued 
above>~ a theory that explains <1"> is to be preferred over 
Popperian falsificationism. 
Lakatos defines as "internal history" those historical 
accounts which are based on this standardization . Any theory 
that yields more internal history of science is to be 
preferred over one that yields less. Whoever abandons <or 
omits) a normative characterization of "rationality' is out 
of this race from the start. The verdicts of the scientific 
community are needed to standardize the explananda~ and the 
normative aspects of a theory of science ar~ needed to 
generate explanations for these explananda . The class of 
explananda is now given and so are theories of science. And 
one can now determine whether a given theory does or does 
not generate explanations for the explanandum. 
So far~ Lakatos"s argument is compellingly clear. But now 
the question arises whether the ability to determine the 
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explanatory success of competing theories of science 
suffices for an evaluation of these theories so that 
Lakatos•s intuitions are fully satisfied. Lakatos seems to 
think that it does. But closer scrutiny of this s e cond 
supposition (see above, page 11> shows that it does not. 
To explain an event is to subsume it under a general 
law~6 • Consider the following three scenarios: 
<2a) From a conjunction of general laws from various 
domains <e.g. social psychology and decision 
theory> the following general law has been deduced: 
<x> <t> (If x is faced with a theory opposing 
x•s own theory, and if that opposing 
theory originated in a country which has 
undergone a political revolution that 
challenges the political structure of x's 
country; if x is considered a religious 
non-conformist in x's own country, and 
if x is involved in a priority dispute 
with a supporter of the opposing theory 
over an experimental discovery which 
served as crucial evidential support 
to that theory : then it is rati onal for 
x to tenaciously hold on and defend x•s 
own theory regardless of whether it 
has been rejected by the international 
scientific community> 
Together with the appropriate initial conditions, 
this general law could form an explanans for a 
redescription of (1'). It should be noted that its 
extension is logically unlimited, but that - as 
a matter of fact - the history of science provides 
only one instance where the conjunction of the 
initial condition actually obtains, i.e. the case 
of Priestley27 • 
(2b) A redescription of (1') is explained in two steps, 
i.e. only after a redescription of (1) has been 
explained: 
1st step : 
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L: <>:><t>< •.. => ••• 
C: (initial conditions] 
E: (a redescription of (l)J 
2nd step: 
L*: <>:> (t) <If >: is a scientist and >: performs an 
action in his or her role as a scientist~ 
then the action of x is rational > 
C*: Priestley is a scientist and in this role 
performed action E (a redescription of <1>, 
the explanandum of the 1st stepJ 
E*: Priestley rationally performed action E (a 
redescription of <l">J 
Here it is L* which really does the job -
regardless of what kind of general claim is 
made by L. 
(2c) Since none of the familiar philosophies of 
science predict <or postdict ) Prie~tley's 
action, a fictional methodology is assumed 
for this third scenario which in some aspects 
resembles Lakatos"s and Feyerabend"s proposals. 
Based on Lakatos"s conviction that any research 
programme may always stage a comeback~ it 
predicts that there always will be scientists 
who engage in the rational strategy of 
counterinduction aimed at the exploitation 
of just this possibility of a comeback2 e: 
(x) <Ey> <t> (If x is a theory or research programme 
and x has recently been replaced by 
another theory or research programme, 
then y will rationally uphold x and do 
so publicly) 
This general law will serve as the major premise in 
an explanans with a redescription of (1') as its 
e>: pl anandum. 
The explanatory power of the three theories of science which 
generated the preceding explanations, cannot be compared in 
respect to <1"). The best of the three will be the one that 
rationally reconstructs most episodes in the history of 
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science aside from (1') . If one wants to find it, the 
theories involved in the three scenarios ought first to be 
identified. The conjunction of general laws in C2a> probably 
presents only a .small SLibset of the methodological 
propositions generated by its underlying theory of science. 
Indeed, it may well be impossible to list the entire set of 
propositions which constitutes that methodology. There a re 
no such problems with (2b). L* is a blanket-law and captures 
in a rather elementary way the 'anti - theoretical" posture 
which Lakatos ascribes to Kuhn: L* is all the methodology 
there is2~. Only scenario C2c) may have been generated 
by what traditionally and intuitively is consi dered a proper 
theory of science. As each of these theories succeeds in 
designating this bit of history as internal history of 
science, how do they fare in the overall rational 
reconstruction of the history of science? As it s tands, no 
matter how strong the theories underlying C2a> and <2c) are, 
obviously they can at best achieve what C2b> or an 
equivalently non-committal theory achieves: the weakest, 
nearly vacuous and irrefutable methodology makes the most 
general claim and therefore has the greatest explanatory 
power. It explains any action as rational which is 
designated ~s a scientific action. 
The only way of avoiding this result is to separate 
acceptable from unacceptable explanatory schemes, e.g. to 
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stance finally comes into play (see above, page 10). The 
scope of that presumption will have to be clarified, and a 
further constraint on theories of science in respect to 
rational reconstructions will be introduced. 
The rejection of apriorism was based on the intuition that 
rationality is embodied in (great) science and therefore to 
be accounted for in historiographic terms . This argument was 
subsequently generalized so as to state: since science is 
rational, there is no need to theorize about the conditions 
under which science is a rational enterprise. L* in (2b) was 
taken to be a paradigmatic statement of the anti-theoretical 
stance. It maintained that any action performed by 
scientists in their roles as scientists is a rational 
action. Now, Lakatos•s second objection to the 
anti-theoretical generalization consists in pointing out 
that it leads to counter-intuitive results: L* is simply 
false . Indeed, both Kuhn and Macintyre do acknowledge that a 
vast generalization like L* cannot be sustained . Conce rning 
Priestley, Thomas Kuhn writes: 
Though the historian can always find men -
Priestley, for instance - who were unreasonable to 
.resist for as long as they did, he will not find a 
point at which resistance becomes illogical or 
un s cien tific. At most he may wish to say that the 
man who continues to resist after the whole 
profession has been converted has ipso facto 
ceased to be a scientist.~ 1 
First of all, this passage confirms what was said before: 
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(philosophical) theo~ies of science in ~espect to ~ational 
~econst~uctions of the histo~y of science. Following upon 
the disdain fo~ ap~iorism~ a histo~io~~aphical app~oach has 
to be developed which - fo~ the sake of explanato~y powe~ 
is as much as possible like the one utilized in scena~io 
(2b). Howeve~~ this inclina~ion towa~ds the anti-theo~etical 
app~oach should lead to the const~uction of a conceptual 
framework fo~ a methodology that is subsequently p~ovided by 
scientific p~actice itself. As a histo~iog~aphical ~esea~ch 
p~og~amme its p~omise o~ inte~est would lie not so much in 
its b~oad and nea~-t~ivial explanato~y powe~. Afte~ all~ 
that explanato~y powe~ would seem to follow simply f~om the 
rest~aint f~om p~oviding a p~ope~ methodology that would 
include a normative conception of ·t~uth', 'objectivity•, 
and ·~ationality• in science. Within that conceptual 
f~amewo~k~ the histo~y of science should be ~ep~esentable as 
a succession of decisions o~ choices on (limited) options, 
whe~e the absence of such p~ope~ methodology functions as a 
p~esumption of ~ationality in science~ and consequently as a 
heu~istic commitment to the elucidation of that p~esumed 
rationality in scientific decision-making on a case by case 
basis. Thus~ the p~omise o~ inte~est of the p~esent app~oach 
would lie in this step by step const~ual of cu~~ent 
methodologies at va~ious stages in the histo~y of science. 
Howeve~~ as that p~esumption of rationality ~eaches its 
li mit~ Lakatos's second objection to the anti-theo~etical 
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devise rules according to which somehow scenario C2b) 
somehow does not count as a legitimate contender. A 
falsifiability-requirement would be one such rule. But 
specifying the rules for distinguishing acceptable from 
unacceptable explanatory schemes is tantamount to 
formulating a <methodological) theory of science: after all~ 
a methodology provides criteria for evaluating explanations 
and therewith guides the search for acceptable explanations. 
The strategy for avoiding the unwelcome result thus leads 
straight into a (vicious) circle: one cannot very well 
presuppose a theory of science as one selects a criterion 
for the selection of a theory of science. 
So~ once the unity of the subject matter has been 
established by partially standardizing the explanandum~ and 
once it is assured that the explanatory schemes which are to 
be compared actually pertain to the same sort of thing~ one 
is faced with all the problems that are traditionally 
associated with the notion of 'explanation•. To be sure, 
these problems can be approached in an apriorist fashion by 
a normative philosophy of science which does not aspire to 
generate a most successful historiographic research 
programme for rational reconstruction in the history of 
science. But this is precisely how the problem arose in the 
first place: from not wanting to be apriorist30 • 
This leads to the adoption of a first constraint on 
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eithe~ one chooses an ap~io~ist app~oach and rules that 
P~iestley was not a scientist anymo~e, o~ one assumes a 
anti-theo~etical point of view, adding ~ . vbe an 
inconsequential proviso :-~has a gene~al ack~owledgment 
that o i - ~u~se not everything scientists do is ~eally 
rational . Such inconsequential provisos we~e al~eady 
contained in the more general fo~mulations of the 
anti-theoretical app~oach that were cited above: 
That is not to say that any scientist behaves 
rationally at all times, or even that many behave 
~ationally very much of the time. 32 
Kuhn states the exception but does not act on it, i.e. does 
not explore this distinction. Similarly, Maclntyre simply 
rules out one of two possible interpretations: 
Either the speake~ thinks that an additional 
premise needs to be added to the a~gument, or he 
does not realize to what he has committed himself. 
If the latter is ruled out, then we can infer what 
kind of additional beliefs the speaker has 
[ ••• ]33 
Acco~ding to Kuhn there a~e, and according to Mac!ntyre 
there may be instances which a~e not justiflably designated 
as ~ational by a general law of type of L*. In order to 
construe these as falsificato~y instances, one has to assume 
that not all that is designated as 'scientific activity' is 
~ational 34 • Howeve~, since the methodology of research 
programmes was adopted as the meta-c~iterion for the 
histo~iography of science, the existence of such 
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falsifications would not warrant the rejection of L* in 
absence of a better rival. Thus still within the framework 
o~ L*~ Kuhn's and Maclntyre•s provisos raise the following 
question: Is there a way of distinguishing between good and 
bad scientific gambits without reverting to apriorism? 
i i . 
There is a fairly simple and straighforward answer to this 
question. It leads to the adoption of a principle of 
investigation which shall guide the construction of a theory 
of science that supersedes Lakatos's historiographic 
methodology. 
Is there a way of distinguishing between good and bad 
scientific gambits without reverting to apriorism? Yes~ 
scientists do it all the time. However~ as they do so, their 
concern is not the rationaliy of scientists but the 
expediency of certain choices towards the achievement of 
certain goals . Their judgements on what is good for science 
' 
and scientific progress, serve in effect to differentiate 
good from bad scientific gambits in such a way that the 
issue of rationality does not even come into play. 
Accordingly, philosophers of science should limit themselves 
to pluralistically identifying the processes involved in 
making these judgements in the course of scientific 
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practice. By identifying rather than postulating 
methodological practices~ they will be able to explore the 
middle ground between apriorism and the anti-theoretical 
approach from the scientist's point of view. 
It will be remembered that Lakatos himself aimed for that 
middle ground between apriorism and the anti-theoretical 
approach. He expressed that by saying that the history and 
philosophy of science should mutually inform each other. So 
far~ however~ the critical discussion of Lakatos's 
intuitions has led to the point where one can seee that 
obviously the history of science can inform philosophy . But 
since the weakest philosophical theory will have most 
explanatory power~ it remains quite unclear how philosophy 
is to inform science or the historiography of science. Some 
of the middle ground can be regained by outlining a 
programme for approaching the issue of scientific 
rationality without formulating a normative methodology, 
while preserving one's intuitions concerning 'rationality' 
as well as the inclusiveness of the anti-theoretical 
position. On the assumption that rationality is not at all 
different in science that in any other context of 
decision-making, the forthcoming approach shall therefore be 
subsumed under a general theory of decision-making. For 
historiographic purposes, this amounts to an acceptance of 
the view that decisions reveal (rational) preference~ i.e. 
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that from the outcome of a decision one can conjecturally 
reconstruct it as rational relative to appropriate 
information, options, and goals. The presumption of 
rationality thus functions as a heuristic. It is used to 
understand the decision-making processes of scientists 
themselves and leads to the formulation of hypotheses as to 
what information, and which options and goals must have been 
available in any given case~e. 
Framing the issue of rationality within general 
decision-theory is not to deny that the scientific 
enterprise is uniquely distinguishable from any other sort 
of social enterprise. On the contrary, specifically 
"scientific" features can be discovered in the situation in 
which scientific decisions have to be made. These features 
may consist of constraints on the formulation of the 
alternative options on which scientists can deliberate, on 
the (professed or real) -goals which the choice among the 
options has to be related to, and on the arguments or rules 
which can be used to relate the chosen alternative to that 
goal. And it is precisely here where traditional 
methodologies and other normative theories of scientific 
conduct enter into the process of scientific negotiation: 
for instance, they may be used to characterize the options 
which confront scientists in their decision-making, 
especially insofar as those options pertain to "explanation" 
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and "prediction•. Also~ if specifically scientific 
decision-making is so constrained that scientists may 
publicly assume only acceptable or even certified36 
methodological postures in order to argue for their choice~ 
then traditional methodologies enter into the theory of 
science as suppliers for the argumentation repertoires of 
scientists. 
The second constraint on (philosophical) theories of 
science in respect to rational reconstructions in the 
history of science has thus emerged: philosophy should 
inform the historiography of science by framing the problem 
of rationality within general decision- theory. Further~ such 
philosophical problem-areas as •explanation" and 
"prediction• should be framed as scientific issues which are 
negotiable by scientists themselves. That is~ a theory of 
alternatives in science is to be culled from philosophical 
reflections on scientific method. This second constraint 
supplements the first one insofar as it helps to 
taxonomically differentiate processes in the history of 
science which are left completely undifferentiated by the 
adoption merely of blanket-law L*. The adoption of these two 
constraints designates a problem-shift in the philosophy of 
science: instead of deliberating on problems concerning the 
rationality of science or scientists, philosophers are now 
asked to structure the problems upon which scientists 
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delibeFate themselves. 
The appFoach pFoposed here is clearly distinct from one 
that formulates a methodological theory of science. For~ it 
maintains only that general decision theory~ a theory of 
alternatives in science~ and the set of (at any given time) 
acceptable methodological postures~ provide together a 
repeFtoire that is sufficient for the business of rational 
reconstruction~7 • The shift of focus towards 
constrained options and methodological postures resulted 
from the realizati~n that~ left alone~ the presumption of 
rationality cannot be usefully employed: it either 
tFivializes an inquiry into science since it will 
demonstrate that just about any action is rational~ or it 
has to be fortified by apFioristic considerations which are 
undesirable for the historiographic reasons that were 
discussed above. This is how the obseFvation that scientists 
themselves show no concern with the issue of rationality but 
a great concern with what is <properly) scientific~ provides 
a master-clue foF this inquiry. And therefore ~ as scientific 
activity is characterized by certain constraints on options 
and methodological postures, the presumption of rationality 
has to be extended to include the presumption of scientific 
conduct. By the same token~ the notion of 'rational 
reconstruction' is narrowed so that it includes only 
rational reconstruction with reference to acceptable 
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methodological postures. That is~ the rationality of 
scientists as indivdual agents cannot be jeopardized by a 
theory ·of science. However~ historical inquiry has to probe 
the extent to which scientists can defend their positions 
within the constraints of scientific argumentation. A 
modified version of L* should therefore rest on this 
presumption of rationality and scientific conduct. Though 
still very weak~ this version of L* is not trivially 
satisfied anymore and rational reconstruction can fail on 
occasion. However~ how easily it can fail depends on the 
constraints on methodological postures which the scientific 
community has imposed on itself at any given time. 
Lakatos•s methodology of scientific research programmes 
has now been challenged by a sketch for a pluralistic theory 
of science. That sketch preserves Lakatos•s basic 
intuitions: 
the history of science should inform the philosophy of 
science~ and vice versa~ 
the notion of •rationality• provides the link between 
history and philosophy of science since it gives rise 
to the programme of •rational reconstruction• in the 
history of science~ 
a philosophical theory of science is more progressive 
<in respect to extant theories of science) if it 
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enables the historian of science to reconstruct more of 
the history of science as rational. 
But the pursuit of these intuitions has led to more radical 
conclusions than those presented by Lakatos himself 
conclusions which were subsequently relativized to standards 
of acceptability as embodied in scientifc practice itself. 
The result can be summarized in two ways. Firstly~ by 
reconsidering Lakatos's definition of "internal history• as 
•rational history in the light of some normative theory of 
rationality'. Since it was shown that just about any 
decision is rational in light of an appropriately weak 
normative theory of rationality~ this definition has to be 
amended in accordance with the second constraint on theories 
of science: 'internal history' is that history which is 
shown to be rational in reference to admissable scientific 
arguments. And secondly~ this result can be summarized by 
stating a deliberately fuzzy principle of investigation <PI) 
as a constraint on theories of science in respect to 
rational reconstructions: 
<PI> A theory of science has to provide a minimally 
restrictive normative theory of rationality <e.g. 
general decision-theory presuming rationality 
along the lines of L*>, and minimal restrictions 
on the system of alternative options, acceptable 
arguments~ and goals. These minimal restrictions 
are thought to be specified and supplemented in 
all kinds of ways in the course of scientific 
negotiation. 
- 30 -
A theory of science in accordance with <PI> deserves the 
label 'pluralistic' because of the words 'in all kinds of 
ways •. Though it sounds exceedingly fuzzy~ this phrase is a 
far cry from the infamous •anything goes'~ insofar as~ in 
principle~ it can be rendered far more precise for any 
particular episode in the history of science~ and since in 
any such episode it may then present only an extremely 
limited range of admissable arguments to the working 
scientist. In this~ the pluralism envisioned here differs 
from other pluralistic theories of science3 e. It does 
not first establish a pluralism of methods as a preferred 
strategy for the working scientist~ and thus only a fortiori 
for the scientist of science: it does not matter on this 
account whether or not it so happens that working scientists 
dogmatically adhere to one set of methodological 
rules3 •. Scientists of science should always anticipate 
that there is a plurality of methods which is manifest in 
the scope of scientifically admissable and even 
philosophically certified arguments at any given time~ and 
which is now available to them for the purposes of rational 
reconstruction. Of course~ if scientists of science discover 
regularities in the process of scientific negotiation which 
obtain at all times and which go beyond what is asserted by 
a theory of science that satisfies principle CPI>, the 
theory of science can be strengthened and improved on the 
basis of empirical results. In this respect, principle <PI) 
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inaugurates self-correcting empirical research-programmes in 
the historiography of science40 • 
Aside from general decision theory~ a theory of 
alternatives in science and an investigation into the scope 
and use of argumentation repertoires will have to embellish 
principle <PI) for a full-fledged theory of science to 
emerge. But nothing has been said and little need be said 
about the notion of scientists• •goals': there are no 
antecedent reasons to assume that the adoption of certain 
goals further scientific progress while others impede it. 
Regardless of whether scientists wish to find truth for its 
own sake~ to enhance the glory of God~ to establish 
"thoroughgoing materialism·~ to undermine the present social 
order~ or to prove the inferiority of women to men - as long 
as they produce scientifically acceptable arguments that 
speak to the matter of a currently pressing alternative in 
science~ the ultimate goals which are to be furthered by 
these arguments need not be taken into consideration41 • 
This is both to admit the tremendous strategic influence of 
external forces on the development of science and to 
discount their importance as one deliberately narrows the 
focus on the forms of conduct which socially and 
epistemologically differentiate the scientific enterprise 
from decision-making in other spheres of life42 • 
i i i . 
The relation of internal to external forces on the 
development of science provides a suitable testing-ground on 
which the proposal that was developed here can be shown to 
constitute a progressive problem-shift vis-a-vis Lakatos"s 
methodology of scientific research programmes. It will be 
recalled that Lakatos defines "internal history" as 
•rational history in light of some normative methodology"~ 
and that this crucial intuitive link between theories of 
science and historiography was amended only slightly so as 
to read "rational history in light of some <weak) normative 
methodology in reference exclusively to scientifically 
acceptable arguments". The task of the philosophy of science 
consists in showing more of the history of science as 
internal history. Thomas Kuhn has pointed out that Lakatos"s 
conception of "internal history' deviates somewhat from that 
of the historian. 
In standard usage among historians~ internal 
history is the sort that focuses primarily or 
exclusively on the professional activities of the 
members of a particular scientific community: What 
theories do they hold? What experiments do they 
perform? How do the two interact to produce 
novelty? External history~ on the other hand~ 
considers the relations between such scientific 
communities and the larger culture. [ ••• J 
Obviously there is much overlap between normal 
usage and Lakatos•. E ••• J Lakatos' internal 
history is far nar~ower than that of the 
' 
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historian. It excludes~ for example~ all 
consideration of personal ideosyncrasy~ whatever 
its role may have been in the choice of a theory~ 
the creative act which produced it~ or the form of 
the product which resulted. 4~ 
The tension between Lakatos's narrower and the historian's 
wider conceptions may be a temporary one. If philosophy of 
science is to show more of science as internal~ then some 
day a sufficiently advanced philosophical theory of science 
may be able to show as rational just what historians already 
call 'internal' science. On this view~ the borders of 
"internal' vs. "external" are fluid. After all, Lakatos 
directly links the notion of "internal science' to the 
relative progressiveness of a given philosbphical theory of 
science: 
When a betier rationality theory is produced, 
internal history may expand and reclaim ground 
from external history. 44 
For Lakatos and his methodology of scientific research 
programmes~ however, the tension still e>:ists and the 
historian's usage is still wider than his - as he himself 
points out in his discussion of priority disputes in 
science. 
According to Merton ''scientific knowledge is not 
the richer or the poorer for having credit given 
where credit is due: it is the social institution 
of science and individual men of science that 
would suffer from repeated failures to allocate 
credit justly''. But Merton overdoes his point: in 
important cases (like in some of Galileo's 
priority fights) there was more at stake than 
institutional interests: the problem was whether 
the Copernican research programme was progressive 
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' 
or- not. (Of COLir-se~ not all pr-ior-ity disputes have 
scientific r-elevance. For- instance~ the pr-ior-ity 
dispute between Adams and Lever-r-ier- about who was 
fir-st to discover- Neptune had no su~h r-elevance: 
whoever- discover-ed it~ the discover-y str-engthened 
the same <Newtonian) pr-ogr-amme. In such cases 
Mer-ton's exter-nal explanation may well be 
tr-ue .) 4~ 
Here Lakatos identifies an episode in the histor-y of science 
which cannot be r-ationally r-econstr-ucted with his 
methodology of scientific r-esear-ch pr-ogr-ammes. And 
accor-dingly~ he consider-s Mer-ton's explanation exter-nal. 
However-~ one could well ar-gue that that e>:p .;. ·~ ation "focuses 
pr-imar-ily or- e>:clusively o ··· '·he pr-ofessional activities of 
the memb~ .. - of a par-ticular- scientific community"~ and that 
it should thus be consider-ed an inter-nal explanation in 
accor-dance with the histor-ian's common usage. After- all~ 
even wher-e pr-ior-ity disputes become dysfunctional ends in 
themselves which do nothing to advance the gr-owth of 
knowledge or- to suppor-t the r-ewar-d system in science~ they 
ar-e still altogether- inter-nal to the fabr-ic and social 
str-uctur-e of science: a dysfunctional pr-ior-ity dispute is a 
self-r-egulating device of the scientific community gone mad. 
Rober-t Mer-ton expr-esses this point: 
It has sometimes been said that the emphasis 
upon r-ecognition of pr-ior-ity has the function of 
motivating scientists to make discover-ies. [ ••• J 
Fr-om this~ it would seem that the institutional 
emphasis is maintained with an eye to its 
functional utility. [ ••• J Once it betomes 
established~ for-ces of r-ivalr-ous inter-action lead 
it to get out of hand. [ .•• J Rationalized as a 
means of pr-oviding incentives for- or-iginal wor-k 
and as expr-essing esteem for- those who have done 
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much to advance science~ it becomes transformed 
into an end-in-itself. It becomes stepped up to a 
dysfunctional extreme far beyond the limit of 
utility. 46 
But regardless of whether pre-theoretically one wishes to 
consider the priority dispute between Adam and Leverrier as 
internal or external, the theory proposed here is able to 
reconstruct it rationally as internal history while Lakatos 
cannot. Indeed~ any involvement in a priority dispute by a 
scientist can be shown to be rational and scientific~ 
especially when the scientist invokes arguments which 
implicitly or explicitly appeal to, say~ the institutional 
importance within the social structure of science that 
credit be given where credit is due. By counting appeals to 
the professional norms of the scientific community as an 
acceptable methodological posture~ this proposal gives a 
more progressive theoretical account of the 
internal-external relation than does Lakatos's methodology. 
And since~ furthermore, the set of acceptable methodological 
postures is determined by scientific practice rather than by 
methodological verdicts, there is no antecedent limit to how 
much ground internal history is y~t to reclaim from external 
history. 
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Ch•ptwr 1 - On Rat1cna1 Rwccnwtructicn 
i V. 
The proposal sketched out here can now be evaluated in 
respect to the various goals which a philosophical theory of 
science can be expected .to meet. Firstly~ the conceptual 
framework for a methodoloy as provided by general decision 
theory, a theory of alternatives in science, and a repertoir 
of methodological postures constitutes at best a weak and 
minimally restrictive normative theory of rationality. Since 
on the view e>:poLtnded here~ scientific decision-making is 
not different in kind from any other form of 
decision-making, nothing about rationality is to be learned 
I 
by looking at the scientific community in particular47 • 
Secondly, the goal of providing a strong historiographical 
research programme can be met by the proposed approach. This 
cannot be surprising, though, since this is what the 
proposal is designed to provide4 e. And lastly, as a 
social theory serving the justification of the <relative) 
autonomy of science as an institution, the proposal does not 
by itself lead to policy statements~ such as whethe~ or not 
it is desirable to preserve that institution as it now 
exists. It does suggest, however, to what extent 
contemporary science is characteristically defined by 
internal processes feeding on the social discreteness not of 
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the goals of scientists~ but of the other elements going 
into scientific decision-making. The very notion of a 
collection of methodological postures that scientists are 
free to assume presupposes a social institution which 
supports this kind of autonomy of choice. The conditions 
under which the autonomous institutional structure is 
maintained are seen as part of what scientists are concerned 
with in their roles as professionals <e . g. in their rational 
decisions to adopt or reject a proposed theory)~ which 
further ties social theory of science to the methodological 
proposal made here. 
This proposal in relation to other philosophies of science 
has been labeled above as "pluralistic". Weak and minimally 
restrictive as it may be~ the conceptual framework~ together 
with next chapter's theory of alternatives in science, 
captures however little consensus there is among 
phi.losophers of science. Equipped with principle <PI) one 
can proceed from this smallest common denominator by 
recognizing the validity of various philosophies of science 
as bonified strategies towards the rational resolution of 
scientific problems. As strategies or elements of the 
overall argumentation repertoire~ however~ each of them is 
just one among many. 
As far as there is any "deep" philosophical conviction 
involved in this project~ it could finally be stated like 
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this: rationality consists in the ability to correctly 
adduce reasons to one"s decisions to act or not to act~ to 
believe or not to believe in certain ways. From the point of 
view of a theory of rationality, the formal correctness is 
all that matters (consistency and coherence>. In the spirit 
of the Enlightenment, "rationality• is not perceived as an 
issue of philosophical interest but rather as a fundamental 
if not unalienable property of the human mind, of human 
thought. Whether the reasons themselves are good or bad, 
appropriate or inappropriate is not a question of 
rationality, it can only be settled within a particular 
context of inquiry. Simplifying greatly, one might say that 
a metaphysical approach to science establishes how 
scientific reasoning arrives at the truth. Methodological 
orientations are divorced from this metaphysical question 
and try to specify good principles of reasoning in 
scientific inquiry. This proposal finally suggests Cand it 
is not the first to do so4 •) that one should go yet one 
step further~ and leave the reasoning to the scientists, in 
order to focus only on whatever may constrain it and how 
these constraints are made to serve the growth of objective 
knowledgeeo. 
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1 The label 'theory of science" is used to designate 
any philosophical~ sociological~ or historical theory of 
science. 'Methodology·~ on the other hand~ designates a 
more or less elaborate system of rules Cor certifiably 
admissable arguments> which is generated by a 
(philosophical> theory of science. 
2 An argument for these assessments of Popper's and 
Lakatos's work will emerge in the course of this chapter. 
3 Lakatos [1978]~ p. 137. 
4 Lakatos [1978]~ pp. 123-131. 
e Lakatos [1978J, pp. 131-136. 
b Lakatos [1978], p. 132. 
7 The contrast between science and the presumably 
non-scientific discipline 'history of science' figures 
prominently in the work of Popper's student~ the 
historian of science Joseph Agassi. Unfortunately~ his 
formulations on the subject are somewhat obscure. It 
seems that he ascribes the impossibility of a scientific 
history of science to a structural feature of historical 
subject matter itself, i . e. to the feature that 
historical agents have a consciousness which differs (and 
has to differ> from that of the historian and which 
cannot be treated by the historian as causally effective: 
the testing ground should, of course, be 
history: a reformer cannot, but an observer 
should apply his theory to history . It turns 
out that things are not so simple, and for the 
following, rather obvious reason. The history 
of science is largely the history of what we 
value in science~ and so the reformer can and 
indeed should rewrite history. [ ••• J And so we 
need to know the difference between the 
discoverer•s reconstruction and the 
legislator's reconstruction - which leaves us 
exactly where we were before. How can the 
reformer apply his ideas~ say, to Newton, if 
Newton knew nothing about these ideas? C • •• J 
When we study physics we C ••• J must fix today•s 
physics - at least long enough to give it a 
good look, to teach it to our young rascals, 
etc. But we need not banish history. C ••• J But 
when we treat the living actions of scientific 
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inquiry we hypostatize not only today's method, 
which is inevitable, but also yesterday's, 
which is unnecessary. Newton, we say, preached 
inductivism but practiced my methodology. ( •. . J 
Clearly, both Bacon and Descartes said, a 
scientist must be aware of his method. Must. 
Duhem and Popper say, he need not be, and is, 
in fact, seldom aware of what he is doing. 
Query: according to Duhem and Popper, is his 
awareness a factor significant to his research 
in any way whatsoever? Suppose we say, no. 
Then, first and foremost, all arguments from 
the way people happen to have looked at science 
become strictly external. CAgassi (1981J, pp. 
227 and 235ff.) 
Having thus shown the impossibility in principle of 
(purely) internal history of science (history of science 
rationally reconstructed by e.g. Popperian means>, he 
salvages the historian's work: by not making a claim to 
scientific knowledge (in a Popperian sense), historians 
cannot be held accountable to such a claim: 
you have a theory about what is internal 
history and how it works; you apply the theory; 
it applies with difficulty; you introduce 
external factors to overcome the difficulty. 
Query: is this move quite kosher? or should 
your theory be rejected? The answer hinges on 
the question, is your theory introduced as 
purely internalist? The answer to this hinges 
on, can there ever be a purely internalist 
theory? If we say, there cannot be a purely 
internalist history, then your rescue operation 
looks more kosher than if we say, there can be 
a purely internalist history. <Agassi C1981J, 
p. 64) 
To be sure, Agassi's problem does not arise in the 
Lakatosian framework. In contrast td Agassi who rescinds 
the claim that there can be <purely> internal history, 
Lakatos modifies the notion that the difficulties of 
applying a theory to history should therefore lead to its 
rejection even if no better theory (edging closer to 
purely internal history) has been proposed. The issue 
whether there can be p~rely internal history stems from a 
Popperian juxtaposition of theory (internal) and 
falsificatory instances <external). Lakatos's 
'sophisticated falsificationism" requires only that a 
better theory of science produces more internal history 
in respect to extant theories. Thus, as opposed to 
Lakatos and on the basis of a largely Popperian 
commitment, Agassi denies the possibility of a science of 
science which is self-exemplifying in respect to its 
conception of 'scientific method'. --Popper himself has 
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rather more principled reasons for not taking recourse to 
the history of science in the attempt at gaining an 
understanding of science: 
how can the regress to these often spurious 
sciences help us in this particular 
difficulty? Is it not sociolbgical <or 
psychological, or historical> science to which 
you want to appeal in order to decide what 
amounts to the question 'What is science?' 
<Popper E1972J, p . 58> 
Thus, while Lakatos thinks it desirable that the science 
of science should be self-exemplifying as far as its 
conception of "science' is concerned, Popper shies away 
from the specter of an infinite regress. 
e There is nothing viciously circular about this, 
considering that this theory was not originally designed 
to meet the goal which Lakatos ascribes to all theories 
of science, i.e. the goal of providing an explanatory 
theory for the history of science. On the contrary , 
Popper's is a paradigm example of a normative theory of 
rationality in the guise of a theory of science . 
9 Lakatos E1978J , pp. 136f. 
The use of "explanans" and •explanandum• underlines 
the continuity between science and Lakatos"s conception 
of the science of science <compare above, note 7> : 
ideally, the science of science should explain scientific 
activity (in history and in the presence) 
methodologically in very much the same way as natural 
scientists explain natural phenomena . -- As Mittelstrass 
[1974] points out, however, the historian's work cannot 
be completely reduced to this conception of a science of 
science : 
Causal explanati o n s of past events are not 
( •• • ]examples of historical comprehension 
<Kausale Erklirunge n fUr zurUckliegende 
Entwicklungen sind E • •. J keine Beispiele fUr 
historisches Begreifen. Cp . 122> 
Whatever is meant here by 'historical comprehension•, 
adopting this view is not tantamount to denying that 
historical comprehension consists largely of the ability 
to adduce (causal) explanations. 
11 Lakatos [1978] , pp . 136f . -- With the juxtaposition 
12 
of •apriorism• with the 'anti-theoretical' stance, 
Lakatos•s a bit heavy-handed, if not derogatory labels 
are reluctantly adopte d here . 
Kuhn C1971J, p. 144 . 
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Kuhn stated this position nowhere quite as clearly 
as in the passage which was quoted just now. However. 
clear evidence for his attitude can also be found in.Kuhn 
C1972J, p. 264 where he evaluates an argument by 
Feyerabend and himself on the role of reason in science: 
to describe the argument as a defence of 
irrationality in science seems to me not only 
absurd but vaguely obscene. I would describe it 
C ... J as an attempt to show that existing 
theories of rationality are not quite right and 
that we must readjust or change them to explain 
why science works as it does. To suppose [ •.• J 
that we possess citeria of rationality which 
are independent of or understanding of the 
essentials of the scientific process is to open 
the door to cloud-cuckoo land. 
Insisting that scientists are rational while hesitating 
to codify this aspect of scientific behavior results in 
severing 'truth' or 'proof• as intra-theoretical notions 
from inter-theoretical criteria employed in the 
<rational> discourse on 'better theories•. Compare p. 266 
of the same article, and p. 263: 
My argument [ •.• J emphasizes that, unlike 
most disciplines, the responsibility for 
applying shared scientific values~ must be left 
to the specialists' group. It may not even be 
extended to all scientists, much less to all 
educated laymen, much less to the mob. 
For a more sophisticated statement of this programme see 
also Kuhn E1983J. 
Maclntyre (1962J, pp. 53 and 61. 
The conflict between the anti-theoretical and the 
apriorist attitudes attests to the presence of a problem 
in the philosophy of science which is common to all 
attempts at learning from something: the problem of 
balancing one's responsiveness to historical contingency 
with one's preconception that there is something 
non-contingent about the structure of science which makes 
it a worthwhile subject of investigation. 
Kuhn's renunciation does not involve the denial that 
there are worthwhile problems associated with the 
investigation of the role of reason in science. On the 
contrary, he puts considerable effort into arguing that 
he does not wish to trivialize or render redundant issues 
concerning truth and justification. Yet he insists that 
there are modes of theorizing about science <such as the 
one employed by himself) which are indifferent to any 
outcome of research into those deep issues. Compare e.g. 




the problem of induction. ( .•. )viewed from 
the perspective developed h~re, acknowledges 
that we have no rational alternative to 
learning from experience, and asks why that 
should be the case. It asks, that is, not for a 
justification of learning from experience, but 
for an explanation of the viability of the 
whole language game that involves "induction" 
and underpins the form of life we live. To that 
question I attempt no answer, but I would like 
one. 
Kuhn segregates two levels of analysis. The level of 
analysis on which he himself is at home avoids this issue 
of justification. Leaving it at that would amount Cin the 
words of Mittelstrass (1974J, p. 123) 
to discharging the analytical conception of 
science from the obligation to comprehend the 
history of the sciences in a Justificatory 
manner as the history of a process of mediation 
between theory and praxis <Entlastung eines 
analytischen Missenschaftsverst~ndnisses von 
dem Erfordernis~ die Geschichte der 
Missenschaften in begrUdnungsorientierter 
Neise als die Geschichte einer Vermittlung von 
Theorie und Praxis zu begreifen> 
But surely, from a given research perspective it is quite 
sufficient to do what Kuhn did, namely to acknowledge 
that there is a further justificatory level of analysis 
which one may not be equipped to address quite yet. 
Lakatos (1978J, p. 133. - Lakatos considers 
"prediction" as roughly equivalent with "stating what is 
Cor was> to be expected". The same can be said of 
"explanation", which provided the basis for Hempel"s 
"symmetry of explanation and prediction". It is thus 
appropriate to discuss Lakatos"s historiographical 
problem as a problem of "explanation' in terms of the 
hypothetico-deductive model of explanation. COn the 
malleability of the H-D model with respect to greatly 
different views on the character of historical 
explanation see Danto C1965J, pp. 201-232. - Compare also 
note 10 above.> 
Aside from these few matters of historical record, 
this appeal to Priestley is not based on an inquiry into 
Priestley"s work and life. 
Compare Lakatos (1978cJ, pp. 202f.: 
A catastrophical consequence of a narrow 
methodology is that, as well as impoverishing 
actual problem-situations, it invokes external 





because its internal framework of rati~n al 
explanation fal·ls too s,·_-_,,·~~ . [ J For· l· nctance 
- . • • • s~ 1 ~ 
the Popper ~ ·,n insistence on abandoning a theory 
after the 'crucial experiment'~ opens the door 
to those trendy 'sociologists of knowledge• who 
are trying to explain the further - and 
possibly unsuccessful - development of the 
rival programme as the irrational. wicked. 
reactionary obstinacy of establis~ed auth~rity 
against enlightened revolutionary innovation. 
Lakatos [1978bJ~ p. 32. 
"More or less the same class of facts" and "roughly 
the same description" are about as precise as Lakatos"s 
own "e>:plaining the pre-.,;ious success of 7". This seems to 
be an ineliminable lack of precision: if an event is 
explained only under a description relative to the 
e>:pl anans~ then (whenever 7·· contains theoretical terms 
defined differently than those of 7) 7~ might in some 
sense explain the success of 7 but will not explain 
events under the same description as 7 did - it will not 
explain precisely the same facts. The paradigm example 
for this is the progressive problem shift of Einstein's 
theory in relation to Newton's. This lack of precision 
may not be partially damaging to Lakatos's account. 
Either way~ nothing much hinges upon it here. 
It is not quite clear whether this represents an 
adequate reading of Laktos•s article. Conceivably~ he 
intended to add •scientifically rational' rather than 
"rational" to each explanandum. However~ this would 
render his argument unintelligible. After all~ it would 
presuppose an independently given notion of 'scientific 
rationality• in contradistinction to plain or ordinary 
'rationality' - and Lakatos gives no indication where 
that notion could be taken from. As interpreted here~ 
"rational" in the explanandum means only •rational in the 
light of any explanatory theory of science•. A privileged 
kind of •scientific rationality• which is somehow 
discontinuous with "rationality' need not be assumed. 
Danto [1965]~ p. 310. 
24 There is another advantage resulting from Lakatos•s 
move: the arbitrariness in redescribing <1> is 
substantially diminished as one selects <1') as the event 
to be redescribed: that is~ the attribute 'rational" is 
introduced as the verdict of the scientific community. 
Relative to the central predicate 'rational'~ the gulf 
between 'raw event' and redescription is now largely 
eliminated: with ( 1') ~ the event "comes" Ltndet- a 
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description that is provided by the scientific community. 
This is how the history and practice of science informs 
the theory of science. 
It should be noted that (1f'), for instance, is 
still a novel <and neither unexpected nor forbidden) fact 
relative to any historical research programme which is 
not out to explain it. As with the various redescriptions 
of <1>, this is of no importance and does not enter into 
the question as to whether some theory performs better 
than any of the others : the relevant difference is that 
any theory of science explains (1), while only some can 
explain (1") (not~ for instance~ Popperian theory of 
science>. 
Since a more extensive account of 'expl a nation' will 
follow in the next chapter, discussion of whether this 
brief statement is satisfactory and how it should be 
amended will be postponed until then . Suffice it to say 
that the reader is free to pass judgement on the 
following three •explanations• . Each of them embodies its 
own standard of what might count as an acceptable 
'explanation' and at least two of the three appear 
blatantly inadequate . Either way , the argument to be 
presented here is independent of whether some of these 
'explanations" are inadequate or not. 
A somewhat similar scenario was proposed as a 
criticism of Lakatos by Hall [1971J, pp. 157f. 
Compare for instance Lakatos [1978J, p . 114: 
what for the falsificationist loo ks like the 
<regrettably frequent} phenomenon of irrational 
adherence to a 'refuted" or an inconsistent 
theory and which he therefore relegates to 
external history ~ may w~ll be explained in 
terms of my methodology internally as a 
rational defence of a promising research 
programme. 
2• Of course. Kuhn does not go quite so far . It is not 
easy to p~ecisely determine his position . From the 
ensueing criticism of L* may emerge a closer 
approxi;ation to his actual view. 
~o What leads Lakatos to a disdain of apriorism for c es 
him to acknowledge the tremendous historiographical power 
inherent in the anti-theoretical approach. It has been 
pointed out repeatedly that Lakatos <probably for that 
reason> falls short of providing a (normative) 
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methodology himself. See for instance Schafer [1974J. 
pp. 217-221. - Lakatos is aware of this and presents-it 
as a 
shift in the problem of normative philosophy 
of science. The term 'normative' no longer 
means rules for arriving at solutions, but 
merely directions for the appraisal of 
solutions already there. <Lakatos [1978]~ p. 
103) 
Kuhn C1970J~ p. 159. - Compare this to Lakatos 
( 1 978] ~ p • 11 7: 
One may rationally stick to a degenerating 
programme until it is overtaken by a rival and 
even after. What one must not do is to deny its 
poor public record. 
Concerning Priestley~ then~ firm anti-anti-theorist 
Lakatos may turn out to be more liberal than 
anti-theorist Kuhn. 
I<Lthn (1971]~ p . 
above page 8. 
144 - for more of the context~ see 
Macintyre [1962J~ p. 
see pages 8f. above. 
53 - for more of the context~ 
Some such construal is necessary also for a somewhat 
strengthened version of L*: 
(:{) <t> <If >: is a scientist and>: performs an 
action in his or her role as a scientist 
which the scientific community does not 
openly condemn as improper~ then the action 
of x is rational) 
The absence of open condemnation is taken as implicitly 
certifying the rationality of >:'s behavior. Here one has 
to assume that intuitions concerning rationality can at 
times override the tacit verdict of the community . Thus~ 
Lakatos•s disagreement with the proponent~ of laws such 
as L* has nothing to do with the extent to which the 
verdicts of the scientific community are incorporated 
into the formulation of a general law. 
~~ Whether this presumption can be shown to hold for 
all cases or not is a sceondary issue: having adopted it 
as a heuristic. the burden of proof lies in the empirical 
work of the de~ision-theorist or of the historian aided 
by decison-theory: 
~6 Acceptable~ that is~ to the scienti~ic community -
and possibly certified by the scrut1ny of 




instance~ is a certified methodological postLtre. (It will 
be presented as such in the final chapter.) 
The remainder of this study is devoted to an 
elaboration and exploration of this approach. However~ no 
attempt will be made to delimit the set of acceptable 
methodological postures~ and no theory provided on how 
they may change over time. Further~ it · will remain q~ite 
open whether there is some algorithm according to which 
only certain decisions are rational qiven certain 
options. Finally~ the notion of "gen~ral decision theory' 
\I'Ji 11 not be elaborated in detai 1. 
Compare e . g. Feyerabend [1978], Naess [1972J. The 
notion of pluralism that is em~loyed here is closer to 
Schafer [1974J or Mer-ton [1981J. 
Radnitzky [1971J presents theoretical and 
methodological monism and pluralism as postures which may 
be characteristic of certain phases in the history of 
science. In order to be sensitive to this characteristic~ 
the historian and philosopher of science has to 
anticipate theoretical and methodological pluralism. 
The research programmes generated by <PI> should be 
designated as 'sensitive' rather than 'frigid'. These 
categories were introduced by Knorr-Cetina [1981J~ pp. 
17ff. as she presented her ethnographic approach to 
scientific reasoning. That approach led her to the 
laboratory as a strategic research-site in the science of 
science. However~ her sensitive approach needs to be 
supplemented by inquiry into scientific argumentation in 
formal contexts~ that is~ in contexts where the 
constraints on acceptable methodological postures are 
enforced. An understanding of science and the production 
of scientific knowledge has to pay attention to the 
contexts of discovery (in the laboratory> and 
justification (constrained negotiation>. The line between 
sensitive and frigid approaches does not c oincide <as 
Knorr-Cetina suggests> with the line dividing the 
investigation of methodological issues form the 
ethnographer's immersion in the laboratory. <The exchange 
with Knorr-Cetina will be continued in further footnotes: 
so far. a claim has been made; a full argument in its 
supper~ will be developed only at the end of the last 
chapter.) 
41 One might say that acceptable scientific arguments 
are all geared towards the <professed> ultimate goal of 
'truth' or 'fit of theory to reality'. That is~ the 
constraint on the set of admissable argument is 
tantamount to a constraint on the publicly statable 
48 -
\. 
Notww to Cha~twr 1 
goals: by staying within the ~ealm of scientific 
a~gumentation~ scientists act as if they we~e inte~ested 
only in t~uth. As far as an analysis of the 
<institutional> st~uctu~e of science is conce~ned~ it 
~eally does not make a lot of diffe~ence whethe~ ~~ not 
the p~ofessed goals always coincide with the pe~sonal of 
individual scientists. Habe~mas's 'theo~y of 
communicative action' lays some g~oundwo~k fo~ a ~esea~ch 
p~og~amme that would explore scientific action in ~espect 
to this simultaneous pu~suit of goals. Especially 
pe~tinent is his discussion of the pe~fo~mative featu~es 
of utte~ances and a~gumentation~ whe~e (following Austin 
[1967]~ pp. 94-131> he distinguishes between 
pe~locutiona~y and illocutiona~y acts that a~e 
simultaneously pe~fo~med by utte~ances. Compa~e Habe~mas 
[1981J~ pp. 389-392: 
Fo~ illocutiona~y acts the meaning of ~hat 
~as said is constitutive~ and likewise, fo~ 
teleological acts the intentions of the agent. 
One now gets what Austin calls perlocutive 
effects as illocutiona~y acts take on a ~ole 
within a teleological context of action. [ .•• J 
F~om these considerations Austin has drawn the 
conclusion that illocutiona~y success stands in 
a conventional o~ inte~nal ~elation to the 
speech-act, while pe~locutiona~y effects ~emain 
exte~nal to the meaning of what was said. CWie 
fU~ illokution~~e Akte die Bedeutung des 
Gesagten konstitutiv ist~ so fU~ teleologische 
Handlungen die Intention des Handelnden. Was 
Austin perlokutive Effekte nennt~ entsteht nun 
dadu~ch~ dass illokution~~e Akte eine Rolle in 
einem teleologischen Handlunsgzusammenhang 
Ube~nehmen. [ •.• J Austin hat aus Obe~legungen 
diese~ A~t die Konsequenz gezogen~ dass 
illokution~~e E~folge mit de~ Sp~echhandlung 
in einem konventionell ge~egelten ode~ internen 
Zusammenhang stehen~ w~h~end pe~lokution~~e 
Effekte de~ Bedeutung des Gesagten ~usse~lich 
bleiben.> 
Fo~ the pu~pose of unde~standing (socially situated) 
communication. one has to ~ely on the illocutiona~y 
cha~acte~ of ~tte~ances Cp. 394>. Thus, t~aditional 
analyses of the aims o~ goals of science should be 
inte~p~eted as attempts at making explicit the 
illocutiona~y fo~ce of acceptable scientific a~guments. 
These analyses p~ovide answe~s to the question: why does 
it make sense fo~ scientists to adopt <and enfo~ce) 
communicative const~aints Cas e.g. on methodological 
postu~es>? 





as far as the historian's work is concerned. rational 
reconstruction covers only a small though significant 
slice of scientific activity. By taking into 
consideration what is insignificant for the purpose of 
rational reconstruction~ the historian creates an 
interplay of internal and external histories of science. 
A drastic example illustrates this point: X is a 
scientist who is known to be a misogynist. Whenever a 
woman produces work relevant to his scientific speci a lty , 
he will subject her contribution to scrutiny far 
exceeding the scrutiny he applies to work by his male 
colleagues. Intending to destroy her career, he proceeds 
to publish only what is most damaging to her findi.ngs. 
Owing to his socialization as a scientist and the 
peer-review system in science, his published article will 
be free from polemics and contain no statement of his 
misogynist position. Here, two histories have to be 
written just as two different courses of action will have 
to be taken against X: the arguments produced by him will 
have to be taken on their own terms regardless of the 
judgement on the person and the integrity of his motives. 
l<uhn [1971J, p. 140. 
Lakatos [1978J, p. 134. 
Lakatos (1978], p. 116. 
Merton [1973J, pp. 321f. - In a footnote Merton 
highlights the notion of "stepping LIP patterns to 
unanticipated e>: tremi ties". 
What may be said, however, is something like this: 
decision-making in science tends to be more scrupulous, 
more transparent than decision-making in other spheres of 
life. This, of course, makes the scientific community a 
good research site for anybody interested in rationality. 
But that doesn't make science or scientists more or less 
rational than other decision-makers. <It is assumed here 
that a normative theory of rationality is 'weak" if it is 
applicable to ordinary~ everyday decision-making as much 
as to scientific decision-making. This use of 'weak" is 
not to pre-empt or trivialize attempts at formulating the 
conditions which make everyday decision-making rational.> 
Whether or to what extent historians should use it, 
is quite a different issue - just as the question to what 
extent historians are or should be involved in seeking 
out or corroborating general laws or theories of history. 
The question posed and answered here is merely: what kind 
of philosophical theory of science wo"ld and co"ld 
perform better or worse as a successful historiographical 
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1:50 
research programme . 
Within the Popperian or deductivist tradition . 
Lakatos unwittingly and Feyerabend quite deli~erately 
have moved in the same direction . Isaac Levi's 
epistemology~ which stands in a Carnapian or inductivist 
tradition~ also captures this intuition quite 
sLtbstant i c1ll y . 
To be sure~ a metaphysical interest in science is 
not obsolete. Any theory of 'truth' or 'objectivity' will 
introduce further normative constraints on the notion of 
'rationality' <in the sense that it is rational to follow 
true principles). These theories are particular 
interpretations of the formal~ reductionist model of 
'rationality' that is provided by general 
decision-theory. And these interpretations become 
manifest as optional methodological postu res . They are 
therefore not appropriately considered as providing fin a l 
words on the enterprise of science. Compare Sch~fer 
[ 197 4 J ~ p. 46 : 
The history of science teaches us tha t the 
task of philosophy - if it has a task - cannot 
be one of complementing~ i.e. completing 
science~ but that it consists rather in the 
defence of its openness and autonomy. <Die 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte lehrt uns~ dass die 
Aufgabe der Philosophie~ wenn sie eine hat ~ 
nicht die einer Erg~nzung ~ d . h. Abschliessung 
sein kann~ sondern eher in der Verteidigung 
ihrer Offenheit und Autonomie besteht.> 
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A Theor~ of Alternatives in Science 
------- ---------------------------
As a first step towards an account of s~ientific 
decision-making~ a theory of alternatives in science needs 
to be developed. The goal of such a theory is to give a 
somewhat precise characterization of the alternatives and 
options scientists deliberate and act upon. From this 
follows almost trivially the constraint that it should 
somehow designate specifically scientific alternatives. 
Therefore, the theory cannot be constructed without some 
antecedent notion of what science is. Here, however~ a 
second constraint enters in. According to the considerations 
of the previous chapter~ such an antecedent notion should be 
weak and unrestrictive; i.e., a theory of alternatives in 
science should be specific~ maximally inclusive and 
minimally pre-emptive 1 • 
Balancing these demands is the constructive task before 
us2 , and it involves a series of steps. 
Firstly, a weak characterization of "scientific 
activity• has to be given. Any number of approaches 
could be employed here. I propose that such a 
characterization can be constructed by somewhat 
eclectically combining the classical explication of 
,explanation" by Hempel and Oppenheim with the 
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criterion of empirical significance proposed by Carnap 
in Testability and Meaning~. A diachronic 
dimension is introduced by projecting Peirce• s theory 
of abduct i on~ deduction~ and i nduction as the three 
stages in the development of a theory onto the largely 
synchronic treatment of scientific activity by Carnap~ 
Hempel and Oppenheim . 
Secondly~ a precise typology of alternatives has to be 
culled from this characterization. To be sure~ 
alternatives can be expected to arise due to the very 
weakness of the charac terization which does not 
uniquely determine the outcomes of many decisions 
scientists might face . The challenge here consists 
merely in finding a sufficiently precise and unified 
way of framing the typology. 
Finally~ I simply propose that a •specifically 
scientific alternative• is any alternative arising from 
'scientific activity• . Thus~ whether an alternative is 
specifically scientific or not is determined solely in 
terms of its genesis from scientific activity. ~ 
Of these three steps, the last one does not warrant detailed 
scrutiny. The remainder of this chapter is therefore devoted 
to the problems of characterizing scientific activity and of 
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finding a typology of alternatives aris l 1 from this 
characterization . 
i . 
What is "sci e r,. i fic activity"? Very loosely~ one can say 
that scientists deal with perceived regularities or 
structural properties of nature and that they are concerned 
with establishing relations between such regularities for 
the purposes of explanation and prediction . Other goals 
often attributed to science ~ such as "finding the truth" or 
"yielding technological control"~ seem largely dependent 
upon explanation and prediction~. Matters become even 
simpler as we adopt the view that explanation and prediction 
share the same logical structure : propositions used for the 
purpose of explanation can or could also be used for the 
purpose of prediction or vice versa6 • This view was 
developed by earl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 1948 . It 
states the following four conditions for "true scientific 
explanation•: 
CR1> The explanandum must be a logical consequence 
of the explanans; in other words~ the 
explanandum must be logically deducible from 
the information contained in the explanans ( .• • J 
CR2> The explanans must contain general laws, and 
these must actually be required for the 
derivation of the explanandum. ( • •• J 
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<R3> The explanans must have empirical content; 
i.e., it must be capable, at least in 
principle, of test by experiment or 
observation. [ .. . ] 
<R4 ) The sentences constituting the explanans 
must be true. 7 
These four conditions provide a broad~ primarily 
synchronic characterization of scientific activity. They 
constitute the deductive- nomological model of scientific 
explanation. By modifiying CRll and substituting a measure 
of inductive support (like 'makes practically certain') for 
strict deducibility~ one can accomodate 
inductive-statistical explanations in science as a variant 
of that model. Speaking of both model and variant, Hempel 
emphasizes that they 
are not meant to describe how working scientists 
actually formulate their explanatory accounts. 
Their purpose is rather to indicate in reasonably 
pre~ise terms the logical structure and the 
rationale of various ways in which empirical 
science answers ex p lanation-seeking 
why-questions. a 
Accordingly, the four conditions are here considered as a 
conventional device for representing explanations9 • The 
main virtue of this device lies in its very broad 
applicability . To be sure , Hempel cautions that his models 
of scientific explanation 
Obviously [ • . . J are not intended to reflect the 
various senses of 'explain' that are involved when 
we speak of explaining rules of a contest~ 
explaining the meaning of a c uneiform inscrip~ion 
or of a complex legal clause or of a passage 1n a 
symbolist poem~ explaining how to bake Sacher 
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torte or how to repair a radio. 10 
But he can claim that the deductive-nomological model 
permits a conjectural formal reconstruction of all contexts 
in which the word 'because" occurs. A largely terminological 
consideration supports this claim. Initially, Hempel and 
Oppenheim proposed <R1>-<R4> in order to explicate the 
structure of 'scientific explanation". Conditions CR1>-CR3) 
were presented as 'logical conditions of adequacy', CR4> as 
the 'empirical condition of adequacy'. The distinction was 
subsequently underlined in a footnote which was later added 
by Hempel. 
Requirement CR4> characterizes what might be 
called a correct or true explanation. In an 
analysis of the logi cal structure of explanatory 
arguments~ therefore, that requirement may be 
disregarded. 11 
Thus, whatever fulfills conditions CR1>-<R3> may be called a 
'scientific explanation', regardless of whether, ultimately, 
it is shown to be true or false . Now, just as CR4> selects a 
subset of 'true explanations' among all 'scientific 
explanations", <R3) selects a subset of "scientif ic 
explanations" among all 'explanations' 12 : anything 
conforming to <Rl> and <R2>, i.e. any proposition that can 
be represented as an abbreviation for a set of propositions 
in deductive-nomological form is an 'explanation' - maybe a 
trivial, empty, meaningless and false explanation, but an 
explanation nonetheless. And if <Rl> and <R2> can be taken 
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as the core of the deductive-nomological model~ then~ 
indeed~ any occurence of the word "because• can be 
represented in that model~ if only due to the heuristic 
povJer provided by (Rl) and <R2). Thus~ if someone says ">: is 
late because she got held up in traffic''~ we can satisfy 
<F:2) by inventing an appropriate general law ("whenever 
someone makes an appointment without anticipating a delay 
and gets held LIP in traffic~ that person will be late"). 
That general law~ in conjunction with some initial 
conditions ("she made an appointment~ didn"t anticipate a 
delay~ and got held up in traffic'') deductively entails the 
e;-:planandum ("she is late")~ thus satisfying <F:U. Now~ 
whether the person who just used the word 'because• meant to 
commit herself to the general law or not: we may say that by 
using 'because• she had to commit herself to some such 
general law 13 • In less trivial fashion~ Hempel himself 
has shown in much of his writing that historical, 
teleological~ functional and statistical explanation as well 
as explanation in reference to intentions can be represented 
using first of all <R1) and <R2> and only then <R3) 14 • 
If CRi) and CR2> ensure broad prima facie applicability of 
the H-0 model as a conventional device for the 
representation of any explanation10 , CR3) and <R4) 
serve to delimit scientific explanation · - hopefully without 
introducing undue constraints upon scientific activity. As 
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Cn•pt•r 2 - A1t•rn«tiv•• in Sci•nc• 
we turn to these latter conditions~ we ask in effect ~ how an 
explanation that is only a candidate for 'scientific 
explanation' can become and be recognized as scientific~ and 
then how it, only a candidate for 'true <scientific) 
explanation' can become just that. Thus~ the very 
distinction between 'explanation'~ 'scientific explanation', 
and 'true explanation' implies a temporal sequence~ 
expressing the sequential formation of subsets or the 
consecutive order of decisions that have to be made once an 
explanation has been proposed. This diachronic dimension to 
the H-0 model 16 can be highlighted using the later 
Peirce's theory of research~ by correlating conditions <R1> 
and <R2) to the abductive phase in the development of a 
theory~ <R3) to deduction~ and <R4> to induction 17 • 
Accordingly, the latter two conditions will be considered 
within this temporal framework. According to Peirce~ 
Abduction is the process of forming an 
explanatory hypothesis. ( ••. J Its only 
justification is that from its suggestion 
deduction can draw a prediction which can be 
tested by induction~ and that, if we are ever to 
learn anything or to understand phenomena at all~ 
it must be by abduction that this is to be brought 
abOL\t. 16 
"Abduction merely suggests that something may be" 1 .,.. It 
proposes an explanation, but only a candidate for •true 
scientific explanation•. As such~ it has to be presentable 
in syllogistic form as required by <R1 > and <R2). 
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[ ••• J abduction, although it is very little hampered by 
logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference, 
asserting its conclusion only problematically or 
conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a 
perfectly definite logical form. Long before I first 
classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by 
logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory 
hypothesis - which is just what abduction is - was 
subject to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis 
cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be 
supposed that it would account for the facts or some of 
them. The form of inference therefore is this: 
The surprising fact, c, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true. 20 
Conditions <Rl) and <R2> explicate the form of inference 
according to vJhich C could be "a matter of course" merely by 
virtue of A's being true: A has to be some sort of general 
law in conjunction with assumed instantiations of the 
antecedents of that law~ i.e. in conjunction with initial 
conditions; and C <the explanandum> has to deduct ively 
follow from A <the explanans) 21 • Thus, once an 
explanation is proposed for a fact or a class of facts, the 
purely mechanical application of <Rl> and <R2) will 
determine what may be termed the abductive success of that 
explanation: an explanation is abductively successful if and 
only if the explanandum does indeed deductively follow from 
the explanans. Decisions about abductive success are 
therefore routinized to the extent that deductive logic can 
be routinely and unproblematically applied. However, once 
abductive success has been established, questions concerning 
the worth, value, usefulness, or appropriateness of the 
proposed explanation arise. After the determination of 
- 59 -
abductive success~ only the explanandum and the logical 
relation between explanans and explanandum need to be known. 
On the basis of this information alone~ i.e. under 
consideration only of <R1) and <R2> the latter sorts of 
judgement cannot be made. However, if our considerations 
include reference to some sort of background knowledge 
<maybe in the more particular form of demands for 
information>, then the scope of the explanandum, C~ can 
inspire what one might call abductive awe : the very fact 
that abductive success has been achieved, that someone was 
able to contrive an explanans from which C would follow as a 
matter of course, becomes a prominent creative and 
intellectual achievement22 • Often, immediate enthusiasm 
for a new theory can be attributed to abductive awe. A 
remark by physicist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg concerning 
LeSage's atomistic hypothesis as to the cause of 
gravitational force is a splendid exemplification of 
abductive awe: 
If it is a dream~ then it is the grandest and 
most sublime dream ever dreamt and one with which 
we can fill a gap in our books, a gap that can 
only be filled by a dream. And if only the dream 
is coherent and one does not deviate from the 
rules of correct analogy, then it could be the 
truth itself or stand in for it . 2~ 
Newton, of course, had coined his notorious "hypotheses non 
fingo• especially with respect to hypotheses like LeSage•s. 
Accordingly and all his awe notwithstanding, Lichtenberg 
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referred to that explanation as a dream rather than a 
scientific hypothesis. Both~ Newton"s dictum and 
Lichtenberg•s label put into question the scientific status 
of the attempt at explaining gravitation. Thus, regardless 
of abductive awe~ something like <R3> has to be included in 
our considerations in order to arrive at a preliminary 
evaluation of the proposed explanation as a scientific 
explanation: 
<R3> The explanans must have empirical content; 
i.e. ~ it must be capable, at least in principle, 
of test by experiment or observation. 
Abduction marks the end of the process of invention or 
discovery: an explanatory hypothesis has been proposed. 
Concerning the scientific status of the explanatory 
hypothesis, we subsequently ask whether scientists should 
Cor should be permitte~ to> entertain the hypothesis. 
Whether a proposed explanation is abductively successful or 
not can be determined by applying the simple test procedure 
provided by CR1> and <R2>. In contrast, whether a scientist 
should entertain a hypothesis is a normati~e question. As 
such, it gives rise to two component issues: 
<A> 
<B> 
can •scientific' be characterized by a _single 
(complete> set of conditions, or can one 
distinguish different kinds of entertainability 
(in terms of plausibility, predictive power 
etc.>, parallel e.g. to Lakatos"s distinction 
of acceptabilities?24 
can one arrive at this complete or incomplete 
set of conditions by a priori reasoning or is 
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it only revealed by scientific practice in 
any given instance or any series of given 
instances? 
Any way of answering these questions falls· under the 
jurisdiction of principle CPI> that was adopted in the 
previous chapter <see above~ p. 30). A direct application of 
that principle leads to the follnwing tentative verdict on 
<A> and CB) : 
CA & B:> The philosophical analysis which leads to 
a minimally restrictive and incomplete set 
of (normative> conditions for 'empirical 
content' will be supplemented in the course 
of scientific practice by decisions which 
may, in effect~ establish various modes of 
entertaining a hypothesis2 e. 
Before we turn to the various ways in which scientists may 
thus supplement the insufficiently restrictive conditions on 
'empirical content', those minimal constraints have to be 
formulated. Indeed, there are only so many ways of going 
about the determination of 'empirical content': 
(i) A proposition has empirical content <or is 
empirically significant> if its tputh and 
the truth of its negation are logically 
possible (and if its truth is physically 
possible>; 
(ii> a proposition is empirically significant 
if there are (empirical> tests of that 
proposition. 26 
For the purpose of designating a subset of 'scientific 
e:·:planations' among all 'e>:planations', Ci > is clearly 
insufficient, if not nearly vacuous: if only logical 
- 62 -
possibility is considered, (i) merely equates contingency 
with empirical significance. But even if physical 
possibility is included as a further demand, (i) rewards and 
encourages the formulation of general laws which in their 
antecedents make no reference to anything in the domain of 
accepted physical truths, i.e. formulations such as 
"Whenever God is angry, an earthqLtake will occLtr". It is dLte 
to this blatant insufficiency of <i> that only Cii) should 
be considered, which, of course, is just what Hempel and 
Oppenheim had in mind. Cii), however, raises further 
questions, firstly and most conspicuously: 
CC) what is a 'test'? 
In accordance with <A & B:> we should expect that there may 
be various complete answers to CC) which share a common 
core. An intuitive expression of that c ommon core might 
state: a test is some sort of operation performed on a 
test-statement which has been deduced from premises in such 
a way that the general law of the explanans is an 
indispensable part of the premises, and such that, as a 
result of the operation, a truth-value is assigned to the 
test-statement27 • The problem of what is an empirically 
significant proposition thus shifts to the question: what is 
a test-statement 2 e? Accordingly, our answer to CC) 
will have to include an answer to this latter question. Now, 
insofar as the test-statement is arrived at by deduction 
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from the explanatory hypothesis~ the explication of CR3) 
corresponds to 'deduction' as the second stage in Peirce•s 
theory of inquiry2 • in such a way that the 
specification of 'test-statement• will be tantamount to the 
formulation of conditions on the outcome of "deduction•. But 
according to Peirce~ regardless of its outcome~ "deduction• 
can be a lengthy~ complicated~ creative~ and intuitive 
process~ involving imprecise observations on a model of a 
hypothetical state of things: 
In deduction~ or necessary reasoning~ we set out 
from a hypothetical state of things which we 
define in certain abstracted respects. Among the 
characters to which we pay no attention in this 
made of argument is whether or not the hypothesis 
of our premises conforms more or less to the state 
of things in the outward world. We consider this 
hypothetical state of things and are led to 
conclude that~ however it may be with the universe 
in other respects~ wherever and whenever the 
hypothesis may be realized~ something else not 
explicitly supposed in that hypothesis will be 
true invariably. [ •.• J All necessary reasoning 
without exception is diagrammatic. That is~ we 
form an icon of our hypothetical state of 
things30 and proceed to observe it. This 
observation leads us to suspect that something is 
true. which we may or may not be able to formulate 
with-precision~ and we proceed to inquire whether 
it is true or not. For this purpose it is 
necessary to form a plan of investigation and this 
is the most difficult part of the whole 
operation. 31 
Given Peirce•s construal of 'abduction·~ his view of 
deduction as such an intricate process makes a tacit 
presupposition: by definition~ an explanatory proposition 
resulting from abduction deductively entails that if certain 
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initial conditions hold~ then the explanandum will ho l d; 
Peirce"s view of deduction thus considers irrelevant and 
excludes this trivially entailed deductive consequence and 
shoots for something else that can be deduced with the help 
of that explanatory proposition. But regardless of whether 
we want to adopt this additional constraint on what counts 
as an outcome of deduction~ precise control over the success 
of the operation becomes possible - as with abduction - only 
at its very end. However~ if Peirce is right~ it may take 
much time and effort until a significant test-statement has 
actually been produced. We are thus faced with the more 
general issue~ to what extent the empirical significance of 
a proposition should depend on the possibly time- and 
energy-consuming vagaries of deduction. 
<O> For a proposition to be empirically significant: 
what relation has to obtain between it and a 
test-statement that is deduced from it? 
Once questions CC> and CO> are answered ~ presumably 
certifying the entertainability of a given explanatory 
hypothesis~ we move to the last stage in the development of 
a theory. After the invention of a hypothesis by abduction _ 
and the decision to entertain it in the course of deduction~ 
the final question of its acceptance by induction arises . 
Having~ then, by means of deduction~ drawn from 
a hypothesis predictions as to what the results of 
experiments will be, we procee~ to test the . 
hypothesis by making the exper1ments ~nd compar1ng 
those predictions wit.! • the actL1al results of the 
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experiment. ( ••• J When. however. we find that 
prediction after predi~tion ( .. ~J is verified by 
experiment ( •.. J we begin to accord to the 
hypothesis a standing among scientific results . 
This sort of inference it is ~ from experiments 
testing predictions based on a hypothesis, that is 
alone properly entitled to be called 
induction.32 
The truth of the sentences is determined in respect to the 
outcomes of tests. If there should be various notions of 
'test' <and various entertainabilities)~ the inductive 
operations performed on the outcome of tests are i n relation 
to various kinds of acceptanc~~ e.g. acceptance as true, 
acceptance as a strongest potential explanation, etc. 33 
Thus, the problems of 'induction' are largely derivative, 
reflecting the issues surrounding 'deduction' . The one and 
only new issue introduced by induction is the problem 
traditionally associated with it: 
<E> what sort of intellectual operation<s> on the 
outcomes of tests should be used to warrant a 
decision on acceptance or rejection of the 
explanatory hypothesis? 
This formulation of <E> also leaves room for alternative 
ways of proceeding. In order to arrive at a theory of 
alternatives in science, we will have to consider CC> , <D>, 
and <E>, hopefully in such a way that their shared focus 
becomes clear enough for us to actually speak of one theory 
of alternatives in science. 
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It is little appreciated that in Testability and Meaning 
Rudolf Carnap presented a theory of unilinear 
<non-revolutionary> development of s~ientific knowledge and 
with it the beginnings for a theory of alternatives in 
science~4 • Indeed~ these aspects of the article are 
relativel y indiscernible given that its rather more overt 
purpose was to formulate minimal conditions on 'empirical 
significance ' . In effect~ responding to questions CC> and 
( 0 ) ~ it maintained 
that all scientific terms could be introduced as 
disposition terms on the basis of observation 
terms either by explicit definitions or by 
so-called reduction sentences, which constitute a 
kind of conditional definition . ~e 
This statement of purpose encapsulates the main features of 
the article: the emphasis on terms rather than propositions, 
the distinction between obse rvational and "scientific" 
terms, and the distinction between explicit definition and 
reduction sentences which are "a kind of conditional 
definition". 
Though fairly inconspicuous, the shift of emphasis from 
propositions to terms provides an effective device in the 
explication of (R3) and in response to CC) and CO> : after 
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discussion of the empirical significance of terms has 
provided LlS with an answer to (C) <"What is a test or what 
is a test-statement?")~ the shift back from terms to 
propositions coincides exactly with the ensueing discussion 
concerning the empirical significance of propositions and 
the ansvJer to <D) ("For a proposition to be empirically 
significant: what relation has to obtain between it and a 
test-statement that is deduced from it?"). 
Thus~ we start off by looking at the language of science 
as a collection of terms which can be taken one by one. The 
problem of empirical significance arises whenever a newly 
proposed explanans contains terms which are not yet part of 
that language. 
The introduction of a new term into a language 
is~ strictly speaking, the construction of a new 
language on the basis of the origi~al one. 36 
Here, a language which contains only observation terms is 
taken as the original language of science: it is empirically 
signifi cant throughout and all further terms are introduced 
on its basis. While Carnap does discuss how elaborate this 
basic observational language might be or might have 
been37' he stresses that at any given time the boundary 
between observational and 'scientific' terms is largely 
conventional, reflecting the present state of knowledge. 
A predicate 'P' of a language L is called . 
observable for an organism (e.g. a p e rson) N, 1f, 
for suitable arguments, e.g. 'b", N is able under 
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suitable circumstances to come to a decision with 
the help of few observations about a full 
sentence~ say 'P(b)', i.e. to a confirmation of 
either 'P(b)' or "-P~b)' of such a high degree 
that he will either accept or reject 
"P(b)".~e 
This explication of "observable" draws ''an arbitrary line 
between observable and non-observable predicates in a field 
of continuous degrees of observability'' 39 • Thus~ we can 
now draw the line between a basic language and a new 
language to be constructed upon it: the basic language 
consists of observational terms and those "scientific' terms 
which have already been constructed upon the observational 
basis~ while the new language is the basic language plus one 
additional "scientific" term. 
The de~isive next step consists in elucidating the notion 
of 'construction of one language on the basis of another'. 
It is here~ where that third main feature of Carnap's 
article~ the distinction between explicit definition and 
physical reduction comes into play. 
If we wish to construct a language for science 
we have to take some descriptive (i.e. 
non-logical) terms as primitive terms. Further 
terms may then be introduced not only by explicit 
definitions but also by other reduction sentences. 
The possibility of introduction by laws~ i.e. by 
physical reduction, is, as we shall see~ v~ry 
important for .science, but so far not suff1c1ently 
noticed in the logical analysis of science. On the 
other hand the terms introduced in this way have 
the disadvantage that in general it is not 
possible to eliminate them~ i.e. _to translate a 
sentence containing such a term 1nto a sentence 
containing previous terms only. 40 
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Carnap distinguishes two way of reducing terms of the new 
language to the terms of the old one: definition and 
physical reduction. Reduction by definition allows for the 
elimination of the new terms ; defined terms do not create 
the power to express information which is not already 
expressible in the basic language. Terms introduced by law 
cannot be so eliminated and do come with the power to 
express new information . We shall see on the other hand that 
an explicit definition fully specifies the meaning of a term 
while physical reduction provides only a conditional 
definition~ leaving the meaning partly undetermined pending 
further inquiry. Definition can then be construed as a 
limiting case of physical reduction: when the conditions 
upon which a conditional definition rests are trivially or 
contingently always fulfilled~ physical reduction becomes 
definition. 
For a step by step review of this juxtaposition~ we should 
first see why it is that explicit definition cannot be the 
only mode of reduction in science. A definition of a 
property D has the following form: 
DM <=> ...• x •••• 
Here~ D is the definiendum and the sentential function 
" •••• >: •••• " the definiens41 • Now consider a case where 
the definiendum is a conditional. Such might be the case 
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when we want to define a dispositional property like 
•soluble " Ci.e. 'soluble in water'). A substance can be said 
to have this property if and only if it dissolves when 
immersed in water. Indeed, most if not all presumed 
structural properties of nature are designated by 
conditional statement42 so that therefore~ if we choose 
to name that property ~ the term chosen for that name will be 
defined by that conditional 43 • But let us return to the 
simple case of 'soluble": a substance is soluble if and only 
if it displays response R ('dissolves') when subjected to 
stimulus S ('is immersed in water•). 
Conceivably~ as a first complaint about this definition we 
might assert that it does not at all give us the meaning of 
•soluble": it does not tell us either what •soluble' is or 
what we mean as we use that word in different contexts; 
instead it only tells us when to call a substance 
•soluble' 4~. This criticism~ however, need not concern 
us here: after all~ we are not searching for a descriptively 
accurate representation of the meaning of a term. Instead~ 
we only need a conventional way of representing terms as 
empirically significant within the context of •scientific 
explanation• - for which, in turn, the H-0 model provides a 
conventional representational device. For that limited 
purpose, stating when a substance can be called soluble 
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tells us enough about the meaning and use of that term. And 
of course~ we shall not expect that every occurence of 
•soluble" in scientific discourse can be construed as 
satisfying this operational definition: uses of •soluble" 
outside of explanatory contexts will have to be accounted 
for in historical terms. Indeed~ terms have histories and we 
should suspect that a term is used differently within the 
context of explanation than it is before it ever appears in 
a general law; and that after having been used for 
explanatory purposes on different occasions~ its full 
meaning may yet again go beyond a plain operational 
definition46 • Thus~ criticism along the lines of 
meaning-analysis does not challenge the validity of 
reduction by definition as a representational device. 
However~ we still have to ask whether reduction by 
definition yields a good representational device. Remember, 
for instance~ that the H-0 model was not intended as a 
descriptively accurate representation of belief-states of 
persons who propose explanations. And yet, it was argued 
that we can plausibly assume that every use of "because• 
commits a person to some general law such that conditions 
<R1) and CR2> are satisfied. Now, can we assume with equal 
plausibility that general law~ in an explanans employ terms 
which are introduced by definitional reduction? This 
amounts to asking whether the operational definition 
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provides a good rule for the attribution of property D to 
any given instance of x. Using it~ we will attribute D to 
any piece of sugar~ regardless of whether it is <or has 
been> immersed in water. For~ if S obtains R will also 
obtain and D should be attributed, and if -S obtains the 
definiens is vacuously true and D should be attributed. 
Likewise, we will attribute-D to a piece of wood which has 
been immersed in water and failed to dissolve. So far, so 
good. But what about a piece of wood which was burned before 
ever having been immersed in water? -S obtains in its case 
and the definiens is vacuously true~ i.e. the rule is 
satisfied only if we attribute the disposition 'soluble' to 
that piece of wood47 • Clearly~ this is a most 
undesirable result - and it obtains for all terms introduced 
in conditional form (i.e. for any dispositional 
prbperty) 4 e. In order to avoid this result, Carnap 
proposed a better rule for the attribution of property D. He 
replaces unconditional definition by conditional definition 
or physical reduction. As a result, our rule for the 
attribution of 'soluble' takes on the form of a bilateral 
reduction sentence49 : 
This sentence reads "if .>i is immersed in water at t ~ .');· is 
soluble if and only if it dissolves at t''. Again~ the issue 
is not whether the sentence renders a descriptively accurate 
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representation for the meaning of •soluble"; but rather 
again ~ whether adopting this version of an operati6nal 
definition in conjunction with the H-0 model yields an 
appropriate representational device for "scientific 
explanation• in contradistinction to mere "explanation'. 
Like the definition~ the bilateral reduction sentence is a 
rule guiding the attribution of D. Here~ D will be 
attributed if S and R~ -D if S and -R are satisfied. For 
those cases where -S holds and either R or -R~ D cannot be 
determined: the reduction sentence will be satisfied 
regardless of whether we attribute D or -D since it is 
vacuously true if -S. Thus~ the rule functions only under 
the condition that S obtains; therefore it provides a 
conditional definition~ telling us for all those (and only 
those) substances which satisfy S whether properties D or -D 
shall be attributed to them. The conditional definition 
tests for that property~ and consequently S can be termed 
the •test-condition" of D. Once it is satisfied, R functions 
as "truth-condition', since it decides the a ttribution of D 
or -D respectively~ 1 • The bilateral reduction tests for 
property D~ where "test" can be thus defined: 
That is, the conjunction of S and either R or -R constitutes 
a test for D. And yet, the bilateral reduction sentence is 
not an empirical proposition, since it rules out only one 
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state of affairs~ namely the conjunction 
CS & R & S & -R> 52 ~ i.e. it prescribes only what is a 
logical truth in the first place~ namely <R v -R) . While it 
tests for a property~ the test as just defined is not a test 
of the reduction sentence. 
However~ the test for a property can function as a test of 
a proposition once predicate D is used referentially in 
respect to some specified domain. For example, the 
proposition Cx) (Sg ... => D,..) ("if x is SLtgar~ then 
it is solLtble"> is tested by bringing about facts which 
satisfy the conjunction of S and either R or -R. And for 
wood we will find that the proposition cw. => D.> 
is tested only if w. is a piece of wood which has been 
immersed in water~ while (>:> CW,.. => D,..) is 
falsified by modus tollens as soon as we discover at least 
once the conjunction of w., s. and -R •• Thus, 
the definition of 'testo .. ' can serve as a preliminary 
answer to our question CC> ('what is a test?'>, presupposing 
that there is a bilateral reduction sentence which 
determines (tests for> D or -D and a proposition in which D 
or -D is us~d, i.e. a proposition tested by the 
determination of D or -D. And thus~ we can give a somewhat 
more complete characterization of 'test•e~: 
CC:> Testo .. -0~ CS. & ER. v -R.J) 
I.e: A proposition which predicates property D to a 
substance undergoes a test if and only if the 
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following conditions are fulfilled: 
Cl) there is a bilateral reduction sentence for the 
predicate~ i.e a procedure which tests for D or 
-D such that if CS & R> then D. and if CS & -R) 
then -D and such that D or -D ~annat be attributed 
if -s; 
<2> the test-conditions stated in the stimulus sentence 
are observed to obtain Cor have been realized); 
(3) it is determined that either R or -R obtains; 
(4) aside from logical connectives~ the terms 
appearing in the stimulus- and response-sentences 
are observable or have been introduced on the 
basis of observation terms. 
The test has 'falsified' the proposition if~ by virtue 
of the reduction sentence~ it either determines D where 
the proposition predicated -D or vice versao4 • 
If the test has not falsified the proposition~ it has 
'confirmed' it. If the facts corresponding to S are not 
merely observed to hold but have been actively 
realized by the persons conducting the test~ the 
test can be called an 'experiment'. 
If we now link this notion of 'test' to our discussion so 
far of what constitutes 'scientific activity'~ we find that 
conditions CR1) and <R2> <which formulate the hard core of 
the deductive nomological model of explanation) designate a 
privileged context for terms~ i.e. the context of 
explanation and prediction~ of general laws and their 
instantiations00 • In order to restrict this context to 
scientific explanation and prediction~ i.e. to establish the 
empirical significance of those laws~ we have now added the 
further minimal requirement that all non-logical terms 
appearing in them shall have been introduced by bilateral 
reduction sentences on the basis of the observation 
language~ or rather~ that those terms shall be representable 
as having been so introduced. This additional requirement 
establishes or makes explicit the test-conditions for the 
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gener-al law. 
Yet it is still far- fr-om clear- what constitutes the 
legitimate use of a ter-m intr-oduced by a bilater-al r-eduction 
sentence~ i.e. the r-elationship between the statement of 
test-conditions and the empir-ical significance of a gener-al 
law. Sur-ely, the substitution of "definition" by "bilater-al 
r-eduction sentence" solved the pr-oblem posed by the piece of 
wood which has never- been immer-sed in water- and which - by 
definition- would have tb be called "soluble" . In its 
place, however-, we now have another- pr-oblem: Can we call a 
piece of sugar- "soluble" which has never- been immer-sed in 
water-? 
Consider- the gener-al lavJ <>:) <Sg,.. => D .... > vJhich 
reads "All sugar- is soluble". This law pr-edicates "solLtble" 
of a gr-eat many things which have never- been immer-sed in 
water-, some of which never- will be <since they no longer-
exist). All these substances have not been tested for-D or 
-D. In r-espect to these substances, the law is neither-
confir-med nor- falsified. Ther-efor-e, our- consider-ations 
concer-ning the intr-oduction of empir-ically significant ter-ms 
have to be supplemented by a ser-ies of simple decisions 
concer-ning their- usee~. These decisions have to be 
guided by the pr-inciple <well-known by now) that s;· · entific 
activity should not be over-ly rF~ tr-icted , i.e. that liber-al 
use of ter-ms 4; at have been intr-oduced by bilater-al 
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reduction sentences should be allowed for in agreement with 
scientific practice. Indeed~ Carnap has tacitly followed 
this principle as we can see from the way in which he argues 
for the decisions that he recommends on the use of 
empirically significant terms. 
First of all~ we should remember that we are dealing here 
with minimal constraints on entertainablity and not on 
acceptance. The problem before us does not concern inductive 
rules~7 • Therefore~ we have all along been able to make 
some tacit assumptions on the relatioh of conditions for 
meaningfulness and us~. For instance, "observation language• 
was defined as a language consisting mostly of observable 
rather than e.g. manifestly observed predicates. And 
similarly~ we require that to be empirically significant a 
proposition has to be testable rather than tested~ i.e. 
merely that a test can be performed~6 • The decision to 
consider testability instead of testedness does not by 
itself solve our problem concerning the general law which 
attributes •solubility• to everything consisting of sugar. 
After all~ many sugary things do not exist anymore and are 
therefore not even 'testable". But to require that every 
substance to which a property has been attributed shall be 
testable in respect to that property~ i.e. to require 
complete testability would amount to outruling all general 
laws~ i.e. all propositions containing the affirmation of a 
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universal quantifier or the negation of an existential 
quantifier. This result does not agree with scientific 
practicee• . Our second decision~ therefore, is to 
require only incomplete testability~ i.e. to require only 
that at least one instantiation of the law is testable. And 
our third and final decision pertains to a hypothetical 
state of the following sort : while we can test for 
solubility in water by simply taking a substance and 
immersing it in water~ consider the case where we want to 
attribute to substances solubility in fluid Q which is known 
to exist only on another~ as of yet inaccessible planet? In 
the case of •solubility in water· ~ we can realize 
test-condition S. While in the case of •solubility in a• we 
could determine by observation whether S or -S and R or -R 
are satisfied~ we cannot now (experimentally> realize them . 
In light of this~ should we require that •testability• shall 
be construed broadly in terms of 'observability• or narrowly 
in terms of 'realizability'? Again~ for the sake of 
non-restrictiveness and in view of scientific practice~ we 
opt for the broad construal~0 • 
This series of decisions introduc es a very liberal 
criterion for the empirical significance of propositions 
that are proposed by abduction as candidates for •scientific 
explanation' . They also constitute an answer to <D>, i . e . to 
the question: ''For a proposition to be empirically 
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significant: what relation has to obtain between it and a 
test-statement that is dedLtced from it?" 
<D:> If predicateD is any non-logical term that is 
not part of the observation language but which is 
introduced by a bilateral reduction sentence 
then : a proposition which uses D is empiricaily 
significant if and only if it is incompletely 
testable~ i.e. if a test but not necessarily an 
experiment [as defined in <C:>J can be performed in 
respect to D for at least one of its instantiations 
as prescribed by the proposition. 
I.e: the proposition is empirically significant once 
one attribution of D or -D is satisfiable: as soon 
as for one instance the observability of the test-
conditions can be assumed . 61 
i i i. 
<D : > provides a fairly general minimal specification of 
<R3) . As such~ it seems almost uncontestable . As we shall 
now see~ those minimal conditions for the entertainability~ 
i.e . empirical significance of explanatory hypotheses are 
far from sufficient. Taking them as such would establish a 
very liberal criterion indeed. And yet , I suggest that a 
more stringent criterion cannot be defended ~ not at least on 
the basis of a consensus within contemporary philosop hy of 
science . Such lack of consensus is, of course~ purely 
conting.ent and may e>:press nothing but the lack of 
inventiveness~ interpretive skill , or willingness to be 
persuaded on the part of philosophers of science62 • If 
I choose to consider it indicative of the e xistence of a 
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variety of available ways of complementing the minimal 
specification of <R3) in the cou~se of scientific p~actice, 
I am still p~epa~ed to admit that, afte~ all, scientific 
discou~se could tu~n out to be mo~e homogeneous than 
anticipated: the suggestion that the scientific cha~acte~ of 
explanato~y hypotheses is negotiated within diffe~ing modes 
of scientific discou~se is a self-co~~ecting empi~ical 
hypothesis about the conduct of scientists. Thus, we a~e on 
a fai~ly safe cou~se and do not have to conside~ the 
insufficiency of <C:> and <D:> an unwelcome ~esult. Instead, 
we should go ahead and investigate some of the ways in which 
the all too libe~al specification of <R3) is amended case by 
case. To that end, we will have to see fi~st of all on what 
g~ounds the c~ite~ion as stated so fa~ p~oves to be 
insufficient63 • Th~ee classical a~guments to that 
effect will be p~esented: 
It has been a~gued that CC:> and <D:> p~ovide no basis 
fo~ excluding a va~iety of deeply flawed and obviously 
non-scientific explanations, i.e. that a subset of 
"scientific explanations" f~om the set of all 
"explanations" is not successfully fo~med with the help 
of <C:> and CD:>. On occasion, it has been concluded 
f~om this that such a subset cannot p~ope~ly include 
any dispositional explanations at all. 
Anothe~ a~gument maintains that bilate~al ~eduction 
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sentences cannot accomodate of t~ansient dispositional 
p~ope~ties~ i.e. that using this method of ~eduction 
amounts to the p~esumption that all p~ope~ties are 
immutable~ which is thought to be an untenable 
assumption. 
Finally~ theoretical terms have been contrasted with 
<pure) disposition terms. Bilateral reduction sentences 
treat all p~edicates as (pure) disposition terms and do 
not capture the function and meaning of theo~etical 
terms in science and scientific explanation. 
As we turn to these criticisms one by one~ we should be 
aware that none of them invalidates CC:) and CD:> as minimal 
requi~ements on the empirical significance of predicates 
occu~ing in the general law of a scientific explanation~ 
i.e. on the ente~tainability of explanato~y hypotheses. 
One cannot infer from the insufficiency of CC:) and 
CD:> that they should be abandoned ~ather than 
supplemented. 
If there is a difference between immutable and 
transient properties such that the latter a~e not 
representable by bilate~al reduction sentenoes~ that 
difference may be contingent upon the state of physical 
inqui~y itself. And it may be that on an appropriate 
construal of "immutable" <vs. ·t~ansient•) only 
- 82 -
immutable properties are indeed admissable into the 
context of explanation. For that context . therefore. 
. . 
CC:> and CD : ) would still be appropriate minimal 
requirements. 
If theoretical terms cannot be repres ented by single 
bilateral reduction sentences~ it is because the 
meaning and use of these predicates is far more complex 
than the meaning and use of <pure) disposition terms. 
This does not entail~ however~ that within the context 
of any given explanation a theoretical term cannot be 
represented as a pure disposition term. 
Thus~ only the first of these three criticisms strictly 
demonstrates the insufficiency of CC : ) and CD : > in respect 
to the task of selecting •scientific explanation• as a 
subset of •explanation•. The latter two maintain on semantic 
grounds the inadequacy of CC:> and CD:> when it comes to 
fully describing scientific activity. They assert that 
consideration of the use and meaning of scientific terms 
should not be restricted to the narrow context of 
explanation and prediction. Instead~ one should deal with 
the language of science and the structure of scientific 
theory as a whole . These two criticisms are thus at odds 
with our deliberate insistence so far on the narrow context 
of explanation and prediction which was thought to lie at 
t h e core of scientific activity6~ . It enters only now~ 
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as the limits of our self-imposed restriction become 
apparent: we are motivated to take special notice of, e.g., 
theoretical terms, as opposed to (pure) disposition terms, 
insofar as we seek access to the way in which scientists 
negotiate ways of supplementing the insufficient conditions 
<C:) and <D:). Indeed, the very genesis of theoretical terms 
may be attributable to that process of negotiation. Thus, 
the relevance of the latter two criticisms emerges as we 
extend our range of vision and start focussing on the ways 
in which scientists supplement CC : ) and <D:). 
The second criticism <concerning immutable and transient 
disposition terms) affords us a short and narrowly conceived 
illustration ~f this attempt to turn what was designed as a 
criticism of Carnap's proposals into an affirmation of <C:) 
and CD:) as minimal requirements on scientific explanation, 
and into a heuristic for the discovery of considerations 
that may be used to supplement <C:) and <D:). That 
illustration will prepare us for the more far-reaching 
project of scrutinizing the remaining two criticisms and 
finally formulating the sought-after theory of alternatives 
in science. 
Pap and MellorQe have pointed to Carnap's tacit and 
apparently untenable assumption that dispositional 
properties are immutable, i.e. non-transient. Indeed, 
consider testing a piece of iron for the property of having 
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positive electrical charge. Consider further that the test 
establishes that the conditions stated by the s- and 
R-sentences are satisfied for the piece of iron at the time 
of the test. And still further~ that the disposition term is 
introduced by our now familiar reduction sentence: 
CS,.t _., - .. ·· <D,. <=> RHt)]. 
Since D,. has no time-index~ we attribute that 
dispositional property to the piece of iron as an immutable 
property. The test has~ once and for all, determined the 
piece to have this property. Yet~ electrical charge is a 
transient property - a piece of iron can carry such charge 
off and on throughout its existence. Thus , we clearly have a 
problem here. But it is a problem that lies beyond the scope 
of philosophical inquiry and as such a desirable problem. 
For there is a very real physical difference between 
permanent and transient dispositional properties. That 
difference has to be investigated by physical scientists and 
should be representable rather than glossed over by 
reduction sentences for disposition terms. Instead of trying 
to find a construal of such sentences that covers both 
cases, we should admit deviant variations on the bilateral 
reduction sentence as warranted by a given state of physical 
knowledge. For instance, a slapdash way of fixing reduction 
sentences for transient dispositions consists simply in 
adding another time index: 
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~ow ~ a substance has a given dispositional property just at 
those times at which it responds to a stimulus s so that it 
satisfies R. Making the attribution of a property dependent 
on the very act involved in its observation~ seems to be a 
highly unsatisfactory result. Yet, this unsatsifactory way 
of introducing a predicate may correspond at times to an 
equally unsatisfactory state of physical knowledge of the 
subject. Consider, for instance, the case in which during 
routine experiments, a certain anomalous property is 
observed at irregular intervals. Though scientists recognize 
the property and know the general conditions under which it 
may obtain, it is irreproducible <they cannot produce it at 
will) and they do not know whether it is transient or 
permanent. It is most appropriately introduced by the 
unsatsifactory reduction sentence that was just stated, 
where R is a general description of the experimental 
condition and S states the anomalous observations. Clearly, 
at this time, one cannot use DHt as an explanatory 
predicate; indeed CC:) and CD:) forbid its use as such. Now, 
in order to gain an understanding of the property, 
scientists may try to isolate the relevant parts of the 
general experimental set-up and some further initial 
conditions that in the experiment had not been held constant 
- hoping that they come upon a specific construction of the 
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state in which the anomalous observations will unfailingly 
occur. Once they have found that construction~ they can 
re-introduce the disposition predicate: in virtue of an 
inductively confirmed generalization ('unfailingly'>, the 
additional time-index can now be dropped••. In the 
course of the investigation~ the stimulus conditions have 
probably undergone significant modification, and it is quite 
possible that the property will now be attributed not to a 
substance but rather to a substance in a certain state which 
may have a clearly delimited extension in time. In respect 
to that state and those stimulus conditions, the transient 
dispositional property has become permanent•7 • And 
indeed~ this result agrees quite well with our intuitive 
notion of explanation: we explain by pointing out that 
(everything else being equal) it is an immutable property of 
the world that the general law is true and that therefore, 
if the initial conditions are satisfied~ immutably the 
explanandum should be expected to occur•e. The 
introduction of disposition terms may thus have a history 
which becomes intelligible precisely because frictions with 
the standard method of introduction by bilateral reduction 
sentences do occur as we juxtapose, e.g.~ pretheoretical 
contexts with the context of explanation and 
prediction••. In this case~ the considerations 
supplementing conditions <C:> and <D:> may be sought in the 
decision-making processes on the transition from one context 
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to the other. 
The example shows how the apparent initial insufficiency 
of bilateral reduction sentences is placed into historical 
perspective by positing the form in which they introduce 
predicates as a first and tentative goal of physical inquiry 
itself: no amount of philosophical reasoning can determine 
whether a given property is permanent or transient or under 
which conditions an apparently transient disposition can be 
construed as a sur-efir-e disposition70 • And, equally, 
philosophical inquiry cannot alone determine in any given 
instance the question of empirical significance~ i.e. 
whether a given explanation is a properly "scienti fic" 
explanation. This, finally, is highlighted by the first and 
most compelling criticism of conditions <C:> and <D : >, i.e. 
the demonstration that they do not successfully delimit a 
subset of "scientific explanations". This criticism is most 
forcefully elaborated by those who quite misleadingly deny 
that disposition terms can be used for explanatory purposes 
at all, and who therefore uphold that Car-nap's method of 
introducing ''all scientific terms [ ••• J as disposition terms 
on the basis of observation terms" cannot be Llpheld 71 • 
For an elucidation of that claim, consider the following 
two explanations: 
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<I> "a dissolves in water because it is solLible": 
general law <x> Sg,.. => D,.. 
initial condition 8g. 
initial condition 8. 
explanandum R. 
(8g: ">: is sugar"; D: '>: is soluble'; 8: ">: is 
immersed in water"; R: "x dissolves"] 
This is an elliptical formulation~ a complete 
statement requires the inclusion of the 
reduction sentence for D: 
general law (>:) C8g,.. => D,..> 
red. sent. ()·:) (8,.. => [0,.. <=> R,..J) 
initial condition 8g. 
initial condition 8. 
e>:pl anandLim R.7:z 
<I I) "a human body whi eh contains SLibstance a 
falls asleep because a possesses dormitive power": 
general law <>-:) (0,.. => D,..) 
red. sent. (}:) [8,.. => <D,.. <=> R,..> J 
initial condition o. 
initial condition 8. 
explanandum R. 
CO: "x is opium"; D: "x has dormitive power'; 
8: 'x is introduced into a human body"; R: 
•x•s host body falls asleep'J 7~ 
Both (I) and <II> meet conditions <R1> and <R2> and are thus 
•explanations•. Moreover, both meet our minimal requirements 
for empirical significance as stated in <D:>~ i.e. they are 
both testabl e 7 ""'. As far as we can tell~ <I) and <I I) 
may well be properly 'scientific' explanations~ at least 
they have 'prima facie entertainability". Yet~ <II> is 
notorious for being a paradigm example of an illegitimate, 
non-scientific explanation. It was carefully culled from 
Moliere's Malade Imaginaire in order to show that 
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explanations in terms of dispositional properties are 
preposterously ridiculous - and by implication~ to show that 
theories which <like Carnap's) do not differentiate between 
good and bad~ dispositional and non-dispositional 
explanations are deeply flawed. 
First Doctor: [ •. • J 
Argan: 
ChorLts: 
Demandabo caLtS}f-1··· et rati onem quare 
Opi ~ ~ facit dormire. 
[ Hr sits down. Beralde signals to Argan, 
the BACHELIERUS. He rises . Beralde prompts 
him.] 
Mihi a docto Doctore 
Demandatur causam et rationem quare 
Opium facit dormire. 
And to that respondeo 
Quia est in eo 
Virtus dormitiva 
Cujus est natura 
Sensus tranquillizare. 
Bene, bene~ bene~ bene respondere! 
Dignus, dignus est entrare 
In nostro docto corpore. 7 e 
The claim that dispositions cannot serve explanatory 
purposes presupposes that this dispositional explanation 
shares ft common defect with all explanations in reference to 
dispositions. However~ that presupposition can be challenged 
simply by highlighting significant differences between the 
'solubility' and 'dormitive power' explanations . By the same 
token~ we will discover clues as to how to supplement CC:> 
and CD:> in such a way that <I> but not <II> belongs to the 
subset of •scientific explanations ' . As a result we may 
consider the explanation parodied by Moliere as 
fundamentally defective~ while <I> is only somewhat 
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uninformative. 
To see what is wrong with the 'dormitive power' 
explanation it is really not enough to consider only the 
formulation given in <II> • . Both (!) and CII> seem 
uninformative since they assert only that some substances 
display a certain response to a given stimulus because they 
are disposed to respond in such manner to that stimulus. I 
can see nothing intrinsi cally wrong with such exercises in 
apparent futility7~. Yet, this sober assessment of CII> 
is not shared by Moliere's protagonists: they take a 
childish delight in their explanation, clouding it, as they 
do, in an aura of profundity. And that is precisely what is 
wrong with their explanation: by taking it as the discovery 
of some essential force, they effectively preclude further 
inquiry into the causal relations which obtain here. They 
adopt a •mystery-raising' rather than 'problem-raising' 
attitude towards their dispositional explanation77 , and 
what should be the beginning of inquiry into, e.g., the 
shared molecular properties of all substances with 
'dormitive power', is taken as the ultimate revelation of a 
principle residing within the substance before them7 e. 
The context for the •solubility• explanation is quite 
different. Indeed, while 'soluble' is one of the favored 
examples when it comes to discussing disposition terms, our 
current state of chemical knowledge has far transcended 
- 91 -
explanations of a particular dissolution in terms of 
"solubility•. A plausible, though not necessarily chemically 
or historically accurate scenario shows how scientists might 
have arrived at a far more thoroughgoing explanation of 
R.79 • Treating the disposition predicate in the 
general law <xl CSgH => DK) as a problem-raising 
predicate , scientists scrutinized all soluble 
substanceseo for shared properties or for distinctive 
traits that would allow for fruitful sub-classifications . 
Thus~ by comparing the behavior of salt, sugar and other 
substances upon being immersed in water~ they discovered 
different kinds of solubility: crystals form in some 
solutions and not in others; after evaporation of the 
liquid~ the solute sometimes remains behind and sometimes it 
has evaporated with the solution; as opposed to salt~ sugar 
does not dissolve well at low temperatures; by adding a 
molecule of salt to water, the boiling-point is raised twice 
as much as when one adds a molecule of sugar; etc. By 
further investigating the shared properties of all 
substances in any group of solubles, they discovered, for 
instance, that electricity is conducted well by all those 
solutions from solutes that also dissolve well at low 
temperatures, and that all other solutions do not conduct 
electricitye1. Thus, they might divide all solutes into 
"electrolytes' vs. 'nonelectrolytes' . Then, they disco ver 
that electrolytes are ''substances that can dissociate into 
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electrically charged particles called ions~ while 
nonelectrolytes consist of molecules that bear no net 
electrical charge "62 • Thus~ sol Ltbl e substances 
consisting of molecules which bear net electrical charge 
have the disposition to dissociate into ions upon being 
immersed in water. Scientists can now presumably tell for 
all soluble substances whether they are electrolyte or 
nonelectrolyte solutes merely by looking at their molecular 
properties. As a result of this development in chemistry~ we 
can now define "soluble" 
where E stands for "is electrolytically soluble" and NE for 
"is nonelectrolytically soluble". And forE and NE 
respectively~ we have these first bilateral reduction 
sentences: 
<>: > <5 1,.. => [NE .. <=> -F:1,.. J) ~ 
where 5 1 means •x is immersed in water at a low 
· d o • dl·ssol••es well"e~. They temperature· an ~1 ·x v 
were soon supplemented by 
( ) (s -··. c~·JE <.·.·=."> _r::·..,. .. J > ~ >: ::ZM -/ I H r._ 
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where 82 stands for 'x is dissolved in water and the 
solution of x is tested for its <electrical) conductivity' 
and R2 for 'x conducts electricity well' . And finally, 
on the highest level of analysis so far, we have : 
C·:) <S::s,.. => CE,.. <=> R::s ... J) 
( ){ ) ( S::s,.. = > E NE,.. < = > -R::s ... J ) , 
where S::s means 'x dissolves in water and the molecules 
of x have beforehand been subje~ted to a procedure 
determining their net electrical charge•, and R::s 
'before having dissolved in water the molecules of x bore 
net electrical charge' . And, in conclusion of our summary~ 
we can now give a more thoroughgoing explanation of R. 
('a piece of sugar a dissolves in water') 64 : 
(!b) "a dissolves in water because it is <non-
electrolytically) solLtble*'~ i.e: 
general law (:d <Sg ... => NE ... > 
def i ni ti on (:.:) (0,.. <=> [E,.. v NE.., J) 
red . sent . <x> <S,.. => ED ... <=> R,..J) 
initial condition Sg. 
initial condition s . 
explanandum R. 
ESg: 'x is sugar•; NE : 'x is nonelectrolytically 
soluble'; D: '>:is solLtble'; E : '>:is electro-
1 bl ·· c• 'x 1's l·mmersed 1'n water' ·, lytically so u e·, ;::> . • • 
R: 'x dissolves'Jee 
Explanation (!b) still represents only an intermediate step 
towards a full explanation for R. as it could be given 
todaye• . But already we can make a number of 
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observations about <Ib) which we could not make about either 
<I> or <II> and which set apart an explanation in reference 
to solubility from the explanation parodied by Moliere . 
In virtue of the various reduction sentences for E and 
NE, we cannot only explain Cor predict> that the piece 
of sugar dissolves, but furthermore that the resulting 
solution does not conduct electricity well and that the 
sugar will not dissolve easily at low temperatures. 
Explanation Clb) is no less dispositional than <I> or 
CII>. However, it contains what one might consider 
higher- and lower-level dispositions, i.e . 
'nonelectrolyte solubility' and 'solubility'. 
It now turns out that in respect to more elaborate <Ib> 
the explanation put forth in <I> was nothing but an 
abbreviated way of talking . 
Also~ it should be noted that our scientists arrived at <Ib> 
only because <I> was neither discarded nor elevated to the 
status of an ultimate revelation, i . e. because D was treated 
as a problem-raising predicate. And finally~ we may surmise 
that the use of 'soluble' in <I> appears non-problematic to 
us largely because it is a n elliptical expression , that i s, 
because scientific understanding of the processes invol ved 
goes far beyond <I>, and because we feel confident that 
accordingly we could give a more comprehe nsive statement of 
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Chapt•r 2 - A1t•rnat1v•• 1n Sc1•nc• 
them. Our scenario so far can now be summarized: scientists 
decided to treat D as a problem-raising disposition term and 
subsequently investigated the problem raised by it; and as a 
result of their investigation D was rendered non-problematic 
as they arrived at higher level dispositions E and NE~ 
towards which in turn they can now adopt either a problem-
or mystery-raising attitudee7. 
The difference between the two dispositional ('soluble' 
and 'dormitive power"> explanations consisted at first only 
in the different attitudes adopted towards them. Due to the 
adoption of these attitudes~ the difference grew to be more 
complex. As opposed to the one-dimensional, mystery-raising 
dormitive power explanation~ our explanation of the 
dissolution of a piece of sugar now involves various levels 
of dispositionality and a non-problematic notion of 
'soluble". So~ if there were criteria which might supplement 
conditions CC:> and CD:> so that we could unequivocally 
distinguish scientific from non-scientific, empirically 
significant from empirically insignificant explanations, the 
juxtaposition of Cib> to <II> should afford us important 
clues. The interpretation of these clues might consequently 
enable us to shed further light on the difference between 
<I> and <II>. More precisely then~ to arrive at criteria 
that would supplement cc:> and CD:>, we would have to make 
explicit 
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Ci) the structural differences between explanations 
of types Clb) and (!!)~ and 
Cii) the reason that explanation (!)~ and net < II>~ 
was developed into full-fledged Clb); i.e. 
ideally~ why Cl) and net CII> is disposed to 
evolve into an explanation of type Clb). 
As far as (i) is concerned~ we shall see that there are at 
least two different interpretations of the difference 
between <Ib> and <II> and that the choice of interpretation 
is highly contingent upon scientific inquiry: depending on 
the outcomes of elaborate negotiation~ the difference 
between the two explanations either proves (Ib> as a 
certifiably scientific accomplishment or remains tenuous and 
tentative. Due to this contingency~ we also will not find 
any intrinsic er structural differences between <I> and 
<II>. Both are plain dispositional explanations and only the 
choice to treat <I> as problem- and <II> as mystery-raising 
renders <I> and not Cl!) entertainable as a 'scientific 
explanation• even if its empirical significance has not been 
demonstrated in full. 
In our step by step construction of scientific activity~ 
we thus arrive fer the first time at momentous junctures 
which require more than highly routinized decision-making. 
After all~ checking fer abductive success and satisfaction 
of conditions cc:> and <D:> is an almost mechanical 
procedure~ requiring no more than knowledge of deductive 
logic and the list of terms which at any given time belong 
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to the language of science. But~ while treating (!) as a 
problem-raising explanation seems to be the only choice to 
make in the context of modern science~ it nevertheless 
requires some bon sens or Urteilskraftea to make that 
choice and act in accordance with it. That it takes more 
than declared intent to make th~s choice becomes apparent 
when controversies arise as to whether ~ e . g . evolutionary 
biologists do in effect treat certain explanatory theories 
in a mystery-raising manner~ regardless of their professed 
commitments. Scientists often have to show by argument that 
indeed they are treating explanatory concepts in 
problem-raising ways . And similarly~ all the other choices 
on the road to the acceptance of (Jb) and of •soluble" as a 
non-problematic disposition term involve scientific 
negotiation beyond routinized comparisons of standards and 
criteria on the one hand ~ theories on the other. 
This~ then~ is our present standing in relation to our 
overall task : proposed explanatory hypotheses are the 
product of scientific activity, and routine decison-making 
ensures that scientific hypotheses are abductively 
successful and meet conditions <C : > and <D : >. From 
scientific activity emerge s at this point a set of 
alternatives concerning the further treatment of hypotheses . 
So far~ this set consists only of the choice between 
treating an hypothesis as either problem- or 
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mystery-raising. However~ as we undertak~ the promised 
comparison of <Ib> and (!I>~ we shall soon arrive at a more 
complete characterization of the alternatives at stake. 
iv. 
Assuming that explanation <I> is just like <II> in that it 
expresses all that we can say about the dissolution of the 
piece of sugar~ we can juxtapose (!) and <Ib> using several 
overlapping formulations: 
"Soluble" is a problem- or mystery-raising term in <I>~ 
non-problematic in (Ib>. 
Explanation (!) may or may not be scientific~ (Ib> 
surely is. 
There is only one reduction sentence for •soluble' in 
(!). Explanation <II> contains a definition and a 
reduction sentence for •soluble" and has at its 
disposal at least three reduction sentences for 
•nonelectrolytically soluble' as well as 
'electrolytically soluble" <the defining terms of 
•soluble"). 
In <I>~ the ascription of 'solubility• to an object 
serves to explain only why it dissolves . Knowing that 
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an object is nonelectrolytically soluble permits us to 
make three independent predictions about solubility~ 
conductivity of the solution~ and solubility at low 
temperatures. 
Each of these formulations expresses that (!b) differs from 
(!) insofar as •soluble" has become well-entrenched in a 
theoretical languagee~. If this is a plausible 
evaluation~ we should expect that the notion of 
•entrenchment in a theoretical language• can be so clarified 
that each of the foregoing formulations is reducible to a 
statement like "there is an (entrenchment) condition which 
is met by (!b) and not by (!)". This condition could then be 
useful as a further criterion for •scientific explanation•. 
Indeed~ the last of the four presumably roughly equivalent 
formulations affords us a clue as to what that entrenchment 
condition might consist in: it might require that any 
scientific explanation should have testable consequences 
other than its explananda. The connection with the notion of 
"entrenchment' is readily apparent: By itself~ an 
explanatory hypothesis in the form of a conditional general 
law entails only that an explanandum will be true if the 
initial conditions are fulfilled. The requirement that other 
testable consequences should be entailed by the explanatory 
hypothesis therefore makes sense only if we amend it~ so 
that it reads: 
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<D*) Any explanatory hypothesis in conjunction with 
appropriate background knowledge should entail 
testable consequences other than the explanandum 
which is entailed by the hypothesis and the 
satisfaction of the initial conditions alone. 
"Entrenchment• is now 'entrenchment within appropriate 
background knowledge•. In some cases~ the appropriate 
background knowledge may not be available yet. In the case 
of <Ib>, it is provided by the various reduction sentences 
for E and NE. Thus~ the presence of several definitions 
and/or reduction sentences for a single term is a sign of 
theoretical entrenchment precisely because it allows for the 
introduction of appropriate background knowledge and the 
deduction of further testable consequences. If we now simply 
add the stipulations that only an explanatory hypothesis 
which meets condition CD*> is (certifiably) 'scientific' arid 
that predicates occuring in such a hypothesis are 
•non-problematic', we have concluded our task of reducing 
the four formulations juxtaposing <I> and <Ib) to condition 
(0*>. The compelling simplicity of the proposal to include 
condition (0*) is only slightly marred by two problems which 
we may choose to consider minor and residual for the time 
being, i.e. the problems that, firstly, the status of <I> is 
still unclear, and ~econdly, that we have maybe prematurely 
decided not only that •soluble" is non-problematic, but also 
'nonelectrolytically soluble'. 
In effect, we have abandoned or modified one of our basic 
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assumptions~ the assumption concerning the symmetry of 
explanation and prediction. While we still maintain that 
explanation and prediction share the same logical form and 
that what happens to be an explanation in these 
circumstances could also be a test or prediction under 
different circumstances~ with <D*)~ pragmatic asymmetry of 
explanation and prediction has actually become a demand to 
be fulfilled by "scientific explanations·~o. Hempel and 
Oppenheim already envisioned this pragmatic asymmetry as a 
temporal or epistemic asymmetry modeled on any isolated 
instantiation of the H-O model. Without going quite far 
enough as to include the theoretical entrenchment of terms 
within the body of background knowledge~ they write: 
Let us note here that the same formal analysis 
[ ••• J applies to scientific prediction as well as 
to explanation. The difference between the two is 
of pragmatic character. If £ [the explanandumJ is 
given~ i.e. if we know that the phenomenon 
described by £ has occured~ and a suitable set of 
statements Czr c.r•••T ck [the 
initial conditions]~ Lz, L•r•••r Lr 
Ethe general lawsJ is provided afterwards~ we 
speak of an explanation of the phenomenon in 
que~tion. If the latter statements are ,,i ven and £ 
is derived prior to the ~ ccurence of the 
phenomenon : t describes~ we speak of a 
~rediction .•~ 
What Hempel and Oppenheim fail to take into account is that 
both our explanations (I) and <II> (the explanations in 
terms of solubility and dormitive power) are explanatory and 
predictive in this elementary sense. Moreover, as it is the 
crucial feature of prediction that it makes reference to 
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phenomena which are as of yet unknown, <D*> should be 
adopted for yet another reason: Hempel and Oppenheim 
conflate two distinct steps when they say that an 
explanation presuppes knowledge only of an £ for which we 
subsequently discover a suitable general law and a set of 
initial conditions . For we are not likely to discover these 
two things all at once and in such manner that the initial 
conditions just happen to be instantiations of the 
antecedent of the general law. On the contrary, the general 
law is chosen as suitable because we have observed that 
certain phenomena regularly concur with the explanandum and 
that they might do a good job as initial conditions. Thus, 
the explanatory use of a general law 
<x> CS" => R") expresses our antecedent knowledge 
of <S & R>. Indeed, one might suspect that only this 
antecedent knowledge of the regular concurrence of 
<S. & R.> gives rise in the first place to the 
formulation of the general law, or even, that only the 
observed concurrence of <S. & R.> gives risr to 
the notion that there is something worthy of an explanation 
here•2 • Now, while we can use the general law in 
conjunction with s . to predict R., we cannot very 
well consider this a prediction of a surprising or even 
unsuspected phenomenon. The predicted R. is unknown 
only in the most trivial sense that it has not yet been 
observed: a prediction of R. serves as a test only in 
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the most trivial sense of testing for the <continued) 
validity of a generalization~ i.e. of testing the uniformity 
of nature~~. Thus~ if we want our explanations to also 
serve as predictions of unknown facts~ we should look for 
those facts outside of the immediate explanatory scope of 
the general law. 
Everything paints to condition CD*> as a suitable 
supplement to CC:> and CD : >. Indeed~ Popper's 'independent 
testability·~ Lakatos• 'excess empirical content' and 
'prediction of novel facts·~ Goodman's •projectibility·~ 
Glymour•s •method of bootstrapping• Cin response to the 
"problem of old evidence">, as well as countless variations 
on these criteria all aim for more or less satisfactory 
specifications of CD*) 9 4 • 
And yet is seems that in his later work Carnap is rathe r 
skeptical towards the possibility of neatly collapsing t he 
notions of entrenchment and independent testability into a 
criterion CD*> for the empirical significance of scientific 
explanations. Instead, he shifts emphasis from the issue of 
empirical significance as a property of scientific theori e s 
to scientific activity as it manifests itself in an on-going 
process of negotiation and decision-making about the 
significance of entrenched terms as t hey occur in 
<undoubtedly scientific) explanations. Though hardly 
perceivable , the roots of thi s shift can already be found in 
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Testability and Meaning~ which provides a splendid account 
of entrenchment and theoretical progress: theories develop 
and science progresses as further reduction sentences and/or 
definition~ are introduced for scientific terms. 
If a property or physical magnitude can be 
determined by different methods then we may state 
one reduction pair or one bilateral reduction 
sentence for each method. The intensity of an 
electric current can be measured for instance by 
measuring the heat produced in the conductor~ or 
the deviation of a magnetic needle, or the 
quantity of silver separated out of a solution, or 
the quantity of hydrogen separated out of water 
etc. We may state a set of bilateral reduction 
sentences~ one corresponding to each of these 
methods. [ ..• J If we establish one reduction pair 
<or one bilateral reduction sentence) as valid in 
order to introduce a predicate "Q3·~ the 
meaning of "Q3" is not established 
completely~ but only for the cases in which the 
test condition is fulfilled. E ••• J We may diminish 
this region of indeterminateness of the predicate 
by adding one or several more laws which contain 
the predicate and connect it with other terms 
available in our language. These further laws may 
have the form of reduction sentences Cas in the 
example of the electric current> or a different 
form~~. [ •.. J Nevertheless, a region of 
indeterminateness remains, though a smaller one. 
( ••• J This region may then be diminished still 
further, step by step, by stating new laws.•• 
Ideally, then~ we will arrive ultimately at a set of 
bilateral reduction sentences for one predicate which will 
completely determine the meaning. Here~ a set of physical 
reduction sentences achieves the status of a virtual 
A set of reduction pairs is a partial 
determination of meaning only and can therefore 
not be replaced by a definition. Only if we reach, 
by adding more and more reduction pairs~ a stage 
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in which all cases a~e dete~mined~ may we go ove~ 
to the f o~m of a definition . ~e 
This sounds st~aightfo~wa~d enough . But it p~oves upon 
close~ sc~utiny to be the most puzzling passage in Ca~nap•s 
a~ticle and in need of revision Cas he himself would late~ 
~ealize). Fo~~ what happens as we ent~ench a p~edicate by 
adding fu~the~ ~eduction sentences~ and as we p~esumably 
app~oach the point at which the set of ~eduction sentence s 
can be somehow t~ansfo~med into a definition? 
To be su~e~ the~e is a ~athe~ clea~-cut case in which the 
addition of fu~the~ ~eduction sentences pe~mits scientists 
"to go ove~ to the fm-m of a definition". In that case ~ 
howeve~~ fu~the~ ent~enchment consists in the establishment 
of a biconditional (instead of a plainly conditional) 
~elation and has nothing to do with na~~owing the ma~gin of 
indete~minacy. And fu~the~mo~e , if we we~e to concei ve of 
CD*) along the lines p~ovided by this spec i al case~ it would 
end up as fa~ too ~est~i ctive a c ondition . The case is 
p~ovided by physical laws which a~e conjunctions of 
conditionals which a~e ~epresentable in the fo~m of an 
equation. Newton p~epares the fo~mulation of such a law in 
his 1672 pape~ on optics: 
To the same deg~ee of Ref~angibility eve~ 
belongs the same colou~, and to the same colour 
eve~ belongs the same deg~ee of Ref~angibility . 
Th e least Refrangible Rays a~e all disposed to 
exhibit a Red colou~ ~ and cont~a~ily those Rays ~ 
which a~e disposed to exhibit a Red colou~~ a~e 
all the least ~ef~angible : So the most refrangible 
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Rays are all disposed to exhibit a deep Violet 
Colour~ and contrarily those which are apt to 
exhibit such a violet colour~ are all the most 
Refrangible. And so to all the intermediate 
colours in a continued series belong intermediate 
degrees of refrangibility . And this Analogy 'twixt 
colours~ and refrangibility~ is very precise and 
strict; the Rays always either exactly agreeing in 
both~ or proportionally disagreeing in 
both.c;.~ 
In its simplest conceivable form~ the resulting equation 
might look like this: 
a = kb 
If k is a known constant~ a is virtually defined as kb~ and 
b as alk. At the same time~ the equation entails or consists 
of three predictive or explanatory conditionals about the 
measured values V for a and b. 
( >: ) <VaJo( _., - .... [Vb,.. = V a,.. /k J) 
(N) <Vb,.. => [V a .. = kVb,..J) 
<x) < [Va,.. ~( Vb,..J -··· .... [k = '·.)a,../Vb,..J) 1oo 
Presuming that the equation encapsulates Newton's discovery 
about refrangibility and the disposition to exhibit certain 
colours~ it introduces a dispositional property shared by 
all light-rays. The property D<a=kb) disposes a ray so that 
its refrangibility and its disposition to exhibit calor 
concur in such a way that there is a precise and strict 
relation between degree of refrangibility and the 
disposition to exhibit a certain color 101 • Since 
identity (in an equation) is extensionally equivalent to a 
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biconditional~ we can simply define D<a=kb) without having 
to fear the counter-intuitive result of having to attribute 
the defined predicate whenever the antecedent of the 
definiens is not satisfied. 
Of course~ one could also introduce D<a=kb> as the 
conjunction of three reduction sentences, each corresponding 
to one of the general laws stated above. 
( )·: ) <V a,.. 
( >~ ) <Vb,.. 
( >~ ) ( [V a,.. 
-··· 
- .. ·· 
=> 
~( 
CD<a=kb),.. <=> <Vb,.. = Va,../k)J) 
CD<a=kb),.. <=> <Va,.. = kVb,..>J> 
Vb,..J => CD<a=kb),.. <=> <k = Va,../Vb,..)J)102 
We can easily switch back and forth between this conjunction 
of reduction sentences to the definition of D<a=kb). Our 
ability to do so has nothing to do with the sheer number of 
reduction sentences and a presumed narrowing of the region 
of indeterminacy. Indeed~ all cases of 
-<Va. v Vb.> still belong to this region. And yet~ 
in contrast to Carnap"s assertion~ no further reduction 
sentences are required to "go over" to the definition, since 
the definitional form is yielded simply by the particular 
(biconditional) structure of the general law. To have 
biconditional general laws is a rare and fortunate privilege 
accrued within certain areas of some of the natural 
sciences. Therefore, if undue restrictiveness is to be 
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avoided~ a demand for this structure cannot be written into 
< D*) • 
Thus, Carnap must have had something else in mind when he 
conceived of theory development in terms of a progressive 
accumulation of reduction sentences which would ultimately 
lead to a definition~0~ . The notion of narr owing the 
region of indeterminacy of meaning provides the clue. The 
meaning of D, introduced by bilateral reduction sentence 
<8 => ED <=> RJ), is undetermined for -8. And a set of 
bilateral reduction sentences for D leaves it undetermined 
for 
. The meaning of D is completely determined when 
is true . At that time~ the reduction sentences "may be 
replaced by the definition"~ 04 
(8., g< R,.. > J . 
This proce dure creates the impression of an almost o r gan ic 
process of growth which culminates in a s mooth transition 
from reduction sentences to definitions: the accumulation of 
knowledge coincides entirely with the emergence of meaning. 
This impression~ however ~ is somewhat at odds with another 
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passage in Testability and Meaning and very much at odds 
with Carnap•s later development of the theme in The 
Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts. Consider 
our reduction sentences for NE: 
( >: ) ( s l. H = > [NE,.. < = > -F: l.,.. J) 
( >: ) ( 82,.. = > [NE,.. < = > -R2H J ) 
( >: > ( S::s,.. = > [NE,.. < = > -R::.•s.. J ) 
CNE: ">: is nonelectrolytically so-luble"; 8 1 : 
•x is dissolved in low-temperatured water•; 
R1: •x dissolves well at low temperatures•; 
82: •x is dissolved in water and the solution of 
x is tested for its <electrical) conductivity•; 
R2: •x conducts electricity well'; 8 3 : 
•x dissolves in water and the molecules of x have 
beforehand been subjected to a procedure determining 
their net electrical charge•; R::s: "the molecules 
of x bore net electrical charge before having 
dissolved in water".J 
Each of these sentences corresponds to a general law 
concerning all substances to which we attribute NE. In 
Testability and Meaning, Carnap makes the following remark 
about the cumulative introduction of such laws and their 
corresponding reduction sentences10e. 
This region [of indeterminacy of meaning] may 
then be diminished still further~ step by step~ by 
stating new laws. These laws do not have the 
conventional character that definitions have; 
rather are they discovered empirically within the 
region of meaning which the predicate in question 
received by the laws stated before. But these laws 
are extended by convention into a region . in which 
the predicate had no meaning previously; in other 
words, we decided . to use the predicate in such a 
way that these laws which are tested and confirmed 
in cases in which the predicate has a meaning, 
remain valid in other cases. 106 
In other words, we have to decide whether or not all three 
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reduction sentences for NE actually introduce one and the 
same concept. For~ 
strictly speaking~ for one concept no more than 
one test procedure must be given . If we specify ~ 
say for "electric charge" three test procedures~ 
then thereby we haven given operational 
definitions for three different concepts; they 
should be designated by three different terms~ 
which are not legically equivalent. 107 
When we decide whether or not "NE" designates the same 
property in each of the reduction sentences~ we are in 
effect negotiating the force of the "should" in Carnap•s 
last sentence . There are two ways of intrepreting the 
sameness of a term vis-a-vis the difference, strictly 
speaking ~ of concepts that are introduced each by only one 
bilateral reduction sentence: 
(i) We revise our reduction sentences for "NE"~ 
acknowledging that~ strictly speaking~ the 
three sentences introduce three different 
concepts, as for instance 
(:-:) (81>< => CNE1H <=> -R1H J). 
We may tentatively justify our continued 
use of the same term c•nonelectrolytically 
soluble ") for NE1, NE2, and NE~ 
by making an empirical claim stating that 
there is no substance to which we can 
attribute any of the three predicates 
NE1. NE2. or NE~ and to 
whi~h we.could not also attribute the 
other two if we conducted the appropriate 
tests . And thus, we might propose three 
pairs of hypotheses of the fo llowi ng kind~ 
which all together assert that the three 
concepts are co-extensive: 1 oe 
<H : > <:-:) CC8 1,. ~< -R1 .. J => [82 .. => -R2 .. J> 
<>: > < c s 1.. ~< -R 1 ... J = > [ 8~.. = > -R~ .. J > 
(ii> Foll·owing Carnap•s SLlggestion in Testability 
and Meaning, we decide to consider the 
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three reduction sentences as each contributing 
to a complete determination of the meaning 
of NE. Since, strictly speaking~ each 
reduction sentence introduces a different 
concept, we adopt the form of a definition 
to represent the meaning of NE. Though our 
three sentences do not yet eliminate the 
region of indeterminacy for NE 10~, we 
can commit ourselves to this preliminary 
formulation : 
NE<=> [(8 1 & -R1) V (82 & -R2) V 
(83 & -R3) V CJ . 
C is a residua l, as of yet unknown 
disjunction of those (8 & R>s wh i ch 
would complete the definition of NE . Thus , 
we do not present an empirical conjecture 
concerning the unified use of 'NE' . Rather , 
we introduce a rule for the unequivocal 
attribution of NE. We no longer need the 
bilateral reduc tion sentences to rule on 
its attribution, but we can preserve their 
purpose of linking that predicate to the 
general laws upon whic~ they were based, 
by transforming them into three conditional s 
of the form : 
(p:) (X) (NE"=) [81" =) -R1"]) 
In terms of its historical genesis, the 
definition of NE is based on the truth of 
each of these conditionals 1 10 • This close 
tie has been severed as the definition was 
presented : at most one of these conditionals 
has to be true for us to rule on the 
attribution of NE. Thus, if we want to 
preserve the information that was once 
represented b y the set of bilateral 
reduction sentences ~ we have to view 
these conditionals as meaning postulates 
rather than hypotheses 1 1 1 • 
The difference between (i) and (ii) is best illustrated by 
considering the following case. Some time after arriving at 
the state of knowledge expressed by explanation <Ib>, 
scientists discover a new substance a, dissolve it in water 
and find 
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i.e. a di ss·ol ves well at 1 ow temper-atur-es and yet the 
solution does not conduct electr-icity well. If we have 
chosen option (i)~ we attr-ibute '-NE1.' and 
"NE2•'· At the same time~ the fir-st of our- thr-ee 
hypotheses <H:> <on the co-extension of pr-edicates NE 1 ~ 
NE2, and NE3) has been falsified and we will have 
to look for- some suitable r-eplacement which mor-e accurately 
captur-es the r-elation between the dispositions to dissolve 
well at low temper-atur-es and to conduct electricity in 
solutions. In the course of that investigation, we may find 
that ther-e is absolutely no connection whatever- between the 
two dispositions: while conductivity is closely r-elated~ 
say~ to the net electr-ical char-ge on mplecules~ solubility 
at low temper-atur-es is a manifestation of~ ~ · ~y, the 
dispositional pr-oper-ty call. >d "diffusivity". However-~ if we 
adopt (ii ~ 1 the cour-se of things will be quite differ-ent. 
The definition leads to an unequivocal attr-ibution of 
NE 112 • But the fir-st of our- meaning postulates <P:> 
tells us that 
which clashes with our- finding of <S1. & R1.>. 
Now~ r-ather- than a falsification, ·we have befor-e LIS an 
anomaly: instead of investigating whether- or- not our-
definition or- meaning postulates should be r-evised~ we will 
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explore the particular circumstances which in this case are 
re~ponsible for an unanticipated observation 11 ~. 
Investigation of that anomaly leads to the finding, e.g., 
that some other forces are at work here which either 
effected solubility at low temperatures where none would be 
expected or diminished the electrical conductivity of the 
sol Llti on. 
Rudolf Carnap presented the issue in very similar terms. 
If a predicate is introduced by a single bilateral reduction 
sentence whi eh "constitutes the vJhol e meaning of the 
t.erm" 114 ~ then 
the negative result of a test for a disposition 
must be taken as conclusive proof that the 
disposition is not present. But a scientist, when 
presented with the negative result of a test for a 
certain concept~ will often still maintain that it 
holds, provided he has sufficient positive 
evidence to outbalance the one negative result. 
[ ••• J The scientist will point out that the test 
procedure for Io based on S and R should not 
be taken as absolutely reliable, but only with the 
tacit understanding "unless there are di stL1rbi ng 
factors" or "provided the enviromnment is in a 
normal state". Generally, the e>:plicit or implicit 
inclusion of such an escape clause in the 
description of a test pt-ocedure for a concept M in 
terms of a condition · s and a result R shows that M 
is not the pure disposition DsR. 11 e 
The pure disposition predicate which is introduced by one 
·bilateral reduction sentence admitting no escape procedures 
is here jw:taposed with theoretical terms which are "never 
completely interpreted" 116 and for which 
the test procedure involving S and R may well 
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admit of exceptions in case of unusual disturbing 
factors. 117 
The addition of further bilateral reduction sentences and 
therefore its further entrenchment transform a <pure> 
disposition term into a theoretical term 11 e : it 
introduces the option of pursuing either course (i) or 
course (ii) if a problem as the one discus sed just now is 
encountered. 
In the case of the virtual definition obtained from a law 
in the form of an equation~ we found ourselves able to move 
back and forth between a set of reduction sentences and a 
definition as easily as one can shift from a biconditional 
to a pair of conditionals. In contrast~ though options (i) 
and <ii) might each accurately represent the use of "NE" by 
the scientists who proposed explanation <Ib>~ the example 
has shown them to be by no means equivalent. This is not to 
say that they do not on occasion and under certain 
conditions converge . 
(ii> converges <rather~ reverts> to (i), when for 
whatever reason one starts contemplating a revision of 
the definition and d e cides to treat the meaning 
postulates as empirical hypotheses the truth or fals i ty 
of which would affect the construal of the definition; 
(i) converges to (ii} once one is convinced that 
hypotheses <H:> are true ~ i . e . once one knows t h e 
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predicates introduced by the different reduction 
sentences to be co-extensive~ i.e. to designate just 
one property. 
Identifying the condition under which <i> converges to <ii) 
is tantamount to specifying the condition under which we are 
justified in adopting (ii). Inversely, scientists who treat 
predicates according to (ii) therewith reveal that they have 
<tacitly) accepted <H:> as true. After all~ a definition is 
supposed to be non-creative, asserting nothing that could 
not be asserted without it: and the transition from the 
collection of bilateral reduction sentences to a 
<preliminary or complete) definition and a collection of 
meaning postulates is non-creative only if hypotheses <H:> 
are true, i.e. if all reduction sentences are known to 
introduce the same concept. 
Now, it is only at this point of convergence that a 
general law containing NE becomes independently testable and 
NE non-problematic. Remember that (!b) was thought to be 
better than either <I> or <II> since it satisfies some 
version of <D*). And it does so because the general law used 
in the explanation of R. C'a piece of sugar dissolves'> 
can also be used to explain or predict e.g. solubility (or 
non-solubility> at low temperatures and electrical 
conductivity <or non-conductivity> of a solution. Thus, a 
general law stating that all sugar is nonelectrolytically 
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soluble can be used to explain the dissolution of a piece of 
sugar and is also independently testable: we test the 
validity of that explanation by seeing e . g. whether sugar 
dissolves well at low temperatures or whether the resulting 
solution conducts electricity well. Each of these tests is 
based on one reduction sentence or meaning postulate of NE. 
The performance of the tests presupposes therefore that we 
are testing for one and the same property, i.e. that the 
three reduction sentences introduce co-extensive predicates. 
Thus, a general law is independently testable and a 
predicate non-problematic only at the point where (i) 
converges to (iil, i.e. only when the adoption of (ii) is 
justified or when empirical hypotheses <H:l are known to be 
true. But, when and whether they are known to be true is 
obviously not a question philosophers can decide. Scientists 
negotiate that issue continuously on evidential grounds: 
once a consensus has been reached, negotiation may be 
reopenend by the discovery of new evidence <as in the case 
of the substance which dissolved well at low temperatures 
and nevertheless made a nonelectrolyte solution) or by the 
introduction of a further reduction sentence for a predicate 
which will significantly expand set <H:) 119 • Moreover~ 
negotiation concerning the truth of <H:> may not be possible 
on evidential grounds alone~ i.e. the outcome of the 
negotiation may not be uniquely determined by evidence. 
Consider again the case presented above: those who propose 
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<H:> conjecturally and who pursue course (i) argue for its 
case in reference to the evidence provided e.g. by the very 
phenomenon which they perceive as a falsification of <H:>; 
yet~ those who maintain that <H:> is true and that 
postulates CP:> should remain untouched also argue with 
respect to evidence, e.g. to past experience and to evidence 
yet to be discovered if one follows up on their 
(content-increasing> ad-hoc hypotheses concerning sources of 
interference. Thus~ negotiation of <H:> is not only in 
principle interminable but may also prove to be difficult 
and tenuous. 
We can conclude our elaborate discussion of explanation 
<Ib> in terms of nonelctrolyte solubility by making some 
judgements on the fictional state of scientific knowledge 
which was presented here . Within the confines of our 
scenario~ •soluble" is now a non-problematic term. It is 
defined by <E v NE>~ and it is accompanied by the 
meaning-postulate that, if something is soluble as defined~ 
then it will dissolve upon being immersed in water. NE, on 
the other hand~ is not quite non-problematic. While the 
sheer number of reduction sentences proposed for NE reveals 
that we have preferred a problem- rather than 
mystery-raising attitude towards it~ we cannot be sure that 
hypotheses CH:> are true for NE . It is likely that the 
general law in <Ib> is independently testable in respect to 
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electrical conductivity or net-molecular charge on the 
solute molecules. But the determination of solubility at low 
temperatures may not be a test of the attribution of NE in 
the general law at all. The negotiation concerning the truth 
of hypotheses CH:> continues and we cannot be sure to what 
extent criterion <D*) has been met. We would nevertheless 
insist that (Jb) is far more advanced than either 
explanation <I> or <II> in respect to CD*)~ and that (!b) is 
therefore a better~ more significant explanation. 
We have thus driven a wedge between 'entrenchment' and 
"independent testability•. The notion of a "theoretical 
term• is associated with 'entrenchment•, while 
non-problematic and thus certifiably significant terms 
coincide with the independent testability of the laws in 
which these terms occur. Only the presumed truth of certain 
empirical laws smolders entrenchment and independent 
testability and makes <D*> applicable to a given 
law 120 • Rather than as a hard and fast criterion~ <D*) 
serves as a guiding light or regulative ideal in scientific 
inquiry: it is a goal of scientific activity to propose 
explanations which conform to CD*>. While non-satisfaction 
of abductive success~ CC:>~ or CD:> effectively terminates 
scientific activity in respect to a proposed explanation~ 
non-satisfaction of CD*> does not. For example, explanations 
proposed by 17th century chemists were abductively 
- 119 -
successful and met conditions CC:> and <D:>: for instance~ 
the key concept "phlogiston• designated the hypothesized 
substance corresponding to the dispositional property of 
burnability~ and was a well-entrenched theoretical term. 
Scientific negotiation accross paradigms finally led to a 
consensus according to which "phlogiston• is not empirically 
significant: under the pressure of the evidence presented by 
Lavoisier and other •modern• chemists~ it became more and 
more difficult to maintain a set of hypotheses <H:> which 
credibly linked the various uses of "phlogiston" 121 • 
Recogniz ing the gap between (mere> entrenchment and 
certifiable empirical significance allows us to consider as 
scientifi c activity the proposal and subsequent negotiation 
of explanations which we now know to be empirically 
insignificant 122. 
v . 
Our initial characterization of scientific activity stated 
that scientists were concerned with perceived regularities 
of nature for the purposes of explanation and prediction. 
Probing the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of 
•explanation•, we have now arrived at a mare elaborate 
statement. Scientists propose explanations which are 
abductively successful and fulfill minimal conditions <C:> 
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and CD:>; they then adopt a problem-raising attitude towards 
them~ seek further reduction sentences for the predicates 
intoduced by the general laws of the explanations~ and from 
then on negotiate whether those laws are independently 
testable and certifiably significant~ i.e. whether the terms 
occuring in the laws are non-problematic. One might add that 
independently testable laws and non-problematic terms are 
not any longer subject of scientific concern but simply used 
in the course of further inquiry into other matters -
unless~ of course, new evidence calls their status into 
question. 
Though this is still a pretty sketchy characterization~ it 
has already begun to generate 'alternatives in science'. 
Once a proposed explanation is abductively successful and 
meets conditions CC:> ~nd CD:>~ scientists have to choose 
between a problem- or mystery-raising attitude towards that 
explanation. Since only the choice of the former ensures the 
entertainability of an explanation and makes it a 
'scientific explanation'~ insofar as it now becomes the 
subject of further scientific negotiations, the choice in 
itself does not present much of a problem here. But as was 
pointed out before <see above~ page 98)~ it may become ~n 
issue whether demonstrably and regardless of professed 
intent a given explanation is actually treated in a problem-
rather than mystery-raising manner. Thus, that choice will 
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present a negotiable problem as it becomes the subject of 
controversy. The other set of alternatives arises when a 
second reduction sentence has been introduced for a term 
which is used in the context of an explanation: is that term 
still problematic or already non-problematic? If we decide 
that it is unproblematic~ we thereby declare it to be 
certifiably signific~nt~ we transform the extant reduction 
sentences into at least a preliminary definition and a set 
of meaning postulates~ we will view certain unanticipated 
observations as anomalies rather than falsifications~ and 
our explanatory laws will be independently testable. 
However~ making that momentous decision involves a possibly 
tenuous judgement on the truth of an empirical hypothesis 
ensuring the eo-extensiveness of the term in question in all 
the contexts of its theoretical use. The issue of whether a 
term is problematic or non-problematic may therefore 
resurface at any time during the life-span of a theoretical 
term. And of course~ there is another set of alternatives 
cutting across the others and lending further dimension to 
them: corisidering a term non-problematic is tantamount to 
accepting it~ considering it as mystery-raising is 
tantamount to its rejection as a scientific term~ yet in 
between we all along face the alternativ~ of <tentative or 
final> rejection and acceptance. 
I trust that the discussion so far motivated sufficiently 
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well these sets of alternatives in science. However, there 
is a conspicuous gap in our updated characterization of 
'scientific activity• where it is tacitly assumed that the 
adoption of the problem-raising attitude automatically 
entails seeking and finding further reduction sentences. 
Closer scrutiny of this tacit assumption shows it to be not 
quite true: making it involves yet another choice. 
Indeed, if we look back at our discussion of how to 
supplement minimal conditions CC:> and CD:> of empirical 
significance, we discover an analogous gap . At one extreme, 
we can say that explanations which are not abductively 
successful, or which do not meet conditions CC:> and CD:>, 
or towards which we adopt a mystery-raising attitude are not 
empirically significant and not entertainable as scientific 
explanations - and inversely, that a subset of •scientific 
explanations• among the set of all "explanations" is formed 
as soon as one adopts a problem-raising attitude towards an 
explanation which is abductively successful and meets 
conditions CC:> and CD:>. At the other extreme, we can say 
that independently testable laws and non-problematic terms 
are certifiably empirically significant. And for some of the 
middle ground between these extremes, we can say that we are 
actively engaged in a negotiation on whether theoretical 
terms (entrenched by two or more reduction sentences) are 
problematic or non-problematic . But what about an 
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entertainable • scientific explanation' in the form of <I> 
which contains an explanatory term which is purely 
dispositional? We have adopted a certain attitude towards 
it which expresses~ so to speak~ the good will to find 
further reduction sentences for that predicate~ and to make 
the term certifiably significant at some point in time. Yet~ 
how long can can one thrive on good will alone~ i.e. how 
long should one be willing to wait for the production of at 
least one other reduction sentence~ and under which 
conditions should we revoke our tentative acceptance of <I>? 
And even more pointedly: does one have to ever find an 
explanation of the form (!b) as a supplement to an 
explanation of form <I> in order to justify the acceptance 
of <I>~ be it as a true~ problem-raising~ entertainable~ 
scientific explanation or as a very promising potential 
answer to a problem? 
For instance~ the early history of •universal gravitation• 
revolves inter alia around the argument that one should 
adopt towards it a problem- and not a mystery-raising 
attitude <treating it as a vera causa)~ and that at the same 
time one should not expect to find an explanation <Ib) of 
why matter exerts gravitational force. The famous verdict 
"hypotheses non fingo• does not in principle rule out that 
an explanation of type <Ib) might be possible at some future 
time. However~ it effecticely rules out the search for such 
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an explanation for the present. Thus~ "universal 
gravitation• became a powerful explanatory tool without 
first becoming the subject of microstructural 
exploration 123 • The same situation holds whenever 
science reaches a fundamental level of explanation which~ 
for the time being~ is not considered a feasible subject of 
further investigation. Thus~ we would have to distinguish 
among problem-raising attitudes as we assess the promise and 
explanatory value of an entertainable hypothesis : 
firstly ~ there is a problem-researching attitude which 
considers the disposition-predicate as a 
placeholder-term that is subject of a <research) 
programme th~t will ultimately render it 
non-problem~tic 124 ; and 
secondly~ there is a problem-deferring attitude~ which 
considers the disposition-predicate a 
stopgap-device 12~, further research of which is 
considered not feasible at or undesirable for the time 
By choosing the placeholder-interpretation over the 
stopgap-interpretation for disposition predicates~ one !akes 
a commitment . to a set of expectation~ concerning the future 
development of scien :B in respect to the predicate in 
quest~ on. Accordingly~ one also provides a statement, if 
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only a weak one~ of the conditions under which the choice 
should be reconsidered. If~ within a certain period of time~ 
the immediate resarch perspectives do not nearly live up to 
the promise of the hypothesis~ and if the purely explanatory 
value of the hypothesis does not warrant its acceptance as 
problem-deferring~ it is probably most opportune to 
altogether reject the hypothesis as mystery-raising. 
By adding this third set of alternatives to the previous 
ones~ we conclude this chapter by presenting the following 
"boardgame-image• of science which serves to represent 
'scientific activity• in its synchronic and diachronic 
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Like all flowcharts, the •boardgame-image• of science 
provides a representational device for certain sequences 
rather than an implicit hypothesis concerning strict 
historical chronology. Due to a number of factors, many 
layers of the sequences represented in the flowchart will 
partially overlap in any given period of time . 
Often, various scientists can probably be found at 
different positions in the game. Thus, there is 
simultaneous argument <and search for evidence) at 
various levels of the chart. 
Scientific theories often contain several key-concepts~ 
any number of which may still be problematic (or become 
problematic again). In respect to certain terms of a 
single theory, we might accordingly find ourselves at 
different stages of the game. 
The chart itself contains a number of loops, i.e. it 
designates places at which upon certain judgements 
discussion of a predicate or the property designated by 
it may revert to any earlier stage. 
Each of these three factors may lead to the introduction of 
new relevant evidence which will affect other scientists~ 
other theoretical terms, and previously made decisions. 
As a device for representing alternatives and sequences of 
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decision-making at the core of scientific activity~ the 
flowchart presupposes only a minimum of normative 
considerations: the routine decisions concerning <R1> and 
<R2) (abductive success) and CC:> and CD:> express normative 
constraints on 'scientific explanation• as well as the 
demand that the problem-raising attitude should be preferred 
over the mystery-raising one. Beyond that~ the flowchart 
functions neither pre- not proscriptively. For instance, it 
is not implied that a predicate should be rendered 
unproblematic. Whether it should be or not~ will in any 
given case depend on matters such as its promise and 
explanatory value~ the availability of evidence, 
feasibility-judgements, demands for information, the 
competitive pressure exerted by rivaling theories, degrees 
of confirmation or corroboration, simplicity~ the frequency 
and character of anomalies or falsificatory instances etc. 
Judgement upon these matters may render a hypothesis that is 
interpreted in a problem-deferring manner as a perfectly 
adequate true scientific explanation 127 • 
While systematic issues are at stake at any point in the 
flowchart~ ~ the temporal dimension becomes prominent as the 
scientists enter into the phase of deduction and conclude 
their routine-assessments of abductive success and minimal 
empirical significance128 • The sheer passage of time 
weighs heavily during the phase between the choice of a 
- 129 -
problem-raising attitude and the presentation of a general 
law which serves to theoretically entrench an explanatory 
concept. One might expect that the collective deliberation 
of alternatives in science qua alternative attitudes to be 
adopted towards a disposition term is especially lively and 
explicit during this period of active waiting. The history 
of a theory which for a long time lingered in this <lively> 
position of relative stagnation may therefore provide a 
splendid illustration of the heuristic and taxonomic powers 
of our theory of alternatives in science . 
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1 According to the standard for the progressivity of 
methodologies which we adopted from Lakatos in the 
previous chapter~ 'maximally inclusive' and 'minimally 
pre-emptive' are relative to extant theories of science: 
both constraints lead to a maximally internal 
reconstruction of the history of science. 
2 Due to the constructive and as such somewhat 
arbitrary character of that task~ it is only appropriate 
that - by using words like •we• and 'us• - I explicitly 
invite the reader to join me in what can only work as a 
shared effort. 
~ These formulations are controversial among 
contemporary philosophers of science . Not all criticism 
of Hempel-Oppenheim's explication er Carnap•s programme 
can be discussed here. However~ an attempt will be made 
to show that in many cases the grounds for 
dissatisfaction serve to underline rather than subvert 
the well-suitedness of these proposals for the purpose at 
hand. From the point of view of <PI) and a research 
programme that is aiming only for a conceptual framework 
for the methodological discussions of scientists~ 
competing philosophies of science frequently appear 
complementary rather than contradictory. 
4 This kind of genetic approach towards a formulation 
of alternatives in science was also taken by B6hme 
et.al. (1972J~ p. 312. They maintain that alternatives in 
science present themselves at those junctures in the 
rational reconstruction of the history of science where 
methodological theories of scientific progress fail to 
uniquelY determine the future course of theory 
development. That is~ alternatives in science arise as 
the (purely) methodological pursuit of scientific 
activity generates such situations. On this account, the 
study of alternatives can then provide the "missing link" 
between the "internal relations (BinnenstrukturJ and the 
social relations [SozialstrukturJ of science". 
~ Compare e.g. Popper E1975J~ p. 191: 
it seems that when we speak of science we do 
feel. more or less clearly~ that there is 
something characteristic of scientific 
activity; and since scientific activity leeks 
pretty much like a rational activity, and since 
a rational activity must have some aim~ the 
attempt to describe the aim of science may net 
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be entirely futile. I suggest that it is the 
aim of science to find satisfactory 
explanations, of whatever strikes us as being 
in need of explanation. 
6 See Hempel and Oppenheim [1965), p . 249: 
an explanation of a particular event is not 
fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken 
account of in time, could have served as a 
basis for predicting the event in question. 
7 Hempel and Oppenheim [1965J, pp. 247f. 
8 Hempel [1965J~ p . 412. 
9 Since the deductive-nomological model of explanation 
has come under attack from various sides (see e.g . Levi 
E1969J~ Van Fraassen [1980]~ Cartwright [1983J>. I should 
make very clear what that representational devi~e 
represents: it designates artifacts which are the object 
of scientific negotiation. That is~ regardless of how one 
has arrived at an explanation and what further fitting of 
the facts to the theory is required~ the explanation will 
be presented in a form that is representable within the 
H-0 model. Indeed~ it would be most misleading to draw 
any inference from the form in which explanations are 
presented to the way in which explanations are produced. 
Cartwright E1983J, p. 104 rightly objects to this sort of 
interpretation of the deductive-nomological model: 
It is never strict deduction that takes you 
from the fundamental equations at the beginning 
to the phenomenological laws at the end. 
Cartwright's own construal of 'explanation" also includes 
a deductive relation of explanans to explanandum. It 
differs from the deductive-nomological account insofar as 
it does not admit a facile interpretation that places the 
general law in the explanans at the beginning of some 
temporal development~ the explained facts at the end. See 
e.g. p. 152: 
To explain a phenomenon is to find a model 
that fits into the basic framework of the 
theory and that thus allows us to derive 
analogues for the messy and complicated 
phenomenological laws which are true of it. 
In contrast to the position which Cartwright so 
convincingly attacks~ I do not propose that there is a 
diachronic analogue to the deductive structure of an 
explanation <though there is a diachronic analogue to the 
criteria of adequacy which those explanations are to 
meet). Further. I do not use the model to embellish a 
realist progra~me in the philosophy of science, i.e. I 
allow for all kinds of modelling and fitting of facts to 
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:1. C:> 
theories that would lead to constant modifications of the 
explanation under consideration. - The term "explanation" 
as used in this investigation~ can be replaced at any 
time by 'simulacrum account• CCartwright)~ 'semantically 
adequate account' <Van Fraassen)~ or 'application of a 
rLtle for material inference' <Levi). <Al:io: I believe 
that all the problems pertaining to deductive-nomological 
explanation also pertain to inductive-statistical 
explanation but not vice versa.) 
Hempel [ 1 965 J ' pp. 412f • 
11 Hempel [1965J, p. 249. 
12 
14 
One might also say that <R3) selects a subset of 
'empirical', 'informative•, 'non-vacuous•, or 'good' 
explanations. I have chosen the label 'scientific 
explanation' for two reasons. Firstly, it captures the 
intentions of the H-0 model of scientific explanation. 
Secondly, I will later argue that scientists who debate 
whether a given proposal is properly 'scientific' or not, 
ar·e actual! y attempting to apply <R3) (or a version 
thereof) to that proposal. 
Or, for a more drastic example, consider a child's 
question, "why is x so?", and the parent's answer, 
"because this is how things are", or, "because this is 
ho~>l it has .:11 ways been": the answer, in both cases, can 
be reconstructed in terms of <R1) and <R2) - serving as 
heuristic devices the two conditions are satisfied by any 
conjectural statement of a general law to which the 
parent has tacitly and elliptically appealed. 
To safeguard against misunderstanding, I should 
emphasize that the expediency of doing so is not at issue 
here. After all, the model is not intended to represent 
the beliefs of persons who advance an explanation. For 
certain contexts, a more accurately descriptive model is 
desirable. Thus, we find Arthur Dante on historical 
explanation and Donald Davidson on the explanation of 
actions adopting different models - only after 
acknowledging the applicability in principle of the H-0 
model. See Dante C1965J, pp. 201-232; Davidson [1980J, 
pp. 261-275. 
1e From here on in, 'explanation' ~hall be used only in 
reference to contexts in which an explanandum is to - hold 
because an explanans holds. 
16 It was pointed out (but not developed) e.g. by 




In the following~ I heavily draw upon Peirce~s 
theory of abduction (after 1901) as restated by Fann 
[1970]. -- The distinction between abduction and 
induction may involve an unintuitive notion of 
"induction•, delegating to "abduction• what is frequently 
considered paradigmatically inductive, namely the process 
of generalization. That Peirce himself held different 
views on this distinction, heightens the confusion. 
Contrasting the •early' and the "present• <1901) views, 
Fann writes on pp. 33f.: 
According to the early view both abduction 
and induction are •synthetic" in the sense that 
something not implied in the premises is 
contained in the conclusion. [ • .• J Induction is 
reasoning from particulars to a general law; 
abduction, reasoning from effects to cause. The 
former classifies while the latter explains. On 
Peirce•s present view any synthetic 
proposition, whether it is a nonobservable 
entity or a generalization (so-called), in so 
far as it is for the first time entertained as 
possibly true, it is an hypothesis arrived at 
by abduction. [ • • • J On the early view this last 
example of an abduction would have been called 
a "generalization" which would only be the 
result of induction. On the present view such 
generalization is suggested by abduction and 
only confirmed by induction. 
Here, only the later ("present"> view is appealed to. 
Peirce [1958-60], 5.171 (camp . also 5.590). 
1 ~ Ibid. 
20 Peirce [1958-60], 5.188f. 
2 1 See also Peirce [1958-60J, 7.202 and especially 
5.146: 
Abductive and Inductive reason i ng are 
utterly irreducible, either to the other or to 
Deduction, or Deduction to either of them, yet 
the only rationale of these methods is 
essentially Deductive or Necessary. 
~!early, Pei r ce"s theory of abduction is far more complex 
than what is considered here. And yet~ for example 
perceptual judge~ents - which according to Peirce are 
limiting cases of abduction - also conform to <R1> and 
<R2>, see e.g. 5.150 and Apel [1975J, pp. 208 and 300ff. 
zz "Abductive awe• designates a certain kind of 
response by scientists to a suggested explanation. The 
presence of abductive awe thus reveals the perc~ived 
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initial plausibility of that proposal. The connection 
between perceived initial plausibility and economical 
features such as caution or boldness. breadth. and 
simplicity is more than tenuous: the.latter · 
considerations enter into an evaluation of the 
anticipated future performance and usefulness of the 
theory~ i.e. its promise. Initial plausibility as it is 
revealed in abductive awe~ on the other hand, is a 
function of the degree of difficulty attributed to the 
task of coming up with any unified account for a given 
range of phenomena. Abductive awe looks backwards at an 
intellectual accomplishment while evaluation of promise 
is prospective. 
Lichtenberg [1975J~ p. 261 (J 1416> : 
Ist es ein Traum~ so ist es der grbsste und 
erhabenste der je ist getr~umt warden~ und 
womit wir eine LQcke in unseren BQchern 
ausfQllen kbnnen~ die nur durch einen Traum 
ausgefQllt werden kann~ und ist der Traum in 
sich zusammenhingend~ entfernt man sich nie 
von den Vorschriften einer richtigen Analogie~ 
so kann er ja die Wahrheit selbst sein oder 
ihre Stelle vertretten. 
Lakatos [1978cJ~ pp. 170-191. 
This verdict is tentative since it does not imply 
that stronger answers are impossible. On the strategy 
adopted here~ it may well turn out that scientists 
uniformly adopt the same way of supplementing conditions 
for •scientific' explanation. Upon the results of future 
research, we might inch towards stronger claims on the 
connection of methodology and scientific practice. 
Though most will agree that no other approach has 
been proposed~ it may not be obvious why (i) and (ii) 
actually present an exclusive and exhaustive disjunction 
of possible approaches. I suggest that - at this point -
•test• be considered a broad enough notion to inc lude any 
mediated or indirect method for determining •empirical 
content•. while <i> proposes the only direct and 
unmediat~d methods. --The difference between (i) and 
(ii) was a live issue e.g. in Carnap [1936/37J . On p . 423 
Carnap argued against Schlick that a sentence 
5 1 is confirmable not because of the 
logical possibility of the fact described in 
s1. but because of the physical 
po~sibility of the process of confirmation. 
Note that this preliminary formulation entails a 
falsifiability requirement: by modus tollens, there is 
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~et~ansmission of falsity f~om the test-statement to the 
conjunction of p~emises f~om which it has been deduced. 
Howeve~~ as of yet we a~e fa~ f~om making the additional 
methodological demand that 'falsification" should lead to 
the abandonment of any of those p~emises. 
As a limiting case the explanato~y hypothesis may 
itself be a test-statement. In this case. the testable 
statement is deduced f~om the explanato~~ p~oposition 
since it is t~ue that <P => P>. 
In a ve~y simila~ fashion. Pei~ce (in 5.197f .• see 
also 7.203) motivates the·t~ansition f~om the·p~ocess of 
'abduction• to 'deduction' in te~ms of how "good' 
explanato~y hypotheses can be designated. Indeed. this 
inqui~y into scientific decision-making seeks to. 
~evitalize Pei~ce's inte~est in deduction, the 'economy 
of ~esea~ch' and his conviction that "What is good 
abduction?" is "the question of P~agmatism" (5.197). 
Fa~ the p~esent pu~poses we can safely bypass 
Pei~ce's theo~y of signs by substituting 'model' fa~ 
"icon • . 
Pei~ce [1958-60J~ 5.161f. 
Pei~ce [1958-60J, 7.206. 
To be su~e, the notion of 'acceptance' always 
involves the notion of t~uth. Mo~e p~ecisely, then, the 
diffe~ent acceptabilities should be stated as 'to find 
t~ue that the sentences a~e t~ue•, 'to find t~ue that the 
sentences yield the st~ongest potential explanation•, 
etc. The notion of acceptance as employed he~e <and as 
employed by Pei~ce) thus coincides with 'fo~mation of 
belief'. --Condition <R4> as stated by Hempel and 
Oppenheim does not reflect a diffe~entiation of 
acceptabilities and ente~tainabilities. Thus, our theo~y 
of alternatives in science employs a mo~e gene~al 
equivalent to <R4> ~athe~ than <R4> itself. 
Fa~ this reason, the following will make extensive 
use of that text. 
Ca~nap [1956J, p. 53. To be su~e, it seems that in 
that late~ pape~ Ca~nap significantly modifies the view 
he held in Testability and Meaning. Howeve~, it will 
become appa~ent that the later a~ticle exp~esses a shift 
of pe~spective ~athe~ than of opinion. 






Carnap [1936/37), pp. 468-471 suggests that just one 
observational term, e.g. 'bright' or 'solid' may 
constitute a sufficient observational basis for the 
language of contemporary physics. 
Carnap [1936/37], pp. 454f. and compare p. 448 
(keeping in mind that the sentence 'P(b)' used in the 
explication of 'observable' is an atomic sentence.>: 
It should be noticed that the term 'atomic 
sentence', as here defined, is not at a . 1 
understood to refer to u lt imate facts. Our 
theory does not assume anything like ultimate 
facts . It is a matter of convention which 
predicates are taken as primitive predicates of 
a certain language L; and hence likewise, which 
predicates are taken as atomic predicates and 
which sentences as atomic sentences. 
Since "conventional' can be construed as 'relative to a 
reseach programme•, admission of conventionality is not 
at all tantamount to admission of arbitrariness into 
scientific discourse . 
Car nap [1936/37), p. 455. 
Car nap (1936/37], p. 443. 
Car nap [1936/37J,, p. 439. 
I .e. if the conditional is true it expresses a 
structural property of nature, if it is proposed as 
possibly true then it designates a presumed property 
nature. 
Since not all generalized conditionals are equal, 
of 
there is not always a need to name the structural 
properties expressed by them. (i) 'If x is immersed in 
water, then x dissolves• is not a physical truth. It is 
true only for certain objects. Conditionals like this are 
often used to introduce names far properties <e. g . 
'soluble'>, since the availability of these names serves 
the useful function of classifying physical objects into 
those which have that property and those which do not. 
Cii) 'If x is in the gravitational field of the earth, 
then x falls freely towards the center of the earth" is 
also not a physical truth, it is not true e.g. far gases. 
Like (i) , it introduces a property that serves to 
distinguish all objects into those that have it and those 
that do not. However, if we want to determine whether 
something has that property or not, we need not 
ordinarily question whether the antecedent condition is 
fulfilled, since, far all practical purposes within 




consequent suffices for defining that property: this is 
the limiting case mentioned above in which (conditional) 
physical reduction becomes (unconditional) definition. 
(iii) 'If>: is a swan~ then>: is white' . is <presumably ) a 
physical truth. It designates a property of nature . There 
is little need in cases like these to introduce a name 
for the dispositional property shared by everything that 
it is white under the condition that it is a swan. <iv) 
"If x consists of matter, then it exerts gravitational 
force' combines <ii) and (iii): the antecedent is always 
satisfied and the conditional itself a physical truth. 
Sometimes~ conditionals of this sort are called 'laws of 
nature•. Again~ the properties of nature tacitly 
introduced by such conditionals do not need to be named . 
It is presupposed that this definition meets the 
requirement that all terms occuring in the S- and 
R-statements belong to the old language~ i.e. that they 
either belong to the observational language or have 
previously been introduced by reduction <or a chain of 
reductions) to the observational basis. 
If this line of criticism is not sufficiently 
compelling in the case of •soluble"~ how about defining 
e.g. "electrical charge• as "deviation of a magnetic 
needle"? 
This view of scientific language has been elaborated 
and carefully defended by Shapere~ see especially his 
[ 1 984] ~ p • >: >:>:V : 
it is the concept of "reasoning" that is 
fundamental to the interpretation of science, 
and the interpretation of scientific language 
is derivative from that. 
Carnap [1936/37J, p. 440. - This becomes even more 
obvious when we transform the conditional so that the 
definiens of Dreads -CS & -R). 
This generalization does not encompass those cases 
where the antecedent of the conditional <S> happens to be 
always satisfied, whether trivially (if it is analytic) 
or contingently so <compare note 43 above). -- Gethmann 
[1980]~ p. 24 suggests that the paradoxical result of 
•soluble wood" stems from the mistaken choice of standard 
logic in the analysis of the definition. He argues that 
it would not arise in the framework of a non-standard 
logic ("Minimallogik") which permits us ·to draw the 
conclusion --R from the premises-Sand <S => R>, but 
which does not permit us to go from --R to R. Using this 
non-standard logic, the attribution of D is therefore not 
warranted on the basis of -s. However~ the issue before 
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us is not how certain conceptual problems concerning the 
introduction of disposition predicates can be bypassed or 
solved. The issue is rather how to best represent the 
problems . upon which scientists deliberate. I would 
suggest that scientific problems are most adequately 
framed within standard logic~ i.e. that we should impute 
to scientists that they adhere to standard logic. This 
imputation seems quite justified in view of the ong'oing 
scientific negotiation concerning the introduction of 
disposition predicates that are a bit more controversial 
than 'soluble'. But again~ the imputation is 
self-correcting in that it can lead to the discovery of 
greater sophistication in scientific ways of framing 
problems. (This argument applies mutatis mutandis to any 
other attempt at solving the problems associated with 
disposition predicates by altering the language in which 
they are commonly introduced, as e.g. the substitution of 
a 'subjunctive conditional' for the conditional by Fetzer 
[ 1981 J' pp. 36f f. ) 
Carnap [1936/37]~ pp. 442f. defines 'bilateral 
reduction sentence• as a special case of a "reduction 
pair", where: 
reduction sentence: s =.> <R => D> 
reduction pair: sl. => CR1 => D> 
s2 => CR2 => -D> 
Carnap [1936/37J, pp. 440f. - Again~ it is presumed 
that S and R can be expressed in the old language. -
here on~ following Carnap's convention (seep. 434), 




151 Carnap [1936/37J, p. 458. 
e2 This sentence represents the factual content of the 
bilateral reduction sentence and is therefore called 
•representative sentence·~ see Carnap [1936/37J, p . 451. 
153 A more precise formulation should eliminate the 
redundancies in the following. 
e4 Again~ a methodological con~ec~i~n between 
'falsification• and 'rejectlon· 1s not assumed here. 
ee Carnap was cited above a~ saying th~t ~he . _ 
possibility of introduct1on by law 1s very 1mportant for 
science 4 but so far not sufficiently noticed'' <Car-nap [1936/37J. p. 443). Yet, he himself did not elaborate the 
significance of this. The clear differentia~ion of •test 
for • and • test of' on the one hand, 'use' < 1 n general 
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laws, e>:planation and prediction) and 'mention' (in 
conditional definitions, bilateral reduction sentences) 
on the other hand, provides a first clue: after all. more 
often than not, reduction sentences remain tacit in. 
scientific discourse while the terms are introduced as 
they are used, i.e. in general laws. 
I believe Ryle [1949] was the first to emphasize the 
use of disposition terms in explanatory contexts. See 
e . g. pp. 124f.: 
Dispositional statements about particular 
things and persons are also like law statements 
in the fact that· vJe use them in a part 1 y 
similar way. They apply to, or they are 
satisfied by, the actions, reactions and states 
of t.he object; they are inference-tickets, 
which license us to predict~ retrodict, explain 
and modify these actions, reactions and states. 
[ . •• J Dispositional statements are neither 
reports of observed or observable states of 
affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or 
unobservable ~tates of affairs. They narrate no 
incidents. 
This account has raised the ire of so-called scientific 
realists like Mellor [1978]. While Ryle"s construal of 
dispositions accords well with their introduction by 
reduction-sentences, Melior's attempt to construe 
dispositions as real properties leads to some constraints 
on the introduction of dispositions which are not met by 
Car-nap's method. On closer scrutiny, however, Melior's 
account differs from Car-nap's only in one respect: he 
does not want to admit the inference [(S & R) =>DJ 
<Mellor [1978J, pp. 64f. and 71). Mellor does not provide 
an argument for this counter-intuitive exclusion. This 
might exemplify that in the debate on dispositions Cjust 
as anywhere else) the debate on realism versus e.g. 
conventionalism concerns a pseudo-problem in the 
philosophy of science. 
~7 Not even with inductive rules that will warrant our 
acceptance as true of the proposition that some 
proposition is entertainable or a 'scientific 
explanation". For, as we shall see, the minimal 
constraints elaborated here do not suffice when it comes 
to deciding whether or not to entertain a hypothesis. 
~e That •testability• and not •testedness' should be 
required, has always been taken as self-evident, even by 
Carnap. Compare also Hempel and Oppenheim"s formulation 
of <R3) in their [1965J, p. 248: 
The explanans must have empirical content; 




principle~ of test by experimentation or 
observation. 
While I do not wish to question the plausibility of this 
very basic assumption~ it should be noted that it leads 
to a self-exemplifying feature of the philosophy of 
science: Schn~delbach [1971J pointed out that 
'observable" and 'testable' (like 'confirmable". 
'falsifiable', etc.) are themselves disposition~terms. I 
believe that here it is crucial to follow Lakatos• 
intuitions on the relation of philosophy and history of 
science: Historical explanations brought forth by the 
science of science should meet our minimal requirements 
on 'scientific explanation' and on the use of 
dispositional predicates in the context of such 
explanations. Accordingly~ the key dispositional concepts 
introduced in this chapter can easily be brought ihto the 
form of bilateral reduction sentences satisfying CC:> and 
(D:> : just consider Carnap's (conditional) definition of 
'observable' as quoted on p. 68; CC:>~ transformed into a 
reduction sentence~ introduces 'testable'; and the answer 
to (D) will introduce 'entertainability• (given that a 
hypothesis is entertainable if and only if it fulfills 
minimum conditions of empirical significance). Of course~ 
this does not render these predicates unproblematic. On 
the contrary~ it establishes an uncanny continuity 
between science and science of science. [Incidentally~ 
one philosopher very aware of that continuity is Nelson 
Goodman~ who introduces the disposition term 
'projectible" in his [1973J, pp. 86f.J 
For Carnap's argument to that effect see his 
[1936/37J, pp. 25f. and 28f. 
Carnap's argument for 'observability• over 
·~ealizability• is stated in his [1936/37] on p. 462 <in 
his terminology~ this is the decision for "observability• 
over •testability'>. He presents a different sort of 
example: science may usefully distinguish people who are 
disposed to get a certain disease from people who are not 
so disposed simply by looking at those who at some time 
contract that disease and for whom we find that certain 
other properties hold - regardless of whether it is 
possible to experimentally test for that disposition 
<whether we can induce or produce the disease). 
This formulation has to be suitably amended in order 
to cover the occurence of several predicates D in a 
proposition: that proposition is empirical!~ significant 
iff it is testable in respect to each occur1ng D. -- For 
Carnap's statement of the decisions leading up to <D>, 
see his [1936/37]~ pp. 33ff. -As an example of how 





following sentence as an empirically significant 
proposition : 
If all minds (or: living beings) should 
disappear from the universe. the stars would 
still go on in their course~. Cp. 37> 
Of course, in order to interpret a lack of consensus 
as indicative of a fundamental problem, I have to assume 
not only that there is some agreement on this lack of 
consensus, but also that it should be ascribed to 
substantive problems in each of the competing approaches 
and not to stubborness on the part of certain factions. 
For an overview of the criticisms (in respect to 
disposition predicates) see Essler and Trapp C1978J. 
See above, p. 54. 
Pap [1963J, p. 570, Mellor C1978J. 
Essler and Trapp [1978] suggest a variation on 
Carnap"s method of introduction. Their reduction sentence 
explicitly expresses the belief that response R will 
unfailingly occur: 
(X) CCEt><S~t => <DH <=> <t>CSHt -> ~Ht~>>~ 
Thus, the bilateral reduction sentence for "having 
positive electric charge• may attribute that property 
immutably to all pieces of iron in a state that is 
temporally delimited by t~ and t2, where at 
t~ one sort of operation is performed on the object 
<so that it is charged) and at t2 another operation 
(so that it loses its charge>. This use of "immutable" 
may be counter-intuitive but it is unavoidable: if we did 
not construe 'immutability• for objects and states within 
longer or shorter time-intervals, every property woul~ be 
transient and the intuitive force of the distinction 
would be altogether lost. 
Though this cannot be substantiated here, I believe 
this to be true also for explanations in which the 
general law is statistical or probabilistic. 
The fact that many composers do not strictly follow 
the rules of harmony does not make these rules a less 
valid tool for researching the methods of those 
composers. Here too, the ways in which they deviate from 
these rules provide the master-clue for an assessment of 
their methods, significance, or style. 
Isaac Levi C1980J, p . 244 emphatically underlines 
these limitations of purely philosophical reasoning: 
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We improve our understanding of predicates 
such as "is compelled to attract iron filings 
placed nearby" by studying magnetic theory~ and 
not by studying possible worlds or any other 
armchair semantics. 
This can be nicely juxtaposed with Goodman (1973J~ pp. 
46ff. which equally emphatically maintains that 
disposition predicates should be defined: 
Philosophy~ to my way of thinking~ has 
rather the function of explicating scientific 
and everyday - language than of depicting 
scientific or everyday procedure. [ •.. J The 
argument that we do better to refrain from 
defining a term in explanatory discourse unless 
that term is customarily defined by scientists 
or laymen is like the argument that philosophy 
ought not to be coherent unless the reality it 
describes is coherent. One might as well argue 
that philosophy should not be written in 
English because the world is n~t written in 
English. There is no positive virtue in not 
defining disposition terms. (pp . 47f) 
Without wishing to discount the intuitive force of 
Goodman"s argument~ I should point out that we arrive at 
a position contrary to his not because we see great 
virtue in not defining disposition terms~ but because of 
the apparent impossibility of defining them in agreement 
with scientific practice <and it is not at all clear how 
Goodman has succeeded in giving a definition). 
This view has been expressed in a va -iety of ways. 
The most forceful statements can be found when the debate 
tL·rns on the question whether dispositional explanation 
is causal explanation (where it usually remains tacit 
that only causal explanation is properly scientific). 
Focussing points of this debate are statements like this 
passage from Armstrong [1969J~ p. 26: 
it is linguistically proper to id~ntify 
brittleness with that state of the brittle 
thing that~ if the object is struck~ causes it 
to break. It is linguistically proper~ I 
assert~ to say that brittleness is a certain 
sort of bonding of the molecules of the brittle 
object. In this I think I am following the way 
scientists are prepared to speak. 
This statement provides a nice example of 'armchair 
semantics• (see the preceding note>. For further 
contributions to the exchange surrounding Armstrong"s 
assertion~ see Squires (1968J~ Coder [1969]~ Stevenson 
[1969J. b~t also Ringen (1982]. Of these contributions~ 
only S~uires [1968J addresses the issue along the lines 




introducing a presumably unacceptable dispositional 
e>:pl anati on. 
This explanation exemplifies rather nicely Ryle"s 
notion that disposition predicates function as 
inference-tickets (see above~ note 56>. It should be 
noted that the disposition predicate could be eliminated 
from this explanation: the explanatory function of the 
disposition predicate is not that of a law. Rather. its 
occurence in a law activates a rule which licenses.the 
inference to the explanandum. Compare Levi [1969]~ pp. 
300f. which recommends this approach to dispositional 
explanation Cand a modified approach to statistical 
e>:planation). 
Here~ a variation on the reduction sentence might do 
a more compelling job: 
<>:) (y) CS •• .., => [D,.. <=> R..,J) ~ where S: • >: 
is introduced into y• and R: •y falls asleep•. 
No detailed argument for this should be needed here. 
Indeed~ given the symmetry of explanation and p~ediction~ 
the testability of the general laws in <I> and <II> 
obtains trivially: R. is not only the explanandum 
but also constitutes the truth-condition in a test of the 
attribution of D by the general law~ i.e. it tests the 
general 1 avJ. 
Moliere [1950J, p. 78. 
The use of •seemingly uninformative• and •apparently 
futile" indicates that neither <I> nor <II> are 
completely uninformative: both are generalizations 
asserting regularities of nature~ and both specify a 
causal agent or~ rather~ a substance in which we can 
presumably locate the causal processe~ at work. Compare 
Squires [1968J, p . 47: 
Thus it would be wiser to say~ not that a 
dispositional explanation gives the cause of an 
event. as that it shows where the cause is to 
be fo~nd. It is rather like saying that the 
weather is responsible for the good crops. This 
rules out certain explanations~ such as the 
richness of the soil or the special breed of 
corn. But it only indicates the area in which 
to look for a cause. [ •.• J Dispositional 
explanations leave room for certain_types of 
causal explanation rather than prov1de them . 
For a more comprehensive statement of this position, see 
Levi and Morgenbesser [1978J~ PP• 401f.: 
Disposition predicates~ like ceteris paribus 
clauses~ function as placeholders for 
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predicates specifying conditions in generalized 
statements . But they are not simply 
place-holders and differ from ceteris paribus 
clauses in a number of respects: Ceteris 
paribus clauses entail no commitment as to the 
kinds of predicates to be empldyed in replacing 
them; disposition predicates do. [ ..• J Thus. if 
we are told that objects break when tapped · 
lightly ceteris paribus, we are told very 
little about how the blatant deficiencies of 
this generalization as a law can be eliminated, 
save that Hemepl-Oppenheim requirements are to. 
be met . We do not know what kinds of predicates 
are to be used [ . • . J For all we know they may 
refer to observable conditions in the 
environment, observable features of the windows 
or the micro-structures of the windows. On the 
other hand, if we are told that fragile objects 
break when tapped lightly, we assume that if we 
are to improve or replace the generalization we 
should investigate the micro-structure of 
fragile objects. 
This distinction <and its ensueing differentiation) 
is taken from Levi [1967J, p. 194. 
It should be noted that presumed goal-directedness 
and teleological thinking is a problem here only insofar 
as it is entailed by the "mystery-raising" attitude: 
there is no intrinsic connection between teleology and 
the explanation as formulated in CII>. And indeed, while 
contemporary pharmaceutical scientists may not use 
"dormitive power", they do use equivalent predicates to 
divide all substances into •tranquilizers" and 
"non-tranquilizers• etc. Accordingly, our common-parlance 
explanation ''person a fell asleep because she took a 
sleeping-pill'' appeals precisely to the kind of general 
law as the one stated in <II) . [Incidentally, we find 
that by using mystery-raising explanations in order to 
underline the difficulties posed by disposition terms, 
philosophers appeal to an attitude which has become 
obsolete with the demise of Aristotelian science . ] 
For the following, I have consulted a few textbooks 
and dictionary articles on solutions and solubilities, 
especially Prausnitz [1982). However, I have made 
extremely eclectic use of these articles - in order to 
prepare the ground for the following discussion, without 
attempting to give a reconstruction of chemical history . 
Since historical accuracy is not the desideratum 





"solubility• in respect to various solvents other than 
water, and also, degrees of solubility. That is: 
•soluble" designates for now only the property of a 
substance to dissolve <vs. not-dissolve) in water. 
Of course, we will have to ask our scientists later 
on (rather, they will ask themselves) whether these 
differences between sugar and salt can all be attributed 
to the property of "electrolyte• versus •non-electrolyte• 
solLtbi 1 i ty. 
Prausnitz [1982J, p. 1048. - Throughout, this 
article makes quite clear that we are dealing here 
largely with dispositional properties of substances. 
Consider, for example, the use of the verbs •tend to• Cp. 
1047) and 'can' Cp. 1048>, and phrases like 'measure of 
the ability to' Cp. 1048) and •tendency to• <pp. 1048 and 
1050) • 
Having two reduction sentences seems redundant here, 
since we have the limiting case that E and NE form an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of soluble substances, such 
that not pelectrolytically soluble" coincides with 
"nonelectrolytically soluble". 
Indeed, in most contexts we might find this an 
excessivley elaborate explanation and we might actually 
prefer simple-minded <I> as a straight answer to our 
qLtesti on. 
Of course, there are other ways of formalizing the 
results of the reported episode in the history of 
chemistry. For instance, we could introduce another 
disposition Di: •x is disposed to dissociate into ions•, 
where 5 4 : •x is dissolved in water and is tested for 
ion-dissociation•, and where R4: •x dissociates into 
ions'. Now . we could introduce another reduction sentence 
for NE and.thus arrive at the following explanation CS: 
•x is immersed in water•): 
<>:) (Sg,.. => -Di,.. > 
(>:) CS,.. => ENE,.. <=> -Di,..)) 
(:·:) <D ... <=> (E ... V NE ... J) 





The following discussion pertains to this formalization 
<and many other possible scenarios) as well as to the one 
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Fo~ instance~ on what may be the deepest level of 
ene~gy conside~ations~ the p~ocess of dissolution is 
tantamount to a dec~ease of the value ~esulting f~om 
enthalpy minus the p~oduct of absolute tempe~atu~e and 
ent~opy. <Compa~e Prausnitz [1982]~ p. 1052.> 
The development desc~ibed he~e could be dubbed 
"p~og~essive disposition-shift'. Afte~ all~ the sketchily 
const~ucted sto~y of the successively mo~e tho~oughgoing 
explanation of R. p~esents an analogue to Lakatos' 
theo~y of p~og~essive problem-shifts in the g~owth of 
scientific knowledge: while he was focussing on the 
adjudication between ~ivaling theo~ies~ I am he~e 
p~ima~ily conce~ned with linea~ (non-~evolutiona~y> 
g~owth of knowledge in no~mal science. In both cases~ new 
p~oblems a~e substituted fo~ old ones. Indeed~ Lakatos's 
methodology was most nea~ly adumb~ated by Levi and 
Mo~genbesse~ [1978] on disposition p~edicates <compa~e 
the extensive quote f~om thei~ a~ticle in note 67 above>. 
-- The p~ogessive substitution of highe~ level 
disposition p~edicates fo~ lowe~ level ones <which 
indicates the ineliminability of diposition te~ms> has 
also been pointed out <though diffe~ent lessons have been 
d~awn f~om it> by Squi~es [1968], p. 45; Mello~ [1978]~ 
p. 70; Poppe~ [1968]~ p. 424; A~mst~ong [1978]~ pp. 417f. 
and 420; and Fisk [1978]~ pp. 207f. 
Unfo~tunately~ it is impossible to histo~ically 
pu~sue this topos in the histo~y of epistemology. Compa~e 
e.g. Duhem [1954J~ p . 218: 
We a~e thus led to the conclusion so clea~ly 
exp~essed by Claude Be~na~d: the sound 
expe~imental c~iticism of a hypothesis is 
subo~dinated to ce~tain mo~al conditions; in 
o~de~ to estimate co~~ectly the ag~eement of a 
physical theo~y with the facts~ it is not 
enough to be a good mathematician and a 
skillful expe~imente~: one must also be an 
impa~tial and faithful judge. 
Duhem himself asc~ibes his emphasis on common sense to 
the influence of Blaise Pascal. Howeve~, it may well be 
wo~thwhile to place into this context Kant's Urteilskraft 
as a mediate~ in the "play of the cognitive faculties" 
<see section VI in the p~eface to the Critique of 
Judgement>: 
ou~ judgement makes it impe~ative upon us to 
p~oceed on the p~inciple of the confo~mity of 
natu~e to ou~ faculty of cognition, so fa~ as 
that p~inciple extends~ without deciding - fo~ 
the ~ule is not given to us by a dete~minant 
judgement - whethe~ bounds a~e anywhe~e set to 
it 0~ not . Fo~ while in ~espect of the ~at ional 
- 147 -
Notww to Chaptwr 2 
employment of our cognitive faculty bounds may 
be definitely determined~ in the empirical 
field no such determination of bounds is 
possible. <Kant [1911J, pp. 28f.) 
In the following, the term 'entrenchment• is used as 
a theoretical primitive~ if only preliminarily. Nelson 
Goodman uses it as a criterion for 'projectibility' in 
his [1973J, p. 101. To that end~ he considers only the 
comparative entrenchment of terms occuring in rivaling 
theories. Without the luxury of such a restriction. the 
question arises just what it means for a term to b~ 
entrenched. After having dealt with this question, 
'entrenchment' will designate the beginning of a 
particular stage in the development of a theory. That 
this stage is full of uncertainties (i . e . that to be 
entrenched can mean quite different things> jeopardizes 
Goodman's definition of 'projectibility' - and this is 
significant insofar as Goodman's transcendental argument 
for the definability of disposition terms depends on the 
successful definition of •projectibility•. 
Indeed, one may now recall that Peirce's notion of 
'deduction• <see above, p. 64) entailed a tacit demand 
for the pragmatic asymmetry of explanation and 
prediction. At the time~ it appeared as an apparent 
asymmetry of abduction and deduction . 
Hempel and Oppenheim in Hempel [1965J, p . 249. 
Compare also Hempel [1965J, pp. 366f. 
The underlying notion of progressive problem-shifts 
in the history of science can be crudely sketched as the 
following sort of progression: We regularly (not 
necessarily always> observe <8. & R.> and by 
manipulating and observing some more we find that 
unfailingly (8. => R.> obtains. Now we 
formulate the general 1 avJ <>: > < 8,.. => R,..) whi eh 
explains R. if initial condition 8. is 
fulfilled. We continue our investigation by looking for a 
Q. such that we regularly observe 
CQ. => [8. => R.J > which leads to the 
formulation of <>:> (Q,.. => [8,.. => R .. J> ~ 
which explains <8. => R.> if initial condition 
Q. is fulfilled . Etc.etc. - This applies to all 
three of our e>:planations so far : <I>, <II>, and <Ib) . 
One can identify six evidential states vis-a-vis a 
general 1 aw of the form <>: > <8 .. => R .. >: ( i ~ 
c - 8 ~~ -R > ; c i i > < 8 8< R > ; < i i i > < -8 ~< R > ; < 1 v > Q; < v > -Q; 
<vi> (8 & -R> [where Q is a consequence of our general 
law in conjunction with suitable background knowledge ]. 
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ways than one. This is no new idea. <Mellor-
[ 1978 J ~ p. 69) 
On this account, a disposition becomes a r-eal pr-oper-ty as 
we learn mor-e about it. Her-e, again, the presumed 
conflict between r-ealism and conventionalism dissolves as 
one consider-s mer-ely the dynamics in the gr-owth of 
knpwledge. -- Finally, for a stimulating discussion of 
the pr-oblem of 'old evidence' (a cr-itique of Glymour- fr-om 
a Bayesian per-spective>, see Gar-ber- [1983J. 
As in Clb) which included the definition 
[D <=> <E V NE)J. 
Car-nap [1936/37), pp. 444f. 
I speak her-e of 'vir-tual definition' r-ather than 
'definition' in or-der- to acknowledge that a ter-m 
vir-tually defined by a set of bilater-al r-eduction 
sentences most pr-obably was originally intr-oduced not by 
definition but with the help of plain physical r-eduction 
sentences. And fur-ther, that ther-e may still be 
independent means of attr-ibuting that ter-m <or- at least 
par-tially determining its meaning). While 'definition' 
often r-efer-s to the adoption of a convention that fixes 
the meaning of a pr-edicate, 'vir-tual definition• mer-ely 
char-acterizes a for-m of par-ticular-ly tight entr-enchment 
in a language. Thus, as was pointed out by Kuhn [1983J, 
Newton's Second Law vir-tually defines 'for-ce' and is 
never-theless empir-icalfy contingent (it is an "a>:iom" and 
a "law"). The notions of entrenchment and progr-essive 
entr-enchment (leading up to vir-tual definitions) thus 
shed light on Kuhn's claim that one cannot lear-n cer-tain 
scientific terms without lear-ning some other-s. 
Car-nap [1936/37J, pp. 449f. 
Newton [1958J, p. 53 [p. 3081 in the or-iginal). 
1ooThese three general laws ar-e not quite on a par. The 
first two pr-edict the outcome of a physical operation 
(measuring), the last the outcome of a mathematical 
oper-ation on two measur-ed values. 
1o1Again, we will find that proper-ties char-acter-ized by 
equations ar-e not always given a name. Pr-esumably~ this 
depends largely on whether- the disposition is considered 
non-pr-oblematic or- pr-oblem-raising. <Curious testimony to 
this lack of names is the occasional use of the 
mathematical str-uctur-e of the equation for a name~ for-
instance: 'inver-se-squareness• taken as a pr-operty of 
physical states.) 
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~ 02Note that the above-stated general laws in 
conditional form (as opposed to the bilateral reduction 
sentences) are true only for a limited domain (e.g. all 
gases~ a ll light-rays) . In the contex t of an e x planation, 
therefore, we would have a general law very much 
r-esembling the ones employed in (!). <II>. and (!b). e . g. 
(>:) ER .. => D<a=kb> .. J . where R: '>: i~ a . . 
light-ray". · 
103 Indeed, the case of a law i n the form of an equation 
was not discussed by Carnap in this context. 
104Carnap E1936/37J, p. 450. 
10eCarnap"s example <very much akin to ours) consists 
of the three reduction sentences introduced in connection 
with the different modes of measuring the intensity of an 
electric current (which were cited above on p . 105 ) . 
106Carnap E1936/37J, pp . 445f. 
107Carnap [1956J, p. 64. - Carnap does not sufficiently 
appreciate this in Testability and Meaning. Indeed, it 
seems that only the criticisms of Pap E1963J, pp . 575ff ., 
Hempel E1963J, p. 689, and Bridgman [1938] drew his 
attention to this point. Hempel's argument makes it clear 
that the problem arises not only from sets of bila~eral 
reduction sentences, but also from an ordinary 
(non-bilateral) reduction pair as defined above in note 
49. Indeed, the problem can be avoided only if a given 
term has only one bilateral reduction sentence, i . e . if 
it is a 'pure disposition term" in the sense of Carnap"s 
[ 1956]. 
1oaThus. if we want to maintain that the concepts 
intr~duced by n reduction sentences are coextensive and 
designate just one property , we are required to 
conjecturally propose all nCn - 1) hypotheses in the set 
CH:>. -- Bridgman [1938] , p . 122 recommended the adopt i on 
of this approach: 
The e quivalenc e of two operations is 
establ i shed by experiment and we must always 
adopt the attitude that the results of such an 
experimental proof may be subject to revision 
[ ... ] 
10 "'After all. (>:) <She V s2 .. V s3 .. ) is 
not an em~irically true proposition. 
1 1oThese conditionals are entailed by the respective 
bilateral reduction sentences . 
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111 1 hope to clarify this contention in the ensueing 
discussion. Compare Carnap E1956J~ p. 48: 
the specification~ not only of the rules C 
[correspondence rules]~ but also of the 
postulates T~ is essential for the problem of 
meaningfulness. The definition of 
meanihgfulness must be relative to a theory T~ 
because the same term may be meaningful with 
respect to one theory but meaningless with 
respect to another. 
I suggest that one can read this as ''the same term may 
fulfill condition CD*> with respect to one theory and not 
~ith respect to another''. To be sure, Carnap seems to 
have envisioned a more limited role for meaning 
postulates: 
the theory T which is here presupposed in 
the examination of the significance of a term, 
contains only the postulates, that is, the 
fundamental laws of science~ and not other 
scientifically asserted sentences, e.g., those 
describing single facts. <Carnap [1956J, p. 51) 
i 12 I am disregarding here that, in the present case we 
happen to have two definitions for NE: since E and NE 
form an exclusive and exhaustive set of all solubles, the 
second definition in the present case is <NE<=> -E). The 
scenario envisioned here would lead to an attribution by 
definition of E. Therefore, we would end up with 
conflicting attributions of NE and -NE anyway. -- It is 
not important, though, whether this sort of case is an 
exception or the rule - since it will be shown that the 
the choice of definition vs. set of reduction sentences 
is only symptomatic as far as the significant underlying 
difference between (i) and Cii) is concerned. We are not 
dealing with intrinsic properties of definitions versus 
bilateral reduction sentences. 
11 3 It should be noted that to treat the conditional not 
as a meaning postulate but as a falsifiable empirical 
hypothesis would put all of our theory in serious 
jeopardy. Just consider: if we remove that meaning 
postulate Cor hypothesis>, the definition of NE would 
still be unchanged. Thus, if we should consequently 
encounter a state of affairs in which 
[(81.& -R1.> & CS2.& R2.>J obtains, 
we would still have to attribute NE even though an 
empirical connection between solubility at low 
temperatures and having property NE is nowhere subject of 
empirical law. Furthermore, it would require us to also 
remove the meaning postulate (or hypothesis) stating that 
substances with property NE form solutions which do not 
conduct electricity well. And so forth. COne might argue 
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that this scenario seems too outrageous, since scientists 
in a situation like this would certainly modify their 
definition. This is probably true. However . once one is 
ready to give up the definition. one in ef~ect reverts to 
a set of bilateral reduction se~tences, i . e. to option 
<i>. The scenario discussed in this note, though it may 
be unlikely, is framed for option Cii).) 
114Carnap [ 1956]' p. 66. 
1 u:scarnap [ 1956J' pp. 68f. 
116Carnap [ 1956 J' p. 67 . 
117Cat-nap [ 1956J' p. 69. 
116The distinction is clear enough. I am not sure, 
however, whether it sustains the contrast between 
'observational' and 'theoretical' terms . After all, 
simple observational terms are particularly well 
entrenched and characterized by a very great number of 
reduction sentences - and would thus have to be 
considered disposition terms which have turned into 
theoretical terms. Thus, Popper [1963J, p. 211 suggests 
that the term 'water' "is dispositional in perhaps even a 
higer degree" than 'soluble', where the "higher degree" 
is due to the greater number of reduction sentences which 
makes 'water' more theoretical than 'soluble'. Maybe the 
'observational' - 'theoretical' juxtaposition can be 
restored by stipulating that all 'non-problematic' 
theoretical terms (e.g . all those for which hypotheses 
CH : > in (i) are true) function as observational terms. 
Concerning the distinction of pure dispositions and 
theoretical terms, compare also note 111 above and Carnap 
[1963J, p. 950: 
Today I would think [ ..• J that the question 
of whether a given disposition is in itself a 
disposition, has no clear meaning. J would 
relativize the term 'disposition' with respect 
to a language, as Pap suggests . Disposition 
terms of a given language are then 
characterized by the fact that they are 
introduced into this language in a certain way. 
Considering all of this together, it becomes a pparen t 
that Carnap [1956J with its emphasis on theoretical terms 
represents not so much a change of opinion but rather a 
change of perspective in respect to Carnap [1936/37J with 
its emphasis on <pure> disposition terms : while the 
earlier article focusses on the introduction of terms, 
the later one on how to characterize terms within a fully 
developed theoretical structure. 
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119See above~ note 108. 
120Maybe it should be pointed out here, that this is 
not a criticism of the notion of independent testability . 
There is nothing like a vicious circle here . I am simply 
trying to show that it takes a negotiated consensus in 
order to consider a law independently testable - and that 
this negotiation has to go beyond the contemplation of 
<I b) and the number of r e duction sentences for NE . 
121 This is not to say that analogous hypotheses <H:> 
were shown to be true for Lavoisier's brand of chemistry. 
-- On the tenuous proce ss of negotiation across 
<incommensurable) par a d igms in the case of phlogistic and 
"modern' chemistry, see Nordmann [1986J . 
1221 believe that from the point of view of the history 
of science~ it is a major result of the approach adopted 
here that one can call phlogistic chemistry 'scientific' 
even though its key concept was ultimately proven to be 
empirically insignificant. For further examples of 
non-referential theories see Laudan [1984J, pp. 103ff . 
and especially p . 121 . -- That independent testability 
and condition (0*) have to be relativized to the state of 
negotiation over empirical hypotheses <H : > at any given 
time is undesirable only in respect to a quest for a 
'logical grammar' of scientific predicates, i . e. for a 
theory of scientific language which tries to avoid being 
contingent upon the results of scientific inquiry . As to 
the 'desirability' of our results, we are now in a 
situation very similar to the one concerni ng the propos al 
for dealing with the tacit immutability requirement: Pap 
[1963J ~ p . 570 complains in respect to the immutability 
requirement : 
But even if solub ility were a permanent 
disposition which is never ·acquired nor lost by 
a substance , this would be a contingent fact, 
not something impl i cit in the 'logical grammar• 
of disposition predicates. 
I am here trying to turn this argument against Pap by 
posing the rhetorical question : "What is there for the 
philosophical reconstruction of scientific language to 
accomplish , if it does not elucidate the forms in which 
results of scientific inquiry into contingent matter s of 
fact are stated at various stages of 
theory-development?" . 
123! am suggesting here that 'universal g~avita~ion• 
was not an independently testab le pred1cate 1n the sense 
of (0*) . Whether Newton's hypotheses non fingo serves as 
evidence for this suggestion hinges upon issues such as 
i) whether 'independe nt testability' presupposes 
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entrenchment in such a manner that an instantion of the 
entrenched predicate appears in the explanandum of a 
higher-level explanation~ i.e. that it does not only 
serve explanatory purposes but is also itself explained; 
or ii) whether the scope of the original explanandum 
(which in turn generated abductive awe and thus partially 
motivated initial acceptance) turns all that is contained 
in the explanandum into "old evidence" which cannot serve 
a significant confirmational function. For the case of 
•universal gravitation·~ I cannot address these issues 
here. The ensueing chapter will contain a closer analysis 
of a somewhat related episode in the history of science. 
124 ln most contexts the term 'diposition predicate• is 
used for predicates to which a problem-researching 
attitude has been adopted~ i.e. for disposition terms 
which are presently considered defective in view of the 
research goal which has not been reached yet. See Levi 
[ 1978 J' pp. 318f. : 
In ma~y contexts~ disposition terms -
especially explicit disposition terms - do not 
meet the standards for terms to be used in in 
fundamental explanation adopted at the time. 
But investigators may, nonetheless, rest 
content with such explanations for the moment 
recognizing the need for further investigation. 
It is in this sense alone that disposition 
predicates are to be construed as placeholders. 
The placeholder-view of disposition predicates has been 
argued most forcefully by Levi and Margenbesser [1978J, 
p. 402~ and Levi E1980J~ pp. 237ff. Similar statements 
can be found in Quine E1978J~ pp. 156f.~ Armstrong 
E1978J~ pp. 419ff.~ Tuomela [1978]~ pp. 427 and 431~ 
Melior [1978]~ pp. 67f.~ Squires E1968J~ p. 47~ Stevenson 
[1969]~ p. 198~ and Ringen E1982J~ p. 123. 
12eThis juxtaposition of "placeholder-term' and 
•stopgap-device• is a bit unorthodox. Indeed~ the two 
terms are often used interchangeably. I have chosen this 
juxtaposition for lack of a better idea <the German would 
allow the juxtaposition of Platzhalter- and 
Leerstellenbegriff). 
12•At this point, it should be pointed out again that 
this theory of alternat~ves in science is inspired by a 
brief passage in Levi E1967J~ p. 194: 
whether or not a predicate is to count as 
dispositional depends in part an theoretical 
commitments. Thus whether or not 
motive-attributions are dispositional depends upon 
whether an investigator considers explanations 
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that contain motive-predicates to be in need of 
further explanation in terms of some more 
'fundamental' theory <e.g .~ a physiological 
theory) . Given this ( • . . )account of 
dispositionality, three distinct kinds of 
disposition predicates can be listed: 
(i) Problem-raising disposition 
predicates: No basis has yet been 
specified~ but the need for such a 
basis is recognized. 
(ii) Mystery-raising disposition 
predicates: No basis is specified~ 
no basis is held necessary~ but the 
predicate is still considered 
dispositional. C ••• J (as in the case 
of 'has dormitive power'). 
(iii) Non-problematic disposition 
predicates: A basis has been 
specified. In this case~ the 
disposition predicat2 can be taken 
as an atbreviation of an adequate 
description nf the basis. 
The account offered in the present chapter differs from 
Levi's presentation only in the subdivision of (i) into 
problem-research and problem-deferring predicates <where 
the inclusion of the latter emphasizes that even pure 
disposition-terms can function as causally explanatory>. 
127Accordingly~ assessments concerning the 
progressiveness or degeneracy of a research programme 
cannot be made relative to the present location of a 
predicate in the chart, but only by considering that 
location together with the scientists• own expectations, 
rivaling programmes, etc. 
128Again, we are reminded of Peirce's perceptive 
discussion of 'd~duction' as a tenuous and difficult 
operation on a newly proposed general law in conjunction 
with appropriate background knowlegde, rather than as a 
simple <atemporal) recognition of the consequences 
entailed in what is already known Cas quoted above on p. 
64) 
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---------------------
The preceding account of scientifi c activity was designed 
to serve as a very broad representational scheme which is 
adaptable to scientific negotiation at any stage of 
theory-development. It thus predicts only in a very weak~ 
near-trivial sense that any episode in the history of 
science can indeed be represented within the theory of 
alternatives in science. Therefore~ it is not the purpose of 
the following venture into the history of evolutionary 
biology to somehow confirm that account. But the inquiry 
into the negotiations concerning Darwin's theory of natural 
selection may exemplify the classificatory power or 
t§~QDQilli~ usefulness to the scientist of science of the 
theory developed in the preceding chapter. Since the 
ensueing discussion of that episode in the history of 
biology also prepares that case-study for a probe <in the 
concluding chapter) into decision-making, argumentation~ and 
rationality in science, the heuristic usefulness of that 
conceptual framework for the business of rational 
reconstruction may also become apparent. And finally, there 
is some additional fall-out along the way as conceptual 
issues concerning the theoretical status of Darwin's theory 
can be clarified. 
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A review of neither the primary nor the secondary 
literature on the case of Darwin and 'natural selection' is 
possible here. Instead, only the most important stages of 
the argument and the historical development of Darwin•s 
theory shall be highlighted 1 • 
i . 
In 1859 Charles Darwin published his On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection . Rarely has the title 
of a book so aptly <and plainly> captured its content. For 
indeed, the book is <in Darwin's own wot-ds > "one 1 ong 
argument from beginning to end"•~ which aims to 
establish that 'species' originated by means of natural 
selection. At times~ that argument appears somewhat 
baroque3 , but nevertheless it is just one , clearly 
focussed argument . Its aim is to establish an explanation of 
the origin of species by means of natural selection. Now, 
the very notion of a natural origin implies the mutability 
of species. It is therefore generally agreed that the 
evolution of species (including their speciation and 
adaption) should be considered the explanandum of Darwin 's 
argument~ along with e . g . geographical dist ribution . 
Darwin's argument thus provides an explanatory mechanism for 
"large classes of facts" which for the most part he did not 
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have to discover himself: 
No educated person~ not even the most ignorant~ 
could suppose that I mean to arrogate myself the 
origination of thee doctrine that species had not 
been independently created. The only novelty in my 
work is the attempt to explain how species became 
modified~ & to a certain extent how the theory of 
descent explains certain large classes of facts; & 
in these respects I received no assistance from my 
predecessors. 4 
The limited claim to originality precisely delimits the 
scope of Darwin"s relevant contribution: the achievement of 
the Origin lay in the introduction and defence of •natural 
selection• . Accordingly various reconstructions of Darwin"s 
argument have shown the deductive relation between the 
explanatory theory of natural selection and the 
<phenomenological) theory of evolution which is part of the 
explanandume. Michael Ghiselin~ in particular~ has 
emphasized the deductive-nomological structure of the 
argument: 
The theory supposes that there are variations 
and this is an obvious fact. It also states that 
for a given structure, sometimes, two different 
variants have different effects in furthering the 
lives of the individuals. Thus it is predicted 
that if there are variations~ if these are 
inherited~ if one variant is more suited to some 
task than another, and if the success in 
accomplishing that task affects the ability of the 
organisms to survive in whatever happens to be 
their environment, then natural selection will 
produce an evolutionary change. Such conditional 
statements are basic to the Darwinian theory, and 
this conditionality has given rise to much 
confusion. 6 
One source of the confusion is the lack of a clear referent 
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for the term 'natural selection' in this statement. While it 
appears in the consequent of Ghiselin's long conditional, it 
also designates some further condition which in conjunction 
with the clauses of the antecedent produces evolutionary 
change. On the account adopted in the previous chapter~ a 
somewhat more intuitive deductive-nomological reconstruction 
of Darwin's argument recommends itself. It construes 
'natural selection' as a disposition predicate~ that is~ as 
a predicate introduced by a reduction sentence which <like 
Ghiselin's formulation) assigns the term 'natural selection' 
to a conditional consequent of a conditional. This construal 
of 'natural selection' as a disposition predicate takes its 
clue from the following passage of the Origin and it is 
borne · out Cat least~ not contradicted) by the entire work 
and its subsequent development in scientific negotiation. 
Several writers have misapprehended or objected 
to the term Natural Selection. Some have even 
imagined that natural selection induces 
variability~ whereas it implies only the 
preservation of such variations as occur and are 
beneficial to the being under its conditions of 
life. No one objects to agriculturalists speaking 
of the potent effects of man's selection; and in 
this case the individual differences given by 
nature, which man for some object selects~ must of 
necessity first occur. Others have objected that 
the term selection implies conscious choice in the 
animals which become modified; and it has even 
been urged that as plants have no volition~ 
natural selection is not applicable to them! In 
the literatal sense of the word, no doubt, natural 
selection is a false term; but who ever objected 
to chemists speaking of the elective affinities of 
the various elements? - and yet an acid cannot 
strictly be said to elect the base with which it 
will in preference combine. It has been said that 
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I speak of natural selection as an active power of 
Deity; but who objects to an author speaking of 
the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements 
of the planets? Every one knows what is meant -and 
is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and 
they are almost necessary for brevity. So again it 
is difficult to avoid personifying the word 
Nature; but I mean by Nature~ Only the aggregate 
action and product of many natural laws~ and by 
laws the the sequence of events as ascertained by 
us. With a little familiarity such superficial 
objections will be forgotten. 7 
In the Origin~ Darwin introduced the disposition predicate 
•natural selection• and he attributed it to 'Nature•. In 
full~ that disposition attribution may read somewhat like 
this: 
Nature is disposed to select the fittest. 
However~ at the time when Darwin was writing the Origin~ he 
provided an even more extensive and still more accurate 
interpretation of •natural selection• in dispositional 
terms. 
I had not thought of your objection of my using 
the term "natLtral selection" as an agent. I use it 
much as a geologist does the word denudation - for 
an agent~ expressing the result of several 
combined actions. I will take care to explain, not 
merely by inference~ what I mean by the term; for 
I must use it~ otherwise I should incessantly have 
to expand it into some such (here miserably 
e>: pressed) formLtl a as the fall owing: "The ten<iency 
to the preservation (owing to the severe struggle 
for life to which all organic beings at some time 
or generation are e;-:posed) of any~ the slightest~ 
variation in any part~ which is of the slightest 
use or favourable to the life of the individual · 
which has thus varied; together with the tendency 
to its inhel~itance." 6 
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It is not only the vmr-d "tendency" which supports the 
dispositional constr-ual of 'natural selection'. From this 
passage also emerges a structural feature shared by this and 
other disposition predicates. Darwin speaks of 'natural 
selection' as "the result of sever-al combined actions". At 
the same time, however, he treats this •result' as a cause: 
Natural Selection almost inevitably causes much 
Extinction of the less improved forms of life, and 
induces what I have called Divergence of 
Character-. <'l' 
While further- research will have to elaborate the precise 
character- of the compositional effect, for now, r-eference to 
that effect can serve explanatory purposes. 
Like all disposition predicates, •natural selection' is 
introduced by a reduction sentence, i.e. together with a 
cor-responding law that is true of all those states which 
have the disposition to • (naturally) select the fittest": 
<:·:)(t) _., - .... 
•sN• stands here for a conjunction of two 
stimulus-conditions: variation and heredity . 'RN' 
encompasses a whole rang~ of partly or entirely ov~r-lapping 
res~anse-phenomena: evolution, speciation, extinction, 
adaptation, geographical distribution, r-eversion, and 
variability 11 • Thus, if there is variation and 
heredity, then the property to select the fittest obtains if 
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and only if there is evolution~ adaptation etc. 12 So 
introduced, 'natural selection• can fulfill its explanatory 
purpose. To say that a species underwent an evolutionary 
change because of natural selection is tantamount to 
proposing an explanatory scheme of type <I> <see above, p. 
89), where 'E' is an environmental state of 'nature•: 
(>:) <E,.. => N.:,tSel ><) 
(:-: > <S,.. => CNatSel >< <=> R,.. J) 
E,.. 
s .... 
That is, a species underwent an evolutionary change because 
the following conjunction of circumstances hold: every 
environmental state of nature has the disposition to select 
the fittest; having that property means for a given state 
(at least> that if variation and heredity obtain in that 
environment, then a species will undergo an evolutionary 
change; and there is environment a and variation and 
heredity obtain in it. To be sure, the explanation as stated 
is deficient somewhat like Ghiselin's conditional. The role 
and meaning of 'natural selection• in this explanation is 
not clear. Indeed, all that one can say about 'natural 
selection' is that it desighates a site for further 
research~ namely the site that is only vaguely described as 
an environmental state in which variation and heredity 
obtain 1 ~. After all, Darwin did not put forth the 
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unqualified conditional 
( >: ) => [S - ··· .,.· F: J) 
which is entailed by the general law and the reduction 
sentence of his explanandum but which does not capture that 
crucial perspective towards further research 14 • 
Darwin's formulation calls for an empirical clarification of 
what it means for an environmental state to have the 
property to "naturally select the fittest•. This pursuit 
will be satisfied <as in the case of sugar and solubility> 
once one is able to say what else must be true of an 
environmental state that has that property~ that ·is~ what 
else besides •variation·~ "heredity·~ "evolution·~ 
"adaptation• etc. as these terms appear in the reduction 
sentence far •natural selection'. In short~ •natural 
selection• appears as a placeholder or stopgap device in the 
explanatory hypothesis proposed by Darwin. An empirical 
inquiry of that property will adopt a placeholder view of 
•natural selection• and it will aim for independent 
testability. 
ii. 
Undoubtedly~ the first question to be asked about this 
reconstruction of Darwin's argument concerns its advantages 
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compared to other reconstructions. Once again~ for present 
purposes the criterion of comparison lies in the 
historiographic power or utility of the competing 
reconstructions. And yet, in this case the historiographical 
virtues happily coincide with a conceptual clarification as 
one looks at the issues which Darwin had to a ddress after 
introducing "natural selection•. 
Just like the dispositional property "soluble", •natural 
selection' is either a placeholder or stopgap device in 
Darwin's scientific explanation. If one returns to the 
passage from the Origin which suggested the dispositional 
interpretation of "natural selection·~ a further analogy 
between "solubility• of "dormitive power• and 'natural 
selection• emerges . In it, Darwin complains that 
It has been said that I speak of natural 
selection as an active power of Deity ; but who 
objects to an author speaking of t h e attraction of 
gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? 
Every one knows what is meant and is implied by 
such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost 
necessary for brevity.1e 
The complaint is directed against a mystery- raising 
interpretation of his theory . To fend off teleological 
readings of any sort was one of the difficult tasks before 
him . As in the case of "solubility• and 'dormitive power• 
the outcome of the choice between the problem-raising and 
the mystery-raising attitude it not determined one way or 
the other by the formulation of the explanatory account 
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itself. Indeed, questions as to whether evolutionary 
biologists fall back into a mystery-raising attitude have 
been raised intermittently ever since the inception of 
Darwin's theory~~. 
While modern philosophers have largely overcome the worry 
of Darwin 's contemporaries that the theory of natural 
selection might be teleological~7 , they have introduced 
the specter of another mystery-raising interpretation of 
Darwin, one that has also been raised in connection with 
•solubil~ty' , but one that has hardly worried Darwin and his 
contemporaries~8 : they have suggested that the theory 
as presented by Darwin is (in crucial aspects, at least) 
tautological, e.g. that 'adaptation' defines 'fitness' while 
it is supposed to explain 'fitness·~•. Now if one looks 
at the reduction sentence (a conditional definition> for 
'natural selection', the plausibility as well as severe 
limitations of this interpretation become quite apparent. 
The presumed tautological character of the theory arises as 
soon as one drops the antecedents or test-conditions of the 
reduction sentence. The temptation to do so is small in the 
case of 'solubility• . It looms large in the case ot 'natural 
selection' since - as Ghiselin said - "there are variations 
[and heredity] and this is an obvious fact''. However, if the 
antecedent in the reduction sentence for 'natural selection• 
is always satisfied, that is quite contingent and an 
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empirical matter. Accordingly one truncates the reductions 
sentence at one's own risk~ especially since the history of 
evolutionary biology has shown that the clarification of 
'natural selection' is closely linked to a better 
understanding of the processes involved in variation and 
heredity. If one takes into account the whole reduction 
sentence and the corresponding empirical laws~ there is 
clearly nothing tautological about the theory of natural 
selection . But to be sure~ once variation and heredity are 
taken for granted~ Darwin's placeholder predicate or stopgap 
device does not provide a particularly informative internal· 
relation between e.g. fitness and adaptation. Thus, to claim 
that the theory is tautological is wrong even if one limits 
it to Darwin's original formulation. On the other hand, the 
predicate 'natural selection' should not be taken to denote 
anything deeper than a well-delineated area for future 
The problems posed by 'natural selection' can thus be 
framed in analogy to the problems posed by 'solubility'. And 
incidentally, doing so helps to clarify a . few persisting 
conceptual problems. 21 
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i i i. 
In the passage which was cited above~ Darwin chose the 
label "metaphorical e>:pression" for "natural selection". It 
proves to be a very useful label in a context of negotiation 
where the introduction of a disposition predicate by one 
sweeping reduction sentence is at stake. For~ it firstly 
captures its openness for interpretation and the need for 
its clarification. That is, it emphasizes that one has to 
adopt a problem-raising attitude towards it. For, 
unquestioning acceptance of that predicate for explanatory 
purposes would amount to a mystery-raising treatment. By the 
same token, the label "metaphoric e>:pression" remains 
uncommitted as far as the next alternative is concerned~ 
i.e. the question of whether to adopt a problem-researching 
or a problem-deferring attitude. Darwin"s position on this 
matter is particularly clear in a letter to Hugh Falconer: 
You make important remarks versus Natural 
Selection~ and you will perhaps be surprised that 
I do to a large extent agree with you. I could 
show you many passages~ written as strongly as I 
could in the Origin , declaring that Natural 
Selection can do nothing without previous 
variablility; and I have tried to put equally 
strong that variability is governed by many ldws, 
mostly quite unknown. My title deceives people~ 
and I wish I had made it rather different. ( ••• J 
for years I was stopped dead by my utter 
incapability of seeing how every part of each 
creature Ca woodpecker or swallow, for instance) 
had become adapted to its conditions of life. This 
seemed to me, and does till seem~ the problem to 
solve; and I think Natural Selection solves it, as 
artificial selection solves the adaption of 
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domestic races for man's use. But I suspect that 
you mean something further~ - that there is some 
unknown law of evolution by which species 
necessarily change; and if this be so, I cannot 
agree. [ ••• J If~ indeed, an elephant could succeed 
better by feeding on some new kinds of food, then 
any variation of anykind in the teeth which 
favoured the grinding power would be preserved. 
Now, I can fancy you holding up your hands and 
crying out what bosh! To return to your 
concluding sentence: far from being surprised, I 
look at it as absolutely certain that very much of 
the Origin will be proved rubbish; but I expect 
and hope that the framework will stand . 22 
Here, a rejection of a mystery-raising interpretation of 
•natural selection' is repudiated23 , while a 
placeholder-attitude towards it is forcefully advocated. In 
due course, the framework will be filled out, and future 
research will have clarified the meaning of 'natural 
selection': 
As in time the term must grow intelligible the 
objections to its use will grow weaker and 
weaker. 24 
But Darwin also argued that 'natural selection' may be 
interpreted as a stopgap-devi~e . To this end he frequently 
employed references to the history of physics : 
I believe that this view in the main is correct, 
because so many phenomena can be thus grouped 
together and explained. But it is generally of no 
use; I cannot make persons see this . I generally 
throw in their teeth the universally admitted 
theory of the undulation of light, -neither the 
undulation nor the very sxistence of ether being 
proved, yet admitted because the view explains so 
much. 2 e 
Darwin's argument for the t e ntative acceptance of ' natural 
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selection' in the absence of di~ect evidence has to ~emain 
somewhat indiffe~ent to the choice between the 
problem-~esea~ching and the p~oblem-defe~ring attitudes. 
Indeed~ to enable that latte~ exchange~ 'natural selection' 
had to be made palatable to the minds of those who would 
want to make it subject of immediate investigation as well 
as to those who would see in it a cogeRt explanto~y theo~y. 
iv. 
So much fo~ Da~win's cont~ibution to the negotiation of 
"natu~al selection•. The ~est is history- and the ove~all 
patte~n of its fu~ther development is also ~ep~esentable 
within the scheme developed in the p~evious chapte~. 
The negotiation conce~ning a p~efe~~ed inte~p~etation fo~ 
the disposition p~edicate 'natural selection' continued well 
into this centu~y. With the tempo~a~y demise of 
Da~winism26 evolved a cont~ove~sy on the choice between 
placeholde~ and stopgap inte~p~etation. The sturdiest 
defende~s of Da~winism had adopted a Humean notion of 
causality in te~ms of constant conjunction. On this notion 
of causality~ adopti~n of a stopgap~ p~oblem-defe~~ing 
attitude towa~ds "natu~al selection' amounted to waiving all 
speculation conce~ning the processes unde~lying natu~al 
selection. Instead~ the efficacy of natu~al selection was 
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measured with statistical methods. In accordance with the 
idea of "constant conjunction·~ the efficacy of natural 
selection is presumed to consist of continuous small-case 
variation which becomes perceptible as it cumulates. In the 
words of W.F.R. Weldon, one of the main proponents of this 
"biometrical" point of view~ 
numerical data ( ••. J contain all the information 
necessary for a knowledge of the direction and 
rate of evolution. Knowing that a given deviation 
from the mean character is associated with a 
greater or less percentage death-rate in the 
animals possessing it, the importance of such a 
deviation can be estimated without the necessity 
of inquiring how that decrease or increase in the 
death-rate is brought about, so that all ideas of 
'functional adaptation' become unnecessary.~7 
The biometricians• statistical and purely phenomenological 
rather than experimental methods encountered harsh criticism 
in the scientific community: The biometricians' 
methods of attempting to penetrate the obscurity 
which veils the interactions of the immensely 
complex bundle of phenomena which we call crab and 
its environment, appear to me not merely 
inadequate~ but in so far as they involve 
perversion of the meaning of accepted terms and a 
deliberate rejection of the method of inquiry by 
hypothesis and verification, injurious to the 
progress of knowledge.2e 
The opponents of the biometricians wanted to gain ~n 
understanding of the causal processes underlying or 
determining natural selection, they held a placeholder view 
of 'natural selection'. With the rediscovery of Mendel's 
work in genetics, these opponents of biometrics had found 
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their home. Historians of the controversy therefore 
juxtapose the parties to the conflict in the following 
terms: 
In Biometry~ the extent of hereditary 
resemblance~ and thus the strength of heredity~ 
was given directly~ by definition~ as the degree 
of manifest resemblance between "phenotypes" <as 
we would say) . For a Mendelian, on the other hand, 
such superficial resemblance could only be of 
significance as an indicator of the operation of 
Mendelian factors. The latter we re the source of 
all inherited resemblance or variation. Only 
explanations in terms of these factors ultimately 
counted as contributions to knowledge about 
heredity . 29 
Having found a physically localizable 'cause' for heredity~ 
variation~ and evolution , the Me~delians abandoned Darwin's 
notion that change is continuous and proceeds in small 
steps. And 'natural selection' became an obsolete notion . 
But while the Biometricians appeared overly cautious in 
their avoidance of empirical specLtlation, the Mendelians 
overrated the explanatory force of Mendelism . As Julian 
Hu>: 1 ey observed: 
Bateson did not hesitate to draw the most 
devastating conclusions from his reading of the 
Mendelian facts . [ .•. J he concluded that the whole 
of evolution is merely an unpacking . The 
hypothetical ancestral amoeba contained - actually 
and not just potentially - the entire complex of 
life's hereditary factors. The jettisoning of 
different portions of this complex release d the 
potent i alities of this , that, and the other group 
and form of life . Selection and adaptation were 
relegated to an unconsidered background. E . •• J The 
biometricians stuck to hypothetical modes of 
inheritance and genetic variations on whi=h to 
exercise their mathematical skill; the Mendelians 
refused to acknowledge that continuous variation 
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could be genetic, or at any rate dependent on 
genes~ or that a mathematical theory of selection 
could be of any real service to the evolutionary 
biologist. ::so 
Huxley presents his view of the controversy under the 
heading "The Eclipse of Darwinism". Statistical research 
upon a stopgap interpretation of •natural selection• was 
degenerating and threatening to become a self-serving and 
mystery-raising mathematical exercise. The genetical 
r esearch programme which was to render the placeholder 
predicate •natural selection• obsolete~ appeared to take a 
mystery-raising twist of its own. It was high time for 'the 
great synthesis' of population genetics which would combine 
some of the biometricians•s methods as well as Mendelian 
theories31 • 
The great synthesis inaugurated a research programme which 
is still active today. At its foundation lies a placeholder 
view of •natural selection•. While •natural selection' is 
now an independently testable~ theoretical term32 ~ one 
is still far from wondering whether molecular and population 
genetics have rendered it unproblematic~3 • Indeed~ some 
of the research which has led to the independent testability 
of •natural selection• has also given rise to new 
controversy. It will be remembered that the independent 
testability of theories depends on the acceptance of certain 
empirical propositions which ensure that in the various 
contexts one is actually testing for the same 
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property34 • The contemporary controversy on the 'units• 
and "levels" of selection exemplifies the difficulty of this 
negotiation: the move to the genetic level allowed for a 
radically improved conception of •natural selection"·; at the 
same time~ it led to notions such as the •selfish gene" 
which may or may not work towards the preservation and 
survival of the organism of which it is a part; and 
scientists are now faced with the question of how to best 
preserve a unified conception of "natural selection•. 
v. 
Once the territory has been staked out and the historical 
development framed as a succession of choices between 
certain alternative interpretations of a dispositional 
concept~ the reasoning in defence of these choices can be 
approached. Given the vastness of material concerning the 
history of evolutionary biology~ this discussion shall be 
limited to that phase of the negotiation where it was first 
proposed that 'natural selection~ as a p~oblem-raising 
disposition predicate is worthy of scientific cons1deration 
and of admittance into the body of <tentatively> accepted 
scientific knowledge. 
- 174 -
1 The following works proved to be most useful for an 
understanding of Darwin's argument and the events 
following upon the publication of the Origin of Species. 
A general introduction is provided by Ruse (1981]. 
Introducing a fascinating collection of reviews by 
Darwin's contemporaries~ Hull (1983] presents the most 
concise formulation of the issues. A wealth of material 
can be found in Ellegard (1958]. Very useful were 
Ghiselin {1984], Himmelfarb (1959]. --For Darwin's 
intellectual development leading up to the publication of 
the Origin such diverse works as Manier (1978J and Gruber 
(1981J were drawn upon. Of Darwin's own writing, his 
letters proved to be most important <Darwin (1887J and 
(1903]) aside from, of course~ the Origin itself <Darwin 
[1959J). The primary source for contemporary criticism of 
the theory of natural selection was Hull [1983J. 
2 DarvJir1 [1887/1893], Vols. 1!' pp. 1()3/82. [Since, as 
of yet,· thet-e is no standardized ~<-Jay of quoting from the 
Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, all references are to 
both, the 1887 edition in 3 volumes and the 1893 edition 
in 2 volumes. When a letter is quoted, date and addressee 
will also be stated. Since the passage just quoted comes 
from Darwin's autobiography, see also Darwin (1958J, p. 
140.] 
~ See e.g. the disarming confessions concerning the 
unintelligibility of certain parts of the argument in 
Gale [1982J. Compare also Huxley [1906J, p. 301. 
4 Darwin to Baden Powell in 1860, as quoted in Young 
[1971J, p. 445. 
~ See especially Ruse [1971] which closely adheres to 
the formulations given in the Origin. - For a very 
perceptive <though very critical) reconstruction of the 
deductive-nomological structure in Darwin's argument by 
one of Darwin's contemporaries see Hopkins [1983]. 
Hopkins introduces the distinction between 
phenomenological l~ws (like Kepler"s laws of planetary 
motion) and physical laws <like Newton's theory of 
universal gravitation>. While a theory of evolution by 
itself would be phenomenological, Hopkins considers 
Darwin's theory of natural selection a physical law which 
properly identifies causes. To be sure, he deems it a bad 
physical law and thus concludes on p. 272: 
Biological science requires at present its 
Keplers rather than its Newtons - the discovery 
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of the more obvious laws according to which its 
phenomena may be arranged, rather than attempts 
at that higher generalization which may account 
for such laws by the operation of physical 
caLtses. 
6 Ghiselin [1984J, pp . 64f . 
7 Darwin [1959/1962], chapter IV, 14/pp . 91f. [Again, 
as there is no standard format for references to the 
Origin, various editions of varied accessibility and 
practicality will be quoted. If (as in the present case> 
the quoted passage did not yet appear in the first 
edition of the Origin there will be a reference to the 
chapter and sentence number in Peckham"s 1959 Variorum 
edition and to the 6th edition as it appeared in 
paperback in 1962. If a passage appeared in the first 
edition already, a third and fourth reference will be 
added, one to the page number of the first edition of 
1859 and another to a popular reprint of that first 
edition in paperback in 1981.J -This brief passage is so 
rich that one may well say that the remainder of this 
chapter is devoted to its interpretation, and a fortiori 
that countless scientists during the last 125 years have 
negotiated its meaning. 
e Darwin [1903J, letter # 79 to Asa Gray <November 
29th, 1859>, pp . 126f. --Another very explicit 
discussion of the dispositional character of "natural 
selection• can be found in an exchange between Owen 
[1868] and Romanes [1896J. Owen [1868J, p . 794 considers 
all dispositional explanations on a par with the 
"dormitive power• explanation which was parodized by 
Moliere: 
Natural Selection is an explanation of the 
process (of transmutation] of the same kind and 
value as that which has been proffered of the 
mystery of "secretion." For e>:ample, a 
particular mass of matter in a living animal 
takes certain elements out of the blood, and 
rejects them as "bile . " AttribLttes were given 
to the liver which can only be predicated of 
the whole animal; the "appetency" of the liver, 
it was said, was for the elements of bile, and 
"biliosity," or the "hepatic sensation , " guided 
the gland to their secretion . Such figurative 
language, I need not say, explains absolutely 
nothing of the nature of bilification . 
Romanes [1896J, p . 334 responds to this passage by 
stressing the problem-raising attitude which can be 
chosen towards •natural selection• and which sets it 
apart from the explanation cited by Owen: 
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it was little less than puerile in him 
COwenJ to see no more in the theory of natural 
selection than such a mere figure of speech. To 
say that the liver selects the elements of 
bile~ or that nature selects specific types~ 
may both be equally unmeaning re-statements of 
facts; but when it is explained that the term 
natural selection, unlike that of "hepatic 
sensation~ " is used as a shorthand e>:pressi on 
for a whole group of well-known natural causes 
-struggle, variation~ survival, heredity~ -
then it becomes evidence for an almost childish 
want of thought to affirm that the expression 
is figurative and nothing more . 
Though Romanes's retort is also not as clear as it might 
be~ the repeated Llse of the word "more" is particLilarly 
noteworthy: Romanes does not repudiate Owen's analogy, 
but with the adoption of the problem-raising attitude 
there is more to 'natural selection' than Owen appears to 
see. 
9 Darwin [1959/1962/1859/1981), Introduction, 39/p. 
28/p . 5/p. 68. 
1.0 The corresponding law over the domain of all those 
things which have the disposition 'natural selection' 
of coLirse, <>:) <t) <S ... t => R,...t). 
is~ 
11 Here, 'variability' designates the limited scope of 
variation and not the ability to vary. Darwin referred to 
the latter in the passage just quoted. Variability and 
reversion are what Popper calls tt-1e "conservative 
principles" of evolution (see Popper [1976)~ p . 170). 
For the distinction between 'fitness' (as belonging 
to the explanans) and 'adaptation' <belonging to the 
explanandum>, see Campbell C1983J . A remark on p. 64 
illuminates the notion that 'selection of the fittest' is 
a disposition of nature: 
Dar win's theory postulates that individuals 
vary in their fitness value ; it explains why 
individual characteristics appear to be so well 
adapted to the environment. 
Compare note 76 to chapter 2 on pp . 144f . - Of 
course, Dar win went a little bit further than this by 
suggesting possible selective mechanisms f or which he 
uses the generic label 'struggle for existence'. His 
largely phenomenological and anecdotal exploration of 
that 'struggle for existence' was a first contribution to 
the research pogramme which he inaugurated by proposing 
his theory of natural selection. 
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14 Introducing an interesting twist to the familiar 
l.l5 
charge that Darwin's theory is tautological, Popper 
suggests that this statement is true as a matter of 
'situational logic' <Popper E1976J~ p. 168)~ i.e. that 
the notion of 'natural selection' is redundant. However~ 
as Popper points out~ not every possible situation E will 
in the terms of situational logic entail the truth of 
<S => R>. It just so happens that the situations called 
'nature' or 'physical environment of biological organisms 
on earth' do entail the truth of that conditional. Then~ 
however~ one has to pose empirical questions concerning 
what it is about these situations that makes them 
situationally entail (8 => R>- and one vlill soon 
rediscover 'natural selection' as the property shared by 
these situations. 
Darwin E1959/1962J, chapter IV~ 14/p. 92 . 
1. 6 And nowadays they have to be raised most vehemently 
against the sociobiological enterprise (see Lewontin 
et.al. [1984J) . For a lucid discussion of the 
difficulties associated with the investigation of 
'goal-directed processes' as well as 'functional 
explanations' in biology see Nagel E1979bJ~ pp. 275-341. 
He maintains that these notions do not necessarily 
involve a mystery-raising attitude or untenable 
teleological presuppositions. Other philosophical 
contributions to the ongoing negotiation on how to 
combine functional explanation with a problem-raising 
attitude are Nagel E1979J~ pp. 398-446~ Hempel [1965J, 
pp . 297-330, and Cummins E1975J. And for a philosophical 
contribution by a preeminent biologist see e.g. Mayr 
[1976], pp. 383-404. 
1.7 Few of Darwin's contemporaries addressed this issue. 
And when they did~ they often did not worry about it 
themselves but suggested that an apparent materialist 
like Darwin should. Wollaston E1983J~ pp. 133f. expresses 
that line of criticism forcefully as he challenges the 
attribution of a disposition (interpreted as a 
placeholder or stopgap device at that ) to 'nature'. 
We believe it was Coleridge who first cnlled 
attention to this fact~ that to treat a mere 
abstraction as an efficient cause is simply 
abSL\rd. [ • •• J But who is this 11 Nature, 11 we have 
a right to ask, who has such tremendous power, 
and to whose efficacy such marvellous 
performances are ascribed? What are her images 
and attributes, when dragged from her wordy 
lurking-place? Is she aught but a pestilent 





obscure the workings of an Intelligent First 
Cause of all? 
On the basis of a largely correct analysis of Darwin's 
theory~ Wollaston adopts a mystery-raising attitude 
towards it and rejects it as such - since his need for 
mysteries is already satisfied by an ''Intelligent First 
Cause". Compal~e also: Hull E1983J~ p. 153 and Hopkins 
(1983]~ p. 271. The issue was also raised in a letter by 
Sedgwick to Darwin <December 1859) in Darwin E1887/1893J~ 
Vols. 2~ pp . 247-250/42-45 . 
One of the few remarks by Darwin which addresses the 
charge that his theory is tautological or expresses a 
truism of situatianal logic (see above~ note 14) also 
happens to be one of his few cutting remarks . It can be 
found in a letter to W.H . Harvey <August 1860) in Darwin 
E1903J Vol. 1~ p. 161~ letter# 110: 
The upshot of your remarks at p . 11 is that 
my explanation~ etc . ~ and the whole doctrine of 
Natural Selection~ are mere empty words~ 
signifying the "order of natur~"· As the 
above-named clearheaded men~ who do comprehend 
my views~ all go a certain length with me, and 
certainly do not think it all moonshine~ I 
should venture to suggest a little further 
reflection an your part . 
Of course, a good number of Darwin scholars have 
mounted a vigorous defence on this score. For instance, 
Campbell (1983] aptly concludes her discussion Cp . 65): 
Adaptations pertain to individual 
characteristics whose function is often 
evident. E •. • J Fitness is a holistic concept . 
It refers to reproductive wholes . Fitness and 
survival are not tautological concepts since it 
is phenotypic individuals who are fit or not, 
while it is genes that survive . 
Ghiselin E1984J~ p. 69 warns quite polemically 
against overinterpreting 'natural selection' : 
The concept of natural selection seems 
unsatisfactory simply because it is 
intelligible by reason. 
For the present purposes, "intelligible by reason" should 
be substituted by "a sensible but tentative foLtndation of 
a research programme". 
Indeed, a third contemporary issue in philosophical 
discussions of Darwin's argument is diffused as one 
introduces 'natural selection• by a reduction sentence 
which functions somewhat like an inference ticket in 
deductive-nomological explanation. The question is 
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whether Dar win " s theory should be int ~rpreted 
• s yntacti c ally" (as a par tl y interpreted axiomatic 
theor·· ) in terms of explanatory power or •semantically" 
in terms of semantic adequacy. Thompson [1983J provide a 
semantic approach towar~s modern evolutionary biology~ 
while Lloy d [1983] deals with Darwi n"s theory and h i s 
support for it. Though Lloyd provides a splendid 
reconstruction of Darwin"s argument~ it is quite 
misleadingly framed in that syntactic-semantic dichotomy. 
As Lloyd herself points out <p. 119 ) , there is 
considerable overlap between the two approaches to 
science when it comes to writing its history. This 
overlap reflects the absence of a real issue here. The 
construal of •natural selection• as a disposition 
predicate that is employed in deductive nomological 
e x planation, shows its tremendous e x planatory power . 
Darwin again and again emphasized this aspect of his 
theory as an argument for its <tentative) acceptance 
(compare Lloyd [1983]~ p. 116). However, explanatory 
power is here exerted by a disposition predicate which is 
either a placeholder or a stopgap-device. The appeal to 
•natural selection• in an e x planation with deductive 
nomological form therefore serves primarily as a 
heuristic artifact within ongoing scientific deliberation 
<after all, it is the outcome of abduction). Scientists 
.then deliberate and negotiate on a modified, more 
elaborate, and meaningful construal of that artifacts. 
That process of negotiation is best described as a 
process of fitting theory and empirical data. Lloyd 
focusses on that process of negotiation : 
When natural selection theory is said to 
present a set of related models, it is meant 
that there are certain model types which are 
given in the theory to account for observed 
phenomena; the variables of these model types 
are specified and instantiated through 
hypothesis and testing in a recursive manner. 
(p. 118) 
It is difficult to see how this process of negotiating 
and fitting should somehow conflict with intermediary and 
ultimate formulations of scientific explanations. On this 
question of philosophical and historiographical 
compatibilities see also note 9 to chapter 2 on pp . 132f. 
2 2 Letter # 143, October 1st, 1862 in Darwin [1903], 
Vol . 1, pp. 208f. 
23 One of his supporters among scientists who came 
dangerously close to a mystery-raising interpretation was 
Asa Gray. In his first review <Gray [1963], p. 46) of the 
Origin he "jLtdge[sJ it probable" that Darwin 
regards the whole system of Nature as one 
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which had received at ist first formation the 
impress of the will of its Author~ foreseeing 
the varied yet necessary laws of its action 
throughout the whole of its existence~ 
ordaining when and how each particular of the 
stupendous plan should be realized in effect~ 
and - with Him to whom to will is to do - in 
ordaining doing it. 
While Darwin does not quarrel with Gray's theological 
interpretation <compare the motto from Butler which he 
added to the second edition of the Origin)~ he would not 
use it as an argument for or against any theory including 
his own. Gray's attitude appears questionable on this 
latter score. 
Letter to A.R. Wallace (# 191)~ July 5th 1866 
Darwin [1903J~ Vol. 1~ p. 271. 
Letter to F.W. Hutton (# 124) on April 




26 See Bowler [1983]. 
2?' Weldon as quoted in Farrall [ 1 975 J ~ p. 284. 
E.R. Lancaster as quoted in Farrall [ 1 975] ~ p. 284. 
MacKenzie and Barnes [1979J~ p. 199. Aside from 
Provine [1971]~ interpretations of the controversy 
between Mendelians and Biometricians are provided by 
Farrall [1975]~ Roll-Hansen [1980]~ and Bowler E1983J~ 
pp. 38ff. See also Huxley [1942J~ pp. 22-24 and Punnett 
[1911]~ pp. 1(lff. 
Huxley [1942]~ p. 24. 
Mayr [1976J~ p. 346 puts the various controversies 
into a larger context: 
the genetic argument was merely a symptom of 
a far deeper disagreement~ the choice between 
saltationism and Darwin"s gradual evolution 
through natural selection. The final 
reconciliation among evolutionists in the 1930s 
·and 1940s~ often designated "the great 
synthesis," is much more appropriately 
considered the real end of a controversy that 
had started well within Darwin's lifetime. 
In the preface of one of the ground-breaking works 
towards the "gr.eat synthesis"~ F:.A. Fisher criticizes the 
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practice of conflating the theories of evolution and 
natural select~on. He makes it plain that one of the 
reasons for holding them apart consists of the 
then-emerging possibility to subject the theory of 
natural selection to independent test: 
To treat Natural Selection as an agency 
based independently on its own foundations is 
not to minimize its importance in the theory of 
evolution. ( .• • J In addition it will be of 
importance for our subject to call attention to 
several consequences of the principle of 
Natural Selection which~ since they do not 
consist in the adaptive modification of 
specific forms~ have necessarily escaped 
attention. <Fisher C1958J~ p. x~ first 
published in 1929> 
On the independent testability of "natural selection" 
which became possible only with population genetics see 
Wassermann C1978J. As should be expected~ the 
introduction of further reduction sentences for 'natural 
selection' has led to a clarification of its mean i ng . 
This is bluntly expressed by Huxley (1942J~ p . 16: 
The term Natural Selection is thus seen to 
have two rather different meanings. In a broad 
sense it covers all case s of differential 
survival: but from the evolutionary point of 
view it covers only the differential 
transmission of inheritable variations. 
To be sure~ there has been discussion whether 
Darwin's theories are fully expressible within <or 
reducible to) molecular genetics . Generally ~ that 
possibility is assessed with great scepticism <and from a 
philosophical point of view). See e.g . Beatty (1982]. 
Independent testability~ i.e . the satisfaction of 
condition <D*> depends on the acceptance of the set of 
hypotheses <H : >. See above~ pp . 111ff . 
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A historical test-case has been prepared by plac i ng it 
within the conceptual framework provided by the theory of 
alternatives of science . The plan of inquiry which was 
developed in the first chapter can now b e brought to bear on 
the negotiation concerning 'natural selection" and the 
business of rational reconstruction can begin. 
i . 
Scientific negotiation is differentiated from other 
contexts of decision-making. not by some special form of 
rationality or by the goals which scientists individually or 
collectively pursue~ but by characteristic constraints on 
the alternatives to be negotiated upon and the arguments 
that can be adduced in support of a choice among the 
alternatives. The adopted plan of inquiry accordingly calls 
for the rational reconstruction of science and the history 
of science on the grounds of general decision-thea-y with 
respect to acceptable arguments. In order to apply (if only 
informally) general decision theory to the negotiation of 
the alternatives that were introduced together with "natural 
selecti on·~ the alternatives themselves have to be made 
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explicit along with the argumentative means available in 
support of one's choice among them. 
As was noted in the previous chapter~ Darwin resolved that 
'natural selection• should be accepted as a problem-raising 
disposition-term. Thus~ he made a particular choice among 
clearly defined alternatives~ implying that for the time 
being no decision is needed on whether to adopt a 
problem-deferring or problem-researching attitude. His 
choice furthermore implied his unambiguous rejection of a 
mystery-raising attitude and his readiness to demonstrate 
that~ indeed~ he himself does not perpetuate this attitude. 
At the same time~ he could and would not enter into a deba te 
on whether 'natural selection' is still problemati c or 
already unproblematic. 
No more needs to be said about the alternatives at hand. 
What needs to be clarified now is the notion that only 
arguments drawn from scientifically acceptable argumentation 
repertoires can be used to defend a choice among the 
alternati ves . 
It was pointed out towards the end of the first rhapter 
that knowledge of scientists' goals is irrelevant for an 
understanding of science. By the same token~ the notion of 
'rationality' ~as reduced to 'providing a cogent rationale': 
it makes no difference what goals scientists have as long as 
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they rationally address scientific alternatives using 
scientifically acceptable arguments 1 • Thus, a (cogent> 
rationale adduced for one's choice among al ternatives may or 
may not coincide with one's reasons or motives for making 
that choice, where repertoires of acceptable arguments 
constrain only the adduced rationale and not one's reasons 
or true motives. But regardless of whether reason and 
rationale do in a given case coincide, employment of 
arguments from acceptable argumentation repertoires serves 
to opportunistically embellish a choice which has already 
been made, if only in a tentative mood or on a hunch. 
Accordingly, if there is a historical law (embod ying a 
methodological rule) suggested by the discussion so far, it 
is a law of tempered opportunism in science and it could be 
formulated like this: 
(~d (y) Ct> Cif >: is a scient.ist and y is an option 
among the set of alternatives in science 
in respect to a given hypothesis , and x 
has adopted y, then x will rationally 
employ [as long as y remains controversial] 
all arguments which are compatible with the 
available evidence, which support y , 
and which can be drawn from a repertoire 
of acceptable scientific arguments) 2 
The force of this law or rule differs greatly in various 
phases of theory development. Depending on the powers of 
human ingenuity, (L*) permits a practically boundless 
accumulation of arguments in the early phases of theory 
development. But very few arguments may be both acceptable 
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and compatible with the available evidence in a later phase 
where e .g. one is testing a hypothesis which has been 
derived from the theory and appropriate background knowledge 
and where a rivaling theory has been seriously challenging 
the theory under investigation. But even in this later 
phase~ imaginative scientists will still be able to provide 
arguments for the acceptance of that theory~ regardless of 
the experimental outcome. A single admissable argument which 
- preferably on evidential grounds - warrants or requires a 
certain choice among alternatives and which accordingl y 
ought to persuade in one fell swoop the entire scientific 
community is only a limiting case of CL*)~ and probably a 
very rare case at that. In contrast~ most philosophical 
theories of science take this limiting case of <L*) as the 
paradigm case of methodological negotiation~. (L*) does 
not attribute ultimate persuasive to any argument at all. 
But it attributes importance in the process of persuasion to 
the weight of arguments instead of the quality of a single 
argument~ where "weight" is a composite of quality and sheer 
number~ the latter reflecting the relative ease with which 
arguments for a certain choice can be put forth . <L*> can 
thus explain something that is apparently quite trivial and 
which many theories of s c ience nonetheless cannot explain~ 
namely the generic phenomenon 
(Ph1) Scientists tend to employ more than one argument 
(or more than one type of argument 4 ) in defence 
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of their choice among alternatives in science.~ 
Along with this phenomenon often comes another one. 
<Ph2) Short of contradicting themselves~ scientists will 
employ conflicting argumentation strategies. 
For instance~ scientists critical of Darwin"s theory have 
argued that first of all it is incoherent, nonsensical~ 
tautological~ or <empirically> meaningless and that secondly 
it is contradicted by empirical evidence . And yet these 
scientists are not engaged in a contradictory interpretation 
of Darwin"s theory since they keep these criticisms 
separate, trying to anticipate possible responses and 
arguing~ in effect, that e.g . if the theory is not 
tautological, then it is false and vice versa 6 • The 
weight of arguments is used to smother the opponent, a 
single argument will seldom do~ even if it is elegantly aims 
right for the heart · of a matter. 
To be sure~ it is much easier to posit a law like <L*> 
than to defend it as a confirmable or falsifiable law in the 
history of science. Indeed, such a defence shall not be 
attempted here. One of <L*>"s major difficulties lies in its 
tacit appeal to the epistemic states of scientists at any 
given time: surely, scientists can draw on ly on those 
argumentation repertoires with which they are familiar. Here 
one encounters the obvious problem of how to find 
independent grounds for establishing that familiarity. And 
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even if one succeeds in doing that <maybe in reference to 
ascertainable aspects of a scientist's training or to the 
certifiable appeal by the same scientist to that repertoire 
in another context>, by far not all is done: one will still 
have to resolve in any given case to what one should ascribe 
an apparent "falsification' of <L* ) . After all~ the failure 
of making use of a repertoire in a situation where that 
would be expedient may be due simply to a discrepancy 
between the historian and the historical agent when it comes 
to making this assessment of expediency. Similar problems 
arise when it comes to designating and precisely delimiting 
the repertoires available at any given time. While there are 
repertoires which have been publicly certified by 
philosophers of science, many acceptable arguments stem from 
repertoires which remain tacit or which are constituted 
merely by historical precedent. And at the same time~ not 
all philosophically certified methodological contrivances 
may yield arguments which are straightforwardly acceptable 
to the scientific community, for instance if they are 
lacking in intuitive transparency or if they employ 
controversial presuppositions that enter into their 
use7. These types of problems are closely linked to the 
general problem of whether historical laws are 
discernible8 • 
Even if a positive answer to these methodological problem 
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id difficult to find~ reference to law-like formulations 
such as (L*) need not be meaningless. In the case at hand~ 
<L*) together with three contemporary certified 
argumentation repertoires serve as a heuristic to structure 
the arguments provided by Darwin and his compatriots in 
defence of •natural selection•. The three repertoires are 
labeled "inductivist·~ 'demarcationist•, and 
"professionalist• . Each of these is generated by 
philosophical or sociological theories of science. Each 
therefore accounts not only for Darwin's use of certain 
arguments but also for further historiographical phenomena 
which are not explained by the theories generating either of 
the other two repertoires . 
i i . 
The terms 'induction•, 'inductive•, and 'inductivist• have 
been used in a variety of ways. Therefore, any attempt at 
characterizing the 'inductivist• repertoire of arguments 
will have to set out with a more general specification of 
what is meant here by 'inductivi s t". 
Hume's famous problem of induction can be posed in form of 
the question: is there truthpreserv i ng ampliative 
inference?~ So-called deductivists sometimes impute to 
so-called inductivists that they are foolhar dy enough to 
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answer this question affirmatively. However, the term 
"inductivist• is more usefully employed as a label for those 
philosophers who are concerned with the explication of 
"induction" as that term was already used in the second 
chapter of this study, namely as the third and last stage in 
Peirce"s theory of inquiry. According to that theory, 
"abduction• designates the invention of an explanatory 
hypothesis, "deduction• its explication and the derivation 
of testable consequences from it, and "induction• its 
evaluation in light of evidence, leading to the rejection of 
the hypothes is or (quite literally) to its induction into 
the body of knowledge 10 • 
Deduction explicates; Induction evaluates: that 
is all. Over the chasm that yawns between the 
ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's 
environment as, coming over him during his 
primeval wanderings in the forest , while yet his 
very notion of error was of the vaguest~ he 
managed to communicate to some fellow, we are 
building a cantilever bridge of induction~ held 
together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every 
plank of its advance is first laid by 
Retroduction 11 alone , that is to say, by the 
spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason; a nd 
neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a 
single new concept to the structure . 12 
The cantilever bridge of knowledge is evaluated not for the 
firmness of its "foundation" , but for the quality and 
expediency of the scientific struts and ties that hold it 
together . Accordingly, the goal of induction as t h e final, 
purely evaluative stage of inquiry is not the estab lishment 
of • (absolute) truth" or •certainty•, but the formation and 
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fixation of belief. 
[ ••• J the sole object of inquiry is the 
settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is 
not enough for us~ and that we seek not merely an 
opinion~ but a true opinion. But put this fancy to 
the test~ and it proves groundless; for as soon as 
a firm belief is reached we are entirely 
satisfied~ whether the belief be false or true. 
[ ••• J The most that can be maintained is that we 
seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. 
But we think each one of our beliefs to be true~ 
and~ indeed~ it is a mere tautology to say 
so. 1 ~ 
Now~ the most elegant and sweeping 'solutions to the 
problem of induction~ fail in precisely this aspect: they 
cannot account for the actual formation of belief. Both~ 
Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach present ways of diminishing 
the force of Hume's problem . And in order to account for 
'belief~~ both have to invoke principles which they do not 
(and cannot) justify. 
Popper maintains that scientific method can be construed 
without reference to truthpreserving ampliative inference 
( . \1. e. inductive inference>. Instead~ falseness-transmitting, 
deductive modus tollens is the form of inference 
characteristic for science. While inductive inference from 
evidence would presumably justify a hypothesis and a 
fortiori our belief in its truth~ modus tollens does not 
contribute to the justification of hypotheses at all 14 • 
It merely certifies the overall reliability of scientific 
method: negative instances will falsify hypotheses~ the 
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principle of falsification is the cornerstone of scientific 
method~ scientists therefore have to actively anticipate the 
possibility of such falsification - and to anticipate 
falsification is to withhold belief 1 e. However~ in a 
chapter which is explicitly devoted to ''my solution of the 
problem of induction'' 16 Popper acknowledges that to 
solve Hume"s problem~ one has to solve it in both its 
logical and its psychological form~ that is~ concerning 
reliable modes of scientific inference as well as the 
formation of belief. 
HL Are we justified in reasoning from 
(repeated) instances of which we have experience 
to other instances (conclusions) of which we have 
no experience? [ •.• J 
HPs Why, nevertheless~ do all reasonable 
people expect~ and believe that instances of which 
they have no experience will conform to those of 
which they have experience? 17 
Popper presents his "solution• to that double-edged problem 
in a fashion that cleverly oscillates between 
tongue-in-cheek logical deceptiveness and a serious argument 
which not so much solves the problem, but forcefully 
establishes that the logical problem is irrelevant to an 
analysis of specifically scientific reasoning and that the 
psychological problem can therefore go unanswered as far as 
the specifics of scientific reasoning are concerned. Two 
sentences from his autobiography convey this ambiguous use 
of "to solve•: 
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As for induction (or inductive logic. or 
inductive behaviour, or learning by in~uction or 
by rep et it :ion or by "i nstrLtct ion") I assert that 
there is no such thing. If I am right then this 
solves, of course, the problem of 
induction. 1-e:-t 
I ndeed, if there is no such thing as induction, the 
methodology which ensures the progress and rationality of 
science has to be based on some non-inductive form of 
inference. By the same token, the issues of justification 
and belief have to be viewed as irrelevant in respect to 
that distinctive methodology. But surely , this does not 
•solve• the psychological problem of induction that was 
posed above as 'Hp,'. This scepticism concerning 
Popper's use of the words •to solve• and 'solution' persists 
as one takes a closer look at his somewhat more extensive 
"F:estatement and SolLttion" of "The Logical Problem of 
Induction''. The overall strategy is clear enough. After 
providing a solution to HL, the logical problem, a 
so-called principle of transference is invoked that will 
lead to the solution of Hp,. 
principle of transference: what is true in logic 
i s true in psychology . <An analogous pri nci pl e 
holds by and large for what is usually called 
•scientific method' and also for the history of 
science: what is true in logic is true in 
scientific method and in the history of 
science.) 1 ., 
This principle in conjunction with the solution to HL 
entails the solution of Hp,. Now, before giving his 
solution to HL, Popper reformulates it twice: 
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L1 Can the claim that an explanatory 
universal theory is true be justified by 
'empirical reasons' [ ..• J? 
[ ••• J L~ Can the claim that an explanatory 
universal theory is true or that it is fa l se be 
justified by 'empirical reasons " ( ••• J?~o 
L1 is clearly a reformulation of H,. And Popper's 
answer to the problem is the same as Hume's: No~ 
it cannot; no number of true test statements would 
justify the claim that an explanatory universal 
theory is true. 21 
One should expect that this answer to L1 is tantamount 
to the admission that a solut ion to the problem of induction 
cannot be provided. Instead~ Popper goes on to L~ which 
he labels a 'generalization' of L1 and which 
accordingly is also proposed as a reformulation of Hume's 
logical problem of induction. This is where the flippant use 
of 'to solve• comes in. Popper's positive answer to L~ 
cannot be considered a solution or a partial solution to 
Hume's p rob lem. That positive answer states that 
the assumption of the truth of test statements 
somet imes allows us to justify the claim that an 
explanatory universal theory is false.~~ 
This answer to L~ cannot be taken as an answer to the 
problem of induction~ since L~ is not properly a 
generalization of L1 and thus a repl acement rather than 
a reformulation of Hume's logical problem H,. L~ 
is supposed to be . a generalization~ since 
It is obtained from L1 merely by replacing 
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Now ~ 
the words 'is true• by the words 'is true or that 
it is false'.2 3 
a proposition G entails the 'generalization• ((l v R) 
only if G is true. As there is no affirmative answer to 
L1~ the affirmative answer to L2 does not reflect 
on L1 and HL. In effect~ Popper has substituted 
the unsolvable problem of induction by the solvable problem 
of refutation24 • Aided by the principle of 
transference~ Popper can show why one would want to 
disbelieve the truth of a falsified theory. He cannot show 
why one would ever want to believe that a theory is 
trueze. AccordiRgly~ the latter part of the article on 
the "solution of the problem of induction' does not rely on 
the assumption that this solution has been provided by the 
answer to Lz. Instead of further demonstrating how he 
has 'solved' Hume"s logical problem ~ Popper proposes an 
alternative approach towards accounting for belief~ that is. 
On that approach~ Hume"s psychological . problem of induction 
is taken on directly a~d vJithout recourse to the principle 
of transference: 
a pragmatic belief in the results of science is 
not irrational ~ because there is nothing more 
"rational" than the method of critical discussion ~ 
which is the method of science. And although i t 
would be irrational to accep t any of its results 
as certain, there is nothing "better" when it 
comes to practical action : there is no alternative 
method which might be said to be more 
rational . 26 
As stated so far~ this alternative approach is clearly 
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insufficient as an answer to Hp,. Justifying a 
commitment to the best available method leaves entirely 
unresolved when and why any particular result of that method 
can or should be accepted and a belief should be formed. A 
possibly appropriate amendment to Popper's alternative 
account has been proposed Cin seemingly quite different a 
context) by Hans Reichenbach who presented his own 
'solution' to the problem of induction. But Reichenbach~ 
too ~ falls short of justifying the formation of belief and 
solving the problem of induction. 
Though Popper and Reichenbach quite disagree on what i s 
the best method of science~ both try to justify actual 
belief in terms of rational adherence to some such best 
method. The quality of that method as employed in scientific 
investigation lends credence to the results of scientific 
investigation. But while Popper's candidate for 'best 
method' is founded upon his answer to L2, Reichenbach's 
inductivism does not presuppose that one should be able to 
answer L1 or any substitute thereof 27 • He argues 
instead that - if there are any regularities in nature 
there are inductive methods which are sufficiently 
well-suited to the task of finding them. His argument is 
quite straightforward: One is free to choose whether one 
wants to consider the world predictable or not . To embark 
upon the enterprise of science is to reveal at least a 
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tentative preference in this respect, namely to consider it 
predictable. Now, the term 'predictable ' is introduced 
for a world which is sufficiently ordered to 
e nabl e us to construct series with a limit . 2e 
And, it is the aim of induction 
to find series of events whose frequency of 
occurence converges toward a limit. 2 • 
Now, Reichenbach has to do no more but to show how inductive 
methods are suited to describe series of events as 
converging towards a limit of frequency. And his 
(sel f-cor rective> inductive principle does just that30 • 
Then , if the world is predictable, i . e . 
if there is a limit of the frequency, the 
inductive principle is a sufficient condition to 
find it. 31 
And conversely, the world is predictable only if inductive 
methods could find a limit of frequency, i.e. 
the applicability of the inductive principle is 
a necessary condition of the existence of a li mit 
of the frequency. 32 
And therefore, our very commitment to the enterprise of 
science entails a commitment to the inductive principle. 
Like Popper's ''method of critical discussion'', the inductive 
principle is thought to be the best, if not only avenue to 
scientific success . Reichenbach realizes, though, that this 
result does not sufficiently account for the formation of 
belief in any particular instance. The inductive principle 
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generates a procedure such that the last value for the 
relative frequency in a series of events is always a 
candidate for~ but never known to be the place of 
convergence. This procedure has to be employed 
unintermittently as one seeks the true value of that place 
of convergence. At any given time~ however~ one will treat 
the last available value as the best and most reliable 
value. 
This procedure must at sometime lead to the true 
value p~ if there is a limit at all ; the 
applicability of this procedure, as a whole~ is a 
necessary condition of the existence of a limit of 
p. L •. J If~ however~ it is only the whole 
procedure which constitutes the necessary 
condition~ how may we apply this idea to the 
individual case before us?~~ 
Reichenbach applies it by treating the last value in analogy 
to a "blind posit" in a wager. 
We know it is our best posit , but we do not know 
how good it is . Perhaps~ although our best~ it is 
a rather bad one. The blind posit~ however~ may be 
corrected . C • •• J Thus the blind posit is of an 
approximative type; we know that the method for 
making such posits must in time lead to success, 
in case there is a limit of the frequency. It is 
this idea which furnishes the justification of the 
blind posit. The procedure described may be called 
the method of anticipation ; in choosing h" as 
our posit~ we anticipate the case where n is the 
"place of convergence." It may be that by this 
anticipation we obtain a false value; we know~ 
however, that a continued anticipation must lead 
to the true value , if there is a limit at 
all . ~~ 
There is a fundamental ambiguity in this passage: the idea 
that the method of making b l ind posits must i n time l ead to 
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success may justify the making of blind posits~ it does not 
justify~ however~ the posits themselves. From the point of 
view of the inductive principle the blind posit that one 
actually makes or uses has no special standing. All one has 
to do is to keep the procedure going and to always be 
prepared to throw out what was considered the best value and 
substitute it by a newly found last value. That is~ one can 
make blind posits as long as one does not believe and does 
not think that the last value in a series of events is the 
true value or place of convergence~0 • Thus~ Reichenbach 
does not answer his question: the method of anticipation 
does not account for the formation of beli ef in a given 
instance and the principle of induction is not applied to 
"the individual case before us". 
Instead of demonstrative inductive inference~ one has 
according to Popper and Reichenbach demonstrably sound 
methods for the production of knowledge - those ~ however~ do 
not by themselves justify belief in any given instance. 
Proposing such demonstrably sound methods at the expense of 
accounting for the formation of belief is a way of 
circumventing rather than addressing Hume's (or Peirce's} 
problem of induction~ quite regardless of the merits of the 
specific proposals. One may surmise that Popper"s and 
Reichenbach's fault lies in their attempt to provide a 
wholesale demonstration wh ich would justify belief in all 
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results obtained by adherence to a given method . To be tried 
instead is a rather more myopic approach which provides for 
a case-by-case evaluation in respect to induction. And in 
contradistinction to Popper and Reichenbach~ the goal of the 
inductivist shall be described as specifying the conditions 
under which one is warranted to accept a hypothesis as true 
in the absence of demonstrable justification of its truth. 
This is in agreement with Peirce's notion of "induction' as 
the evaluation of a hypothesis for the purpose of induction 
into the body of knowledge whether or not one can 
justifiably hold it to be true. More succinctly put, 
inductivists are not concerned with the justification of 
hypotheses~ whether directly Cby inductive inference) or 
indirectly <owing to the soundness of method). Instead, they 
are concerned with human decision-making: at any g iven time 
one decides on the best ranking of preferences among the 
options of believing a hypothesis, disbelieving it~ or 
suspending judgement on it- where 'to believe•, •to 
disbelieve·~ and •to suspend judgement• form an ultimate 
partition, i.e. an e>: c 1 usi ve arrd e>: haust i ve set of 
options36. In relation to this larger enterprise of 
inductivism, all attempts at specifying measures for e.g. 
degrees of confirmation are subservient contributions of 
detail, and as of now neglectable at that. If successful, 
specification of such measures may provide one important 
kind of input into the evaluative process~7 • 
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Induction conceived of as the formation of a preference 
within an ultimate partition of theoretical attitudes 
towards hypotheses~ is a species of what was formerly called 
~eliminative• in contradistinction to •enumerative 
induction•. A complete account of what goes into this 
process of evaluation~ preference-ranking and elimination of 
alternatives cannot be given here. A somewhat sketchy 
presentation of the necessary tools of devices driving the 
inductive machinery must suffice38 • Background 
knowledge provides the standard of serious possibility. It 
outrules hypotheses which contradict presently held beliefs: 
one can seriously entertain only hypotheses which are 
compatible with one·~ present background knowledge. A demand 
for information generates an ultimate partition of potential 
answers to a given problem. <This ultimate partition is not 
to be confused with the just-mentioned ultimate partition of 
potential theoretical attitudes towards any of these 
answers.) The informational value of the potential answers 
is assessed as one applies an information-ranking function. 
For instance~ one might consider "theories allowing for 
action at a distance to bear higher ( • •. J informational 
value than those which insist on contact action'' or vice 
versa3~. Once a preliminary ranking of potential 
answers has been established~ evidence is brought to bear on 
them. With the introduction of evidence~ the answers require 
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re-evaluation. Here~ confirmational commitments determine 
the relative weight one decides to assign to various kinds 
of confirmatory or falsificatory evidence . Rankings 
according to informational value and evidential support 
subsequently enter into the larger task of weighing the risk 
of error against the benefit of informational gain in 
respect to the ultimate partition of theoretical attitudes~ 
i . e . believing~ disbelieving or suspending judgement. 
The conceptual apparatus presented so far closely confor ms 
to Peirce's insight that 'belief' is tantamount to 'settl ed 
opinion' on the one hand~ to 'acceptance as true' on the 
other. However~ the role assigned to background knowledge as 
the standard for serious possibility points to what is 
apparently a serious defect in Peirce's formulation. While 
equating 'settled opinion' with 'acceptance as true' agrees 
entirely with experience and intuition as far as it captures 
the feeling of confidence associated with 'belief', it is 
also counter-intuitive insofar as it does not seem to 
provide for the possibility of changing one's mind or of 
having a sceptical or critical attitude in general. But 
there is indeed a rather simple way of remedying that 
defect. All that is required is a proper mode of sequencing 
the decision-making situations which constitute the 
phenomenon 'change of mind' 40 • 
The induction of a newly formed belief into a corpus of 
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knowledge expands that corpus. One can distinguish •routine 
expansion• and 'inferential expansion' 41 • While 
inferential expansion is the result of more or less explicit 
deliberation, routine expansion generally ensues upon some 
antecedent commitment to admit certain kinds of new 
information into the corpus~ for instance the information 
gained through sensory stimulation or the testimony of 
trusted friends . Once the corpus is expanded, the freshly 
inducted belief constitutes a standard of serious 
possibility. It may happen now that conflict arises as one 
imports a contradiction into one's corpus by routine or 
inferential expansion. In response to this conflict, the 
corpus will be contracted and what was formerly a firmly 
held belief is contemplated once again for its cog ency . 
Contraction, just like expansion~ takes place in response to 
evidence : one needs grounds for doubting as much as for 
believing. After cont raction one is fr ee to entertain 
alternatives which previously were not considered seriously 
possible. One may be in suspense between various accounts 
for any length of time, until by inferential expansion a new 
or modified version of the eliminated belief is inducted 
into the corpus. 
Without compromising the notion that belief is a standard 
for serious possibility at any given time <and t hus 
considered infallible), revision of belief can be 
- 203 -
represented by the sequence of expansion~ contraction~ and 
re-expansion of a corpus of knowledge. But aside from 
integrating infallibilism and corrigibilism~ the sequential 
reconstruction of 'change of belief" suggests a mode of 
accounting for formation and change of belief in science. 
Indeed~ an earlier episode from Charles Darwin's scientific 
career allows for a paradigmatic application of these 
conceptual tools42 • In 1839 Darwin published a paper on 
the "Parallel F:oads of Glen Roy" 4 ::s. In it~ he argued 
for the adoption of a hypothesis on the origin of a puzzling 
geological phenomenon . He had convinced himself of its truth 
in a series of steps. First~ he had drawn up an ultimate 
partition of potential answers to the problem. That ultimate 
partition contained a number of previously proposed 
hypotheses and Darwin's own suggestion which was part of a 
larger geological research programme. He then applied an 
information-ranking function~ namely Lyell's actualism: on 
the regulative principle of actualism~ highest informational 
value is accorded to those hypotheses which make reference 
only to causes which are now (and always) in 
operation44 • From this application emerged his own 
proposal as the preferred hypothesis . Only then he traveled 
to the site and collected evidence in support of that 
hypothesis . Though the empirical evidence was not as clearly 
in favor of Darwin's theory as he expected it to be~ he 
satisfied his confirmational commitment by detecting a 
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number of phenomena which corroborated his view and which 
were inexplicable on the alternative accounts. The published 
paper presented his empirical findings as part of an 
argument which eliminated all the rivaling hypotheses from 
the ulitmate partition~ leaving - on the 'principle of 
exclusion• - his own as the only viable account. Some time 
after the induction of his geological hypothesis into his 
corpus of belief he came by routine expansion upon another 
hypothesis which had not been part of the ultimate 
partition. Moreover~ the new proposal met the informational 
demands imposed by Lyell's actualism. Believing as he did~ 
that he had correctly applied the pinciple of exclusion on 
an exclusive and exhaustive set of potential answers~ 
getting to know an overlooked hypothesis was tantamount to 
importing a contradiction into his corpus of belief. Darwin 
immediately realized the full impact of his oversight. He 
contracted his corpus and remained in anxious suspense among 
the two preferred hypotheses. After suspending judgement for 
j us_t about 21 years~ Darwin finally rejected his proposal 
and accepted the remaining rival. 
As the inductivist would predict and as Martin Rudwick and 
David Hull point out~ Darwin behaved as a rational agent 
throughout this process. The story of Darwin's hypothesis on 
the Parallel Roads of Glen Ray tells of no failure in 
scientific method~ on the contrary~ it tells of ultimate 
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success. Darwin prudently weighed the risk of error which is 
inevitably linked to drawing up an ultimate partition of 
potential answers, against informational gain and evidential 
support. In effect, he did so twice. For, as he finally 
chose to accept the remaining rival to his own theory, he 
again selected the best among an ultimate partition of 
potential answers. If Darwin's theory on Glen Roy has 
nevertheless been considered "a :tong gigantic blunder from 
beginning to end"""'""'~ it is because Darwin himself 
called it so . 
Having been deeply impressed with what I had 
seen of the elevation of the land of South 
America~ I attributed the parallel lines to the 
action of the sea; but I had to give up this view 
when Agassiz propounded his glacier-lake theory. 
Because no other explanation was possible under 
our then state of knowledge, I argued in favour of 
sea-action; and my error has been a good lesson to 
me never to trust in science to the principle of 
e;.: c 1 usi on. 46 
Here, Darwin provides a strangely ambiguous assessment. On 
the one hand he clearly justifies his procedure: given the 
constraint of the "then state of knowledge" he finds that, 
indeed, "no other explanation was possible". On the other 
hand, he says that he has learned to distrust the principle 
of exclusion. Both, Rudwick and Hull produce a cohere nt 
interpretation of these statements by specifying precisely 
what Darwin may have learned to distrust. 
"'Jhat vJas at fault was not the "principle of 
e>:clusion" itself, but the degree of Darwin's 
trust in it. In other words , had he been more 
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cautious~ he WOLtld have inserted a proviso: "Since 
A cannot account for the observed phenomena~ while 
B can~ B must be the "true caLtse" -- u.nl ess there 
are other alternatives, C ••• etc .~ which I have 
not considered ." 47 
Darwin was correct to doubt this principle but 
wrong in thinking that he could do without it . He 
continued to use the principle of exclusion 
throughout his later works. What he had learned 
was not that the principle of exclusion could 
never be trusted but that it could never be 
trusted completely . [ •.• J It could not in actual 
practice make a hypothesis a~solutely certain~ 
since in the natural sciences it is never possible 
to eliminate all alternatives . 4 6 
The latter statement suggests not only that Darwin continued 
using that principle~ but that furthermore - as the 
inductivist would predict - science cannot do without it. 
After all~ the inductivist problem of accounting for the 
formation of belief became pressing precisely as the 
impossibility of ampliative inductive inference led to a 
shift from the evasive ideal of "certainty' to 
'well-reasoned preference". 
The inductivist repertoire controls the application of the 
principle of exclusion . It concerns the identification of a 
demand for information, the construction of an ultimate 
partition of potential answers~ the choice of an 
information-ranking function over the members of the 
partition , and finally the confirmational commitments which 
explicate the evidential grounds for preferring some one 
among all potential answers4 •. While scientists use 
that repertoire to justify their belief that a certain 
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choice among alternatives in science is the right choice to 
make~ scientists of science can use it to explain that : 
<Ph3> Scientists form beliefs~ i.e. tend to ide ntify 
preferred theories with true theories.~o 
Since a belief is a standard for serious possibility, an 
explanation of CPh3) can contribute to an understanding not 
only of consensus and paradigm formation but more 
specifically of tenacity in science: once a belief is 
formed~ scientists need not take seriously newly proposed 
rivals until a point is reached where by further ignor ing 
the rival one would import a contradiction into one's corpus 
- either~ as in Darwin's case, a contradiction with current 
beliefs (e.g. on the correctness of an ultimate partition) 
or a violation of an internal standard of reasoning~ 1 • 
From the vast resource of material provided by Darwin and 
his contemporaries , only very few . statements shall now be 
used to briefly illustrate the workings of the inductivist 
repertoire towards the formation of Darwin's belief in 
'natural selection'. 
In considering the Origin of Species, it is 
quite conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on 
the mutual affinities of organic beings, on their 
embryological relations, their geographical 
distribution , geological succession, and other 
such facts , might come to the conclusion that each 
species had not been independently created, but 
had descended. like varieties, from other species. 
Nevertheless •. such a conclusion , even if well 
founded. wouid be unsatisfactory, until it could 
be show~ how the innumerable species inhabiting 
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this world have been modified~ so as to acquire 
that perfection of structure and coadaptation 
which most justly excites our admiration . [ . • • J 
The author of the 'Vestiges of Creation' would. I 
presume~ say that~ after a certain unknown number 
of generations~ some bird had given birth to a · 
woodpecker~ and some plant to the misseletoe. and 
that these and been produced perfect as we n~w see 
them; but this assumption seems to me to be no 
explanation~ for it leaves the case of the 
coadaptations of organic beings to each other and 
to their physical conditions of life~ untouched 
and unexplained . It is therefore of the highest 
importance to gain a clear insight into the means 
of modification of coadaptation.o2 
This passage identifies a demand for information~ namely~ to 
find an explanatory scheme for the process of evolution. And 
already~ it applies a most elementa ry informat i on-ranking 
function to clear the field of such potential answers as the 
one presumably provided by Chambers . Indeed~ Darwin denies 
that Chamber's theory was abductively successful which 
surely rules it out as a potential answer. 
Darwin's answer remained without serious rival. The 
ultimate partition of potential answers consisted only of 
Darwin's proposal and a residual hypothesis which mere ly 
states that there may be other solutions03 • The poverty 
of that ultimate partition allowed Darwin to apply a simple 
and uncontroversial information-ranking function which 
really stated no more than: if there is demand for 
information and if it is met by only one theory, t hen its 
informational valued and usefulness shoul d be ranked 
considerably higher than that of the vacuous residual 
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hypothesis. Only therefore, the explanatory value or 
abductive success of the theory could be used as an argument 
for its acceptance : 
I have always looked at the doctrine of Natural 
Selection as an hypothesis, which, if it explaine d 
several large classes of facts . would d e serve to 
be ranked as a theory deservin~ accep tance ; and 
this, of course, is my own opinion . ~4 
To be sure, on occasion Darwin also e mployed the 
information-ranking which he had used at Glen Roy . 
I further believe, that this very slow, 
intermittent action of natural selection accords 
perfectly well with what geology tells us of the 
rate and manner at which the inhabitants of this 
world have changed.~e 
Though reference to Lyell's act ualism may have been designed 
to persuade Lyell himself and other Lyellians, Darwin did 
not actually need to invoke this principle to argue for the 
<tentative) acceptance and belief of a theory which is an 
only ser i ous contender : 
I have now at last satisfied myself <but that is 
very different from satisfying others) on this 
head [ ••• J I dare say you will think all this 
utter bosh, but I believe it to be solid 
truth . eo 
i i i.. 
Darwin drew upon the inductivist argumentation repertoire 
in order to justify his belief in the truth of the theory of 
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evolution by natural selection. In his review on the Origin 
Richard Owen criticized what he took to be the exclusive 
employment of only this argumentation strategy: 
Now~ on such a question as the origin of 
species~ and in an express~ formal~ scientific 
treatise on the subject, the expression of a 
belief~ where one looks for a demonstration~ is 
simply provoking . We are not concerned in the 
author•s beliefs or inclinations to believe. 
Belief is a state of mind short of actual 
knowledge. It is a state which may govern action~ 
when based upon a tacit admission of the mind•s 
incompetency to prove a proposition, coupled with 
submissive acceptance of an authoritative dogma~ 
or worship of a favourite idol of the mind.e7 
While Owen does not deny that Darwin may have good reasons 
for believing his theory to be true~ he insists that any 
expression of belief in the absence of demonstration or 
proof plays no significant role in a scientific argument. 
After all, Owen himself may have good reasons for 
disbelieving that theory which would lead to unproven 
conviction pitched against unproven conviction. And Darwin, 
as he reports to Lyell a conversation with Owen, appears 
ready to agree with him: 
He added : - "If I must criticise, I should say~ 
we do not want to know what Darwin believes and is 
convinced of. but what he can prove." I agreed 
most fully a~d truly that I have probably gr~atly 
sinned in this line, and I defended my general 
line of argument of inventing a theory and seeing 
how many classes of facts the theory would 
explain. I added that I would endeavour to modify 
the "believes" and "convinceds. " He took me up 
short: "You will then spoil your book, the charm 
of ( ! ) it is that it is Darwin himself. uee 
- 211 -
Darwin's readiness to concede that the expression of his 
convictions and beliefs should be modified~ corresponds to a 
shift from one argumentation repertoire to another~ namely 
from the inductivist repertoire to one that is here 
construed as "demarcationist•o• . 
In the preceding quotations~ a proof or demonstration was 
thought to provide a compellingly forcefu l scientific 
argument. And regardless of whether there actually are 
proofs and demonstrations in the natural sciences and 
particularly in biology~ a scientist•s conviction or belief 
is thought to be entirely circumstantial or ep iphenomenal as 
far as specifically scientific reasoning is 
Owen and Darwin are thus expressi ng 
Papper•s view an the role of belief in science. 
As was shown above~ Popper's •solut ion• to the problem of 
induction does not include an account of haw bel ief is 
farmed and when one may be justified in believing a theory 
Rather~ it provides a way of 
circumvent ing or bypassing that problem. Belief is 
epiphenomenal to the scientific enterprise insofar as one 
may rationally believe all sorts of things~ e.g. hypotheses 
which contain mystery-raising p redicates as well as 
unprablematic theories62 • Unl ess one can positively 
prove or demonstrate the truth or falsity of a scientific 
theory~ showing one's grounds far believing it is no 
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substitute for establishing that it can be subjected to 
meaningful scientific criticism. Informed by Popper's 
critical rationalism as the hallmark of science~ the 
demarcationist argumentation repertoire caters to the 
methodological posture which scientists adopt as they argue 
that a given theory is properly scientific, that it raises 
problems rather than mysteries. 
Popper's methodo~ogy is based on the now largely 
uncontroversial recognition that there is no positive proof 
or demonstration in science, but at best negative proof or 
falsification. It is methodologically irrelevant that 
scientists do indeed positively believe in the truth of 
theories . It is equally irrelevant that they do so on 
rational grounds, i.e. - in accordance with inductive rules 
on decision under unresolved conflict. Their belief is ~ so 
to speak, a by-product of scientific work, a dimension of 
human decision-making rather than of evaluation on 
characteristically scientific principles. Even if one 
maintains that this by-product becomes an indispensable 
force in shaping the further development of a theory and of 
science~ the fundamental difference of orientation between 
Popper's demarcationist and Carnap's inductivist programme 
subsists. That difference is clearly expressed by 
StegmDller: 
There are absolutely no points of contact 
between Popper's and Carnap"s theories. [ .•• J 
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Popper's theory of corroboration pertains to the 
theoretical evaluation of unverifiable 
hypotheses . Carnap"s theory pertains to the 
establishment of norms for human decisions under 
risk6~ . 
A human decison under risk or unresolved conflict does not 
settle theoretical problems: in regard to a scientific 
theory~ conflict remains unresolved and everything is open 
unless that theory has been falsified. To be sure~ 
theorists of science and scientists themselves need to 
integrate the inductivist posture which gears argumentation 
towards persuasion and the demarcationist posture according 
to which belief is altogether irrelevant in science64 • 
This integration has to take place on a different level of 
scientific reasoning which will be introduced in the 
following section with the 'professionalist' repertoire. 
For now~ from the Popperian point of view it clearly 
suffices to present the following sort of argument: If the 
professed open-mindedness of science appears disingenuous as 
far as the private person, the individual scientist is 
concerned~ it is precisely this deliberately cultivated and 
sustained disingenuousness which distinguishes the 
collective engagement in the search for scientific truth. 
After all, a public commitment to steadfast open-mindedness 
sustains certain philosophical, cultural, and political 
norms and values quite regardless of whether there is a 
deeply felt belief in these norms and values on a personal 
level. What is true on the level of cultural norms holds 
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also for the norms of conduct prescribed by the 
methodologically sound scientific procedure of 
falsificationism: aside from everything else scientists may 
think and do, they have to ensure that they also conform to 
the falsificationist standard of critical inquiry which 
legitimizes their work methodologically (and possibly also 
socially or culturally•~). 
It is therefore not enough for Darwin to address a demand 
for information~ to propose a theory which meets that 
demand~ and then to argue that it meets the demand in such a 
way that for any number reasons it should be accepted. 
Dat-wi n had to show moreover that his theory meets the demand 
for information in a particular way~ namely in a way that 
makes it available to critical discussion and thus worthy of 
scientific concern••. For this purpose~ a 
mystery-raising attitude towards it had to be outruled and a 
firm establishment of its empirical significance had to be 
pursued. The demarcationist argumentation repertoire is 
geared towards that end: falsifiability is a criterion that 
demarcates science from pseudo-science and thus the 
problem-raising from the mystery-raising attitude. As sLtch ~ 
the repertoire first and foremost includes all those 
arguments whi eh address th.e questions whether a theory is 
falsifiable or not and~ if yes, whether or not it has 
actually been falsified so far. 
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However~ this is not the full extent of the Popperian 
repertoi t-e. Firstly , it encompasses arguments aimed at the 
theoretical evaluation of competing scientific theories in 
terms of their past performance in respect to the 
falsifiability requirement <one might call this the 
regulatory extension of the demarcationist repertoire). And 
more importantly for the case at hand~ it also includes a 
heuristic extension for the theoretical evaluation of 
non-scientific, metaphysical, or not yet certifiably 
scientific ideas in respect to the falsifiability 
requirement, Both these extensions involve the notion of 
"theoretical evaluation•. Apparently this notion has been 
much misunderstood and should be clarified first -
especially since Popper himself fuels that misunderstanding 
when he presents in the following terms the regulative 
extension of the repertoire: 
Of course theories which we claim to be no more 
than conjectures or hypotheses need no 
justification (and least of all a justification by 
a none>dstent "method of induction", of which 
nobody has ever given a sensible description). We 
can, however, sometimes give reasons for 
preferring one of the competing conjectures to the 
others, in the light of their critical 
discussion.o7 
More specifically, a theory's ability to withstand attempts 
at falsification is to provide grounds for such preference. 
Although we cannot justify a theory - that is, 
justify our belief in its truth - we can sometimes 
justify our preference for one theory over 
another; for example if its degree of 
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corroboration is greater . •e 
The notion that a theory's corroboration can serve as a 
reason for preferring it over other theories has been taken 
as a none too well disguised re-issue of inductive 
confirmation~ and Popper was seen to be inadvertently 
slipping from falsificationism to inductivism69 • 
StegmQller vigorous l y defends Popper on this score: 
Popper's proposal states: in each domain of 
empirical inquiry one is to choose the empirically 
most significant theory among all the rivaling 
theories - that is the one with the most potential 
falsificatory instances~ i.e. the most risky and 
logically least probable one . -And all of this 
not for the purpose of accepting it but in order 
to subject it to strict testing <more precisely: 
in order to subject it to the strictest test which 
one can think of). 7 o 
StegmQller"s clarification suggests the source of the 
misunderstanding . Where Popper juxtaposes 'belief" and 
"preference"~ StegmQller simply speaks of 'acceptance". And 
while Popper seems to be saying that one cannot 
scientifically justify belief in the truth of a theory but 
that one can sometimes justify one"s preference for one 
theory over all other known theories~ StegmQller bypasses 
this presumed distinction by simply denying that one can 
scientifically justify the acceptance of a theory . Indeed, 
StegmQller"s reading is the only plausible construal of 
Popper's argument. Surely Popper would not reject "beli ef " 
as a purely epiphenomenal internal state of mind of 
individual scientists only to posit "preference• as another~ 
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supposedly distinct and somehow scientifically justifiable 
state of mind71. And indeed~ in the Logic of 
Scientific Discovery Popper made the same paint as above 
without invoking the notion of 'preference' . 
Scientific theories can never be 'justified'~ or 
verified. But in spite of this~ a hypothesis A 
can under certain circumstances achieve mare than 
a hypothesis B - perhaps B is contradicted by 
certain results of observations~ and therefore 
'falsified' by them~ whereas A is not falsified; 
or perhaps because a greater number of predictions 
can be derived with the help of A than with the 
help of B. The best we can say of a hypothesis is 
that up to now it has been able to show its worth ~ 
and that it has bee n more successful than other 
hypotheses although ~ in principle~ it can never be 
justified~ verified~ or even shown to be 
probable. This appraisal of the hypothesis relies 
solely upon deductive consequences <predictions) 
which may be drawn from the hypothesis. There is 
no need even to mention induction . 72 
'Corroboration' or 'degree of carrabaratian• expresses the 
resilience of hypotheses in the face of attempts at 
falsification. Faced with a well-corroborated hypothesis~ 
i.e. in the absence of grounds for its rejecti~n~ 
scientists stick with it nolens volens . They •prefer• a 
well-corroborated and highly falsifiabl e theory only insofar 
as they follow a rule which demands that resilient 
scientific theories with considerable empirical content are 
first on the list of theories requ iring attempts at 
falsification . The relevant distinction is not between 
'belief' and 'preference• as assumed states of mind~ but 
between •preference by rule' and •preference as human 
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choice" . "Preference by rule" is a species of theor etical 
evaluation resulting from the application of a rule that 
operates on the degree of confirmation and which has somehow 
been deduced from falsificationist demands on scientific 
t.heori es. To be sure~ Popper himself has not formulated 
such a t-ul e : 
I do not propose any •criterion• for the choice 
of scientific hypotheses: every choice remains a 
risky guess. Moreover~ the theoretician's choice 
is the hypothesis most worthy of further critical 
discussion <rather than acceptance). 7~ 
All negotiation on the theoretician's e1Ltsive "most worthy" ~ 
i.e. all attempted specifications of that 
preference-guiding rule belong to what has above been termed 
the •regulatory extension• of the demarcationist 
reper't.oi l~e74 • Thus~ •preference by rule' in contrast 
to 'preference as human choice• is construed in strictly 
deductive manner~ while all human choice including the 
formation of any state of mind (preferring or believing as 
well as disbelieving) involves an act of induction. 
The theoretical evaluation of rivaling scientific theories 
surely requires elaborate negotiations on notions like 
"degree of corroboration•, •comparative predictive power", 
or •relative progressiveness of research progammes•. 
Moreover, questions of what is epistemologically sound 
procedure in respect to any of these notions will arise, and 
these, in turn, are frequently discussed in more general 
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philosophical terms, e.g. as critically employed 
metaphysics7~. But as difficult as this process of 
negotiation may be, it stills seems far mor e tangible than 
the process of negotiation on the heuristic value of 
non-scientific or not-yet certifiably scientific theories. 
For, in the latter case, one has to anticipate the 
scientific value of metaphysical ideas7 •. 
While both Popper and Imre Lakatos acknowledge the 
science-generative force of many metaphysical ideas, it took 
Lakatos•s notion of a •positive• and •negative heuristi c " to 
suggest if only weak criteria for the theoretical evaluation 
of metaphysical core-ideas: 
All scientific research programmes may be 
characterized by their "hard core• . The negative 
heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct 
the modus tollens at this "hard core•. Instead, 
we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even 
invent •auxiliary hypotheses•, which form a 
protective belt around this core, and we must 
redirect the modus tollens to these. It is this 
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has 
to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and 
re-adjusted, or even compl~tely replaced, to 
defend the thus-hardened core. 77 
While the negative heuristic simply consists of the 
directive to deflect criticism of the hard core to its 
protective belt, the c onstruction and modification of the 
protective belt is part of the positive heuristic. 
The negative heuristic specifies the "hard core• 
of the programme which is i rrefutable by the 
methodological decision of i ts proponents; the 
positive heuristic consists of a partially 
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articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to 
change, develop the "refutable variants" of the 
research programme, how to modify, sophisticate, 
the "refutable" protective belt. ( ..• J One may 
formulate the 'positive heuristic" of a research 
programme as a "metaphysi~al" principle. ( • .• J We 
may appraise research programmes, even after their 
'elimination", for their heuristic power: how many 
new facts did they produce, how great was their 
'capacity to explain their refutataions in the 
course of their growth"?79 
Almost paradoxically, then, one would have to say that while 
the hard core generates scientific work, it is not itself a 
primary subject of scientific concern. As far as the 
requirements of the demarcationist repertoire are concerned, 
critical reasoning and science itself take place in the 
negotiation on the protective belt which impacts rather 
obliquely on the hard core. And yet, the overall research 
programme can be assessed in respect to the requirement of 
falsifiability which is to be met at least by the auxiliary 
theories of the protective belt. The demarcationist 
repertoire contains the arguments used to establish 
falsifiability for the protective belt as it is given now or 
as it may develop under the guidance of the positive 
heuristic. Argumentation from the demarcationist repertoire 
may thus start off by first acknowledging that a given 
theory is not or not yet falsifiable in a significant sense 
(tho~gh it should be) 79 • It then proceeds to make the 
case that nevertheless it would be premature to discard that 
theory as mystery-raising. In support of this, this line of 
argumentation may continue by emphasizing that 
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judgement-calls are needed here. And as input to these 
judgement-calls~ falsificationist considerations on the 
general architecture of theories in terms of beauty and 
simplicity will be introduced. And possibly in reference to 
past experience in the history of science~ one will argue 
that the requirement of falsifiability or independent 
testability is going to be met at some future time. 
Especially these latter sorts of arguments from the 
heuristic extension of the demarcationist repertoire were 
employed in the negotiation on Darwin"s theory of evolution 
by natural selectioneo. For~ the testability of 
Darwin"s theor~ was the central issue from the 
falsificationist point of view. Once independent testability 
has been established~ recourse to the heuristic extension is 
not warranted anymore. And if independent testability cannot 
be established in principle~ recourse to the demarcationist 
repertoire will do no good. But a quick survey of the issue 
shows that these matters were quite open in the case of 
"natural selection•. 
By providing an explanatory scheme for the evolutionary 
process~ the theory of natural selection created a 
protective belt around the theory of evolution which 
constitutes the hard core of the research programme 
"Evolutionary Biology". As such~ the theory of natural 
selection insulated the theory of evolution from immediate 
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criticism. Indeed~ the negotiation of natural selection 
requires at least a tentative acceptance of evolution: 
insofar as the theory of natural selection provides an 
explanatory mechanism for evolutionary processes~ the merits 
of that explanatory theory can be assessed only once it is 
agreed upon that there are evolutionary processes which 
ought to be accounted for. Simply by introducing the theory 
of natural selection~ Darwin shifted the status of evolution 
radically from daring biological conjecture to theoretically 
embedded state of affairs. This was most clearly expressed 
by Gearge Romanes in 1896: 
we must have same reasonable assurance that a 
fact is a fact before we endeavour to explain it. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that we should 
actually demonstrate a fact before we endeavour to 
explain it. Even if we have but a reasonable 
presumption as to its probability~ we may find it 
well worth while to consider its explanation; for 
by so doing we may obtain additional evidence for 
the fact itself. And this because, if it really is 
a fact~ and if we hit upon the right explanation 
of it, by proving the explanation probable, we may 
thereby greatly increase our evidence of the fact. 
In the very case before us, for example, the 
evidence of evolution as a fact has from the first 
been largely derived from testing Darwin"s theory 
concerning its method. It was this theoretical 
explanation of its method which first set him 
seriously to enquire into the evidences of 
evolution as a fact; and ever since he published 
his results~ the evidences which he adduced in 
favour of natural selection as a method have 
constituted some of the strongest reason s which 
scientific men have felt for accepting evolution 
as a fact. Of course the evidence in favour of 
this fact has gone on steadily growing, quite 
independently of the assistance which was thus so 
largely lent to it by the distinctively Darwinian 
theory of its method81 
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Romanes"s somewhat cumbersome treatment concludes with a 
euphemism. Where he notes that evolution was adopted •quite 
independently" of the theory of natural selection which 
precipitated its adoption~ one should almost say "in spite 
of". The theory of natural selection steadily lost support 
towards the end of the century while the theory evolution 
rather swiftly became generally accepted doctrine . The 
relation between accepted hard core and tentative protect 
belt can thus be used to explain phenomenon <Ph4) . 
CPh4) Darwin"s contribution consisted of providing an 
explanatory scheme for the controversial theory 
of evolution. He did not introduce significant~ 
direct evidence for the process of evolution . And 
yet~ as an immediate consequence of his work~ the 
theory of evolution was swiftly accepted~ while 
the theory of natural selection was for a long 
time considered highly doubtfule2 • 
In strictly Popperian terms~ then ~ insofar as the core of 
the research programme of evolutionary biology cannot be 
criticized directly~ it is by definiton "metaphysical • : 
It is metaphysical because it is not testable . 
C ••• J For assume that we find life on Mars 
consisting of exactly three terrestrial species. 
Is Darwinism refuted? By no means . We shall say 
that these three species were the only forms among 
the many mutants which were sufficiently well 
adapted to survive. 83 
Evolutionary theory can be saved by ad-hoc adjustments~ 
whatever the presenting phenomena . These ad-hoc adj ustments~ 
however~ are generated from the evolutionary core by the 
theory of natural selection on the protective belt. S i nce 
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that latter theory may well be <independently> testable, 
each ad-hoc adjustment that is designed to save the 
evolutionary core may have testable consequences and may 
have to satisfy coherence conditions which severely 
constrain the scope of ad-hocness. Thus, as Popper continues 
the passage just cited, he infers somewhat too hastily that 
the metaphysical core of evolutionary biology renders the 
entire research programme metaphysical. 
Thus Darwinism does not really predict the 
evolution of variety. It therefore cannot really 
explain it. [ ..• J In other fields, its predictive 
or explanatory power is still more disappointing. 
Take "adaptation". [. •. J Adaptation or fitness is 
defined by modern evolutionists as survival value, 
and can b~ measured by actual success in survival: 
there is hardly any possibility of testing a 
theory as feeble as this. 84 
Popper's mistake lies in the demand that each and all 
explanatory relations between protective belt and hard core 
should be accessible to independent test65 • But whether 
or not one can ultimately find a way of determining (degrees 
of} 'adaptation' or "fitness" independently of actual 
survival values, the theory of natural selection involves a 
great number of other empirical phenomena, some of which may 
well constitute independent testability86 • Indeed, 
Popper lat~r revised his opinion on the testability of 
natural selection. 
I still believe that natural selection works in 
this way as a research programme. Nevertheless, I 
have changed my mind about the testability and the 
logical status of the theory of natural selection 
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[ ••• J In its most daring and sweeping form~ the 
theory of natural selection would assert that all 
organisms~ and especially all those highly complex 
organs whose existence might be interpreted as as 
evidence of design and. in addition. all forms of 
animal behaviour~ have . evolved as t~e result of 
natural selection ; that is~ as the result of 
chance-like inheritable variations. of which the 
useless ones are weeded out, so th~t only the 
useful ones remain. If formulated in this sweeping 
way~ the theory is not only refutable. but 
actually refuted. For not all organs ~erve a 
useful purpose: as Darwin himself points out, 
there are organs like the tail of the peacock, and 
behavioural programmes like the peacock"s display 
of his tail~ which cannot be explained by their 
utility, and therefore not by natural selection. 
Darwin explained them by the preference of the 
other sex, that is~ by sexual selection. Of course 
one can get round this refutation by some verbal 
manoeuvre: one can get round any refutation of any 
theory. But that one gets near to rendering the 
theory tautological. It seems far preferable to 
admit that not everything that evolves is useful~ 
though it is astonishing how many things are; and 
that in conjecturing what is the use of an organ 
or a behavioural programme, we conjecture a 
possible explanation by natural selection87 
Aside from the question whether Popper is right on questions 
of detail or interpretationme, this passage is most 
illuminating in three respects. Firstly, what it says about 
natural selection is easily restatable in the followin g 
now-fami liar terms: the theory of natural selection is 
tautological only if one adopts a mystery-raising attitude 
towards it. But it can function successfully as a research 
programme if one continues the negotiation by conjecturally 
proposing empirical interpretations of that theory, i.e. if 
one adopts a problem-raising attitude towards it. Secondly, 
for a long time there was little or no tangible success in 
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the negotiation on natural selection. Indeed~ one might 
infer from Popper's discussion that even today few inroads 
have been made towards the clarification of natural 
selection and its empirical significance. But then again, in 
the absence of a serious contender to the theory of natural 
selection~ the rate of success in the negotiation is not 
very important as long as the problem-raising attitude is 
actively pursued. For, thirdly~ in the meantime natural 
selection does a perfect job at insulating the theory of 
evolution. 
In accordance with the t hree remarks on Popper's 
interpretation of natural selection~ one can now identify 
the following types of arguments which were employed by 
Darwin in defence of his theory and which were drawn from 
the demarcationist argumentation repertoire Ci~ its 
heuristic extension>. Into that repertoire belong 
all arguments aimed at establishing natural selection 
as a protective belt that delineates a proper domain of 
.scientific discourse <leading to the tentative 
acceptance of evolution>, 
al l references to the beauty, simplicity, abductive 
success or explanatory power of the theory, since those 
references are indices of high empirical content and 
greater falsifiability, 
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all admissions of the theory's failure to presently 
meet the scientific standard of falsifiability~ 
all allusions to analogous episodes in the history of 
science where a judgement in favor of conceptually 
difficult theories constituted scientific progress~ and 
all anticipations of conditions under which the theory 
may be or may become falsifiable. 
The introduction of the theory of natural selection 
created a realm of scientific discourse which rendered the 
theory of evolution acceptable •. That is~ by inventing a 
theory~ Darwin staked out new grounds for scientific 
research. In the course of negotiation on whether his theory 
was properly scientific~ 'science' was redefined to now 
include the previously untenable (and untenably ideological) 
idea of evolution. To quote two contemporary reviews: 
to raise this hypothesis of creations by 
variation to the rank of a scientific theory, is 
the object of Mr. DARWIN'S book~ and to do this he 
has endeavoured to invent and prove such an 
intelligible rationale of the operation of 
variation~ as will account for many species having 
been developed from a few in strict adaptation to 
existing conditions69 
The history of science shows that the great 
epochs of its progress are those not so much of 
new discoveries of fact~ as those of new ideas 
which have served for the colligation of facts 
previously known into general principles, and 
which have thenceforward given a new direction to 
inquiry. It is in this point of view that we 
at t ach the highest value to Mr. Darwin's 
work. 90 
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Surely~ it was not enough to simply invent a theory. A 
theory which will successfully serve as the protective belt 
for another~ has to meet some requirements which should 
enable it to digest the brunt of criticism. In properly 
Popperian fashion~ H. Fawcett~ one of Darwin's compatriots 
presented the following sketch: 
it should at once be distinctly stated that Mr. 
Darwin does not pretend that his work contains a 
proved theory~ but merely an extremely probable 
hypothesis. The history of science abundantly 
illustrates that through such a state of 
hypothesis all those theories have passed which 
are now considered most securely to rest on strict 
inductive principle. [ ... J The mode therefore is 
plainly indicated by which the incorre~tness of 
Mr. Darwin's speculations can be completely 
established. If the physical philosopher can 
demonstrate that the geological record has not 
this character of extreme imperfection, Mr. Darwin 
will doubtless be amongst the first to admit that 
his theory can then be no longer 
maintained. 91 
Fawcett•s claim that Darwin's theory is falsifiable was 
rather singular. Indeed~ he was speaking here about what is 
probably a further protective belt: the imperfection of the 
geological record insulates the theory of natural selection 
from certain sorts empirical criticism. Moreover~ the claim 
about the imperfection of the geological record is not as 
easily falsifiable as Fawcett seemed to think. 
In contrast~ the strategy of Darwin and his followers did 
· not rest on the claim that his theory is falsifiable. And 
yet~ they also argued from a falsificationist <or 
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demarcationist> point of view as they tried to pre-empt 
falsificationist criticism: 
I am actually weary of telling people that I do 
not pretend to adduce direct evidence of one 
species changing into another, but that I believe 
that this view in the main is correct, because so 
many phenomena can be thus grouped together and 
e;.: pl ai ned. '9>2 
Accordingly, Darwin was quite delighted about John Stuart 
Mill's assessment of his theory~ and rightly so•3 : 
Mr. Darwin"s remarkable speculation on the 
Origin of Species is another unimpeachable example 
of a legitimate hypothesis. 1-'Jhat he terms "natural 
selection" is not only a ~~era cau.sa~ but one to be 
proved capable of producing effects of the same 
kind with those which the hypothesis ascribes to 
it: the question of possibility is entirely one of 
degree. It is unreasonable to accuse Mr. Darwin 
Cas has been done) of violating the rules of 
Induction. The rules of Induction are concerned 
with the conditions of Proof. Mr. Darwin has never 
pretended that his doctrine was proved. He was not 
bound by the rules of Induction~ but by those of 
Hypothesis. And these last have seldom been more 
completely fulfilled. He has opened a path of 
inquiry full of promise, the results of which none 
can foresee. And is it not a wonderful feat of 
scientific knowledge and ingenuity to have 
rendered so bold a sLiggestion~ which the first 
impulse of every one was to reject at once~ 
admissible and discussible, even as a 
conjecture?""4 
This assessment would provide the theory a chance for 
growth. Marking it as a product of "hypothesis' or 
'abduction" (vJith 'deduction" and 'induction' still 
outstanding>, has a similar effect as labeling 'natural 
selection' a metaphor: prudent restraint in the assessment 
of its scientific standing yields a gain in scientific 
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credibility to the theory and its authors. It shows that 
they are embarked on a problem-raising course and unwilling 
to confuse a good explanatory hypothesis with a proven 
scientific theory. While he kept waiting for 'direct 
evidence' and with the example of great science in mind~ 
Darwin knew that not all depends on the immediate 
falsifiability of "natural selection". 
It can hardly be supposed that a false theory 
would explain~ in a satsifactory manner as does 
the theory of natural selection, the several large 
classes of facts above specified. It has recently 
been objected that this is an unsafe method of 
arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the 
common events of life, and has often been used by 
the greatest natural philosophers. The undulatory 
theory of light has thus been arrived at; and the 
belief in the revolution of the earth on its own 
axis was until lately supported by hardly any 
direct evidence. It is no valid objection that 
science as yet throws no light on the far higher 
problem of the essence or origin of life. Who can 
explain what is the essence of the attraction of 
gravity? No one now objects to following out the 
results consequent on this unknown element of 
attraction; notwithstanding that Leibnitz formerly 
clccused Newton of intJ~oducing "occult qualities 
and miracles into philosophy." 9 l5 
To be sure, by far not all of this convoluted argument could 
have been drawn from the demarcationist repertoire~ 
especially not the first sentence. But loud and clear is the 
appeal to 'great• episodes in the history of science, and 
these episodes are told in respect to eventual 
falsifiability of theories which at first may have seemed 
like occult conjectures. One need not surrender the 
demaractionist ideal of falsifiability in phases of 
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theory-deveopment where one can defend only by admittedly 
unsafe common-sensical arguments the scientific sp i rit of a 
research programme. In other words, in order to assume a 
falsificationist methodological posture. one need not hold 
on ly falsifiable theories.~~ 
iv. 
The heading of the section in which Lakatos introduces the 
notion of 'positive heuristic' reads: 
Positive Heuristic : the construction of the 
~protective belt~ and the relative a utonomy of 
theoretical science~7 
The catchphrase here is ''the relative autonomy of 
theoretical science''. Lakatos appear s to suggest that the 
introduction of a protective belt not only inaugurates a 
research progra~me but also creates the conditions which 
socially insulate it . On this account, the protective belt 
may originate a scientific discipline both as a social 
institution and an intellectual concern. However, it seems 
th3t to Lakatos the issue of the autonomy of science extends 
only to the question where a n d by whom scientific problems 
are generated•e . But Lakatos's proposal can be extended 
to explain the insulation of scientific discourse from 
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ideological discourse in general and thus to an explanation 
of phenomenon <Ph5>: 
CF'h~) Th h th th 
· ~ oug e •eory of evolution by natural selection 
as well as some of its predecessors (theories of 
evolution and Malthus's principle of population) 
were subject to heated ideological and theological 
debate~ Darwin"s own writings as well as his 
exchange with many contemporary critics remained 
remarkably untouched by this controversy . 
<Ph5) is closely related to (Ph4l. The acceptance of 
evolution was a direct outflow from the shift of debate to 
the principle of natural selection. That shift of debate 
created a realm of discourse which presupposed that the 
process of evolution needs accounting for. And by the same 
token~ that shift made 'evolution' a matter of purely 
theoretical concern in its relation to the explanatory 
principle of natural selection. The account for <Ph4) can 
thus be extended to an account of <Ph5> if one only provides 
a crucial 'missing link"~ namely~ a theory of why the 
emergence of purely theoretical concerns should matter 
enough to the scientific community as to produce the 
pronounced watershed between theoretical and ideological 
concerns that has become manifest in <Ph5). 
In the sociology and social history of science <Ph5) has 
been a most fruitful anomaly to historical-materialist and 
other interest-oriented approaches. It was fruitful insofar 
as in the course of accounting for <Ph5) from a Marxist 
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point of view~ the importance of argumentation repertoires 
in science was first uncove red. However ~ that notion was not 
fully explored and the explanation of <Ph5) therefore 
remained unduly antagonistic to all internalist theories of 
science~ whether philosophical or sociological . 
Supplementing the interest-oriented approach and bringing it 
in tune with the Lakatosian explanati on of <Ph4) amounts to 
delineating the "professionalist argumentation repertoire'. 
And just as the 'inductivist' and 'demarcationist• 
repertoires were culled from philosophical theories of 
science~ role and content of this lat ter repertoire can be 
culled f rom sociolog i st Robert Merton"s t heory on the 
normative structure of science. 
In a review of Darwin-historiography~ Steven Shapin and 
Barry Barnes criticize the ways in which historians have 
dealt with social Darwinism in general , and <Ph5) in 
particular . 
The central question seems to have been whether 
the author of the Origin of Species of 1859 was in 
any If-Jay either a "part of~" or "respons ible for," 
social Darwinism. The generally agre ed-upon answe r 
seems to be that the acc used was innocent on both 
counts . This chapter [ . •• J reflect s upon the 
l ikely reasons for~ and consequences of , such a 
protracted and expe nsive litigation.~~ 
As they scrutinize the methodological presuppositions of the 
historians under review~ Shapin and Barnes encounter the 
work of Robert Young who has come closest to the desired 
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explanation of <Ph5). In the tradition of Marxist 
historiography~ Young focusses on the ideological background 
of the ni neteenth-centLtry debate on "Man • s Place in Nature". 
Within the context of his inquiry~ <Ph5) clearly presents an 
anomaly: 
Lyell and Darwin [ ..• J are~ relatively speaking~ 
the purest of scientists in the Victorian debate 
and as such are nearer to the position of 
physicists~ chemists ~ and mathematicians. 1 oo 
Indeed~ the relative ideological purity of Darwin•s writings 
appears to invalidate the Marxist explanatory model 
according to which science is <merely> a device for the 
construction of an ideological supersturcture which serves 
to justify the economic base of contemporary society. 
It can~ of course~ be argued that the 
base-superstructure distinction is only useful to 
historians of science as a vehicle for freeing 
themselves from the restrictions of the 
internalist-externalist distinction and that 
having once freed themselves~ they should lay 
aside the model which has led so disastrously to 
economic reductionism in vulgar marxism. C ••. J My 
own current position is that the employment of a 
sufficiently subtle theory of mediations and 
interactions between socio-economic factors and 
intellectual life would make the 
base-superstructure model servicable once again~ 
at least in an interim way, until we can develop a 
fully relational~ totalising approach . 1 01 
Yo\..tng founds his sLtbstitLttion of "vulgar mar>:ism" by a 
"subtle theory of mediatfons and interactions" on Man-: 
himself who in The German Ideology prepares the ground for 
an explanation of <Ph5) . 
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each new class which puts itself in the place of 
one ruling before it~ is compelled, merely in 
order to carry through its aims, to represent its 
interest as the common interest of all the members 
of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it 
has to give its ideas the form of universality, 
and represent them as the only rational, 
universally valid ones.1o2 
Not discouraged by the methodological problem of how to 
empirically establish the efficacy of class interest ' within 
a "sufficiently subtle" historiographical approach~ Young 
proceeds to evaluate Darwin in the terms set by Marx: 
It should be granted that the work and influence 
of Lyell and Darwin were less intentionally and 
obviously an expression of more basic 
socio-economic forces and structures than, for 
example, the work and influence of Chambers, 
Spencer, and Wallace. Similarly, their greater 
scientific prestige meant that those who employed 
their theories for socio-political purposes could 
claim a sounder foundation in the nature of things 
- in scientific laws - for their extrapolations 
and generalizations. 103 
The ideological concerns of Lyell and Darwin may not be 
reflected in their writings, but this makes them only 
particularly successful in the task of legitimizing those 
concerns . Phenomenon <Ph5) arises as scientists succeed in 
render-ing the ruling ideas of the ruling class in "the form 
of universality [ ..• J as the only rati onal, universally 
valid ones". (F'h5) now confirms t~ather than contradicts the 
base-superstructure approach: the fewer traces of their 
class-commitments scientists leave in their work, the more 
serviceable their work is going to be to their class. Along 
these lines, Young"s more detailed analysis of Darwin"s 
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argument culminates in the claim that Darwin's success as a 
scientist consisted in assembling from a few familiar 
components a theory in the desired~ putatively 
non-ideological form of universality: applying Lyell's 
uniformitarianism~ Darwin simply extrapolated the model 
provided by artificial selection to the development of all 
biological organisms. Accordingly~ Young concludes: 
Darwin's mechanism - in its nineteenth-century 
form and its nineteenth-century context - turned 
out to be a very frail reed~ but in bending with 
the winds it allowed his real commitment to the 
uniformity of nature to contribute to the general 
movement of nineteenth-century naturalism. If we 
notice the extent to which the special status of 
natural selection was weakened by scientists, 
theologians, and philosophers, Darwin's 
achievement turns out to be much more like that of 
Lyell and of the other evolutionists: together~ by 
a rather confused mixture of metaphysical, 
methodological, and scientific arguments which 
depended heavily on analogical and metaphorical 
expressions, they brought the earth, life, and man 
into the domain of natural laws. 104 
Young's explanation of <Ph5) leaves sociologists and 
social historians of science <like Shapin and Barnes> 
dissatisfied since it remains fundamentally ambiguous 
towards science and scientists in relation to overall 
society. As long as the problem is couched in terms of 
Darwin's intentions or ''real commitments~, Young's account 
invites speculations as to whether science or scientists 
actively promote ideological causes or whether the very 
objectivity of scientific results renders these results so 
malleable that society at large can put them to any 
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ideological use at al1 10~. What seems to be missing is 
a way of systematically assessing the relation of scientists 
and science to culture. 
For all that Young's work has been important and 
convincing ~ he has not succeeded in shifting the 
balance of historical attention away from the 
individual and his motives . 1o6 
t:~nd insofar as YoLmg does .:1t tempt a shift "away from the 
individual and his motives"~ his statements 
represent a revealing gesture towards an 
institutionalized orientation in the history of 
science. 107 
That is, it may not be sufficient to shift attention from 
individuals to the institution of science as long as the 
institutional structure of science is thought to be 
. . 
differentiated from overall culture by a set of attitudes 
and motives shared by all scientists individually. If talk 
of individuals and motives does not help to clarify the 
scope of scientists• contributions to the justification of 
ideology~ talk in terms of the institution of science as a 
particular~ maybe arbitrarily defined aggregate of 
individuals and motives will not help either. Instead~ the 
very question whether the institution of science is somewhat 
distinct from overall culture has to be raised as an 
empirical issLte. 
We think and act on the basis of the resources 
oLtr culture provides; and thereby vJe may add to 
these resources. and provide additional materials 
upon which the ~hought and activity of others may 
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be c~nstructed. There is no reason for treating 
Darw1n~ Newton~ or indeed any scientist. as an 
exception to this. [ . .. J Nonetheless~ a · culture 
need not be seen as an homogeneous whole. How 
differentiated it is at any time~ how many 
"sLib-cultures" e>:ist within it~ how "insulated" 
they may be from other sub-cultures and from the 
wider cultur~~ and to what.extent any individual•s 
writings connect with this or that part - all 
these questions cannot be decided by a priori 
conceptions of how science must be, but only by 
••going and looking". Individualistic accounts of 
science~ which relate the truth of science to its 
purity~ anticipate the answers to empirical 
questions. 1. 013 
In the case of Darwin and his wider culture~ Shapin and 
Barnes suggest that it was not sufficiently differentiated 
to warrant recourse to a juxtaposition of scientific culture 
<in which Darwin participated) and society overall <which 
was ideologically supported by social Darwinism>. 
In fact~ there is every reason to suspect tha~ 
the British intellectual scene of approximately 
1859 was comparatively undifferentiated~ with · 
cultural resources being taken from a common stock 
and put to a wide range of uses. Robert Young has 
convincingly documented this "common context .. 
[ ••• J To the extent that Young [ •.• J prove[sJ to 
be right about the context, we should stop making 
differentiations inappropriate to that 
conte:·:t . 1.o<T 
Shapin and Barnes do not explain <Ph5>, but they suggest 
that the phenomenon itself is couched in questionable 
categories, that it simply does not exist, presupposing as 
it does a somehow problematic contrast between ideological 
and scientific debates1.1.o. By thus diffusing rather 
than solving problem <Ph5> , Shapin and Barnes have 
shouldered another apparent anomaly: why would so many 
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historians <inc luding Robert Young) misperceive the 
phenomenon and frame it in terms of 'science• and "culture'? 
Their answer to this problem is simple and compelling: Young 
structures the problem in terms of two cultures for the same 
reason and equally mistakenly as Darwin himself did. Where 
Darwin justified his own actions on supposedly "scientific ' 
grounds even though scientific discourse at his time was 
continuous with ideological discourse~ Young accounts for 
Darwin' s actions in terms of arguments and 
motive-ascriptions which are modeled after the currently 
<still) presumed separation of institutionalized science and 
wider CLil ture . 
As Mills ( 1940) says~ vocabularies of belief and 
motivation are to be treated as shared public 
resources~ intelligible by reference to the 
community possessing them~ and what that community 
does with them . Thus~ the imputation of motives by 
professional historians is to be understood by 
their communal c6ncerns and modes of practice. 
And, analogously, Darwin's self imputation of 
motives can only be considered in relation to 
communal concerns and practices in the context 
wherein they were uttered. Darwin's expressed 
motives do not provide a pipeline to his 
soul. 111 
Thus, without the ref erence to Marx and on methodological 
groun d s different than his~ Shapin and Barnes preserve 
Young's effort to provide a partial explanation of <Ph5) by 
bringing fo the fore the common context of naturalists• 
debates in Victorian England. Their ensueing criticism is 
well-taken as they point out Young's failure to question his 
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own as well as contemporary ascriptions of motive in terms 
of <ideologically) acceptable vocabularies of motive. 
However~ from here on their argument becomes more 
questionable. Had Young been aware of ideological 
vocabularies of motive - it continues - he would have seen 
that only an undifferentiated wider cultural context 
provided the referent to Darwin's vocabulary~ and he would 
have consequently realized that phenomenon <Ph5) was framed 
in a way which in turn is merely an artifact of contemporary 
society and its vocabulary of motive. 
The two parts of Shapin and Barnes•s argument against 
Young employ Mills's notion of vocabularies of motive in two 
distinct ways. Firstly~ it is used to illuminate the 
dependency of any and all motive ascriptions on the 
vocabulary available to society at any given time. In this 
capacity~ it compellingly questions Young's attempt at 
uncovering the 'real', 'extrascientific' commitment of 
someone who argues within the institution of 'science'. 
Indeed~ sociological and philosophical theories of science 
should avoid explanations of social actions in reference to 
either professed or real motives. But having discovered the 
<m~rely) ideological fo~ndation of ascriptions of motive, · 
Shapin and Barnes employ Mills's notion secondly in order to 
altogether discount the social efficacy of vocabul aries of 
motive. Used in this capacity, it leads to the 
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counter - intuitive result that <Ph5) is not properly framed 
and that there is no clearly discernible tradition of 
science as a considerably autonomous social institution for 
the production of objective or~ if one prefers~ objectified 
knowledge. Surely~ there is no way of convincing Shapin and 
Barnes that the contemporary view which clearly identifies 
such a tradition is more than false consciousness11 2 • 
It can be shown~ however~ that Mills's proposal for a 
research-programme on vocabularies of motive provides for 
both~ an ideological critique of ascriptions of motive and 
an account of the social efficacy of these vocabularies , 
i.e. that Mills's programme need not culminate in the denial 
of social institutions . On the contrary, social institutions 
are each defined by a vocabulary~ and each is therefore able 
to perform very specific tasks such as "scienti f ic" 
negotiation towards the production of objective or 
objectified knowledge. In other words, one need not deny the 
ideological dependency of scientific thought <e.g. in the 
formation of basic concepts or in scientists• pursuit of 
goals>, if one wants to elucidate the internal social 
structure of science which is defined by a self-imposed 
confinement to scientifically acceptable vocabularies of 
motive or argumentation repertoires. Having said this, one 
can further argue against Shapin and Barnes that the more 
comprehensive view on vocabularies of motive leads to a more 
comprehensive and therefore better explanation of <Ph5). 
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These contentions can be supported by first taking a brief 
look at three passages from Mills's stimulating and 
intriguing 1940 paper on Situated Rctions and Vocabularies 
of Motive 11 ~. Just like Shapin and Barnes~ he makes a 
compelling case against using reference to either professed 
or real or underlying motives in the explanation of social 
action. 
"F:eal attitLtdes" versus "mere verbalization" or 
"opinion" implies that at best we only infer from 
his language what "really" is the individual's 
attitude or motive. Now what could we possibly so 
infer? [ ••. )All we can infer and empirically 
check is another verbalization of the agent's 
which which we believe was orienting and 
controlling behavior at the time the act was 
performed. The only social item that can "lie 
deeper" at-e other lingual forms. [ .•• J What is 
reason for one man is rationalization for another. 
The variable is the accepted vocabulary of 
motives~ the ultimates of discourse~ of each man's 
dominant group about whose opinion he 
cares. 1 l· 4 
Here~ Mills uses the term 'ultimate of discourse• for 
•vocabulary of motive'. Where Shapin and Barnes seem to 
think that these vocabularies will be used <merely> for ex 
post facto justifications of social actions which are 
performed independently of haw they will be justified~ Mills 
emphasizes the efficacy af vocabularies as ultimates af 
discourse when it comes ta anticipating and evaluating the 
consequences af contemplated action. 
Motives are accepted justifications far present~ 
future~ or past programs ar acts. Ta term them 
justification is not ta deny their efficacy. Often 
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Ch•ptwr ~ - Argum•nt•t1on Rwp•rto1re• 
anticipations of acceptable justifications will 
contr-ol condLICt. ("If I did this~ ~o-Jhat caul d I 
say? What would they say?") [ .•. J A man may 
begin an act for- one motive. In the cour-se of it~ 
he may adopt an ancillar-y motive. This does not 
mean that the second apologetic motive is 
inefficacious. [ .•• J It may str-engthen the act of 
the actor-. It may win new allies for- his act. 
[ •• • J When an agent vocalizes or- imputes motives~ 
he is not tr-ying to describe his exper-ienced 
social action. He is not mer-ely stating "r-easons". 
He is influencing other-s and himself. 11 ~ 
Social settings at once make available~ constr-ain~ and 
validate r-easoning fr-om a par-ticular- vocabular-y . 
Rationalization is not •mer-e• but legitimate rationalization 
- to under-stand science is ther-efor-e not simply to see that 
scientists can use pr-esumably objectifying vocabular-ies to 
oppor-tunistically embellish the choice of a given goal~ but 
also to under-stand the social setting of science which 
legitimates and pr-escr-ibes the employment of these 
par-ticular- vocabular-ies 116 • The question has now been 
r-aised just how a social institution legitimizes the 
employment of cer-tain vocabular-ies . But it is r-ather- obvious 
that e.g. the inductivist and demar-cationist ar-gumentation 
r-eper-toir-es in science ar-e legitimate at least for- the 
somewhat banale r-eason that they can be successfully 
employed: they ar-e good at what they do <i.e. they do 
discer-n r-ational gr-ounds for- belief, they do ensur-e the 
empir-ical content of theor-ies~ etc.) 117 • The 
availability~ legitimacy~ and validity of a c er-tai n limited 
number- of r-eper-toir-es mar-ks a given social setting as a 
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normative setting . The recognition o f vocabularies of motive 
as ultimates of discourse, and the constraints on these 
vocabularies as indices of the normative character of social 
institutions~ readmits the notion of vocabular~es of motive 
to the task of explaining social action and phenomena like 
<Ph5>: instead of explaining a particular action in 
reference directly to stated or inferred motives~ one can 
explain in reference to available vocabularies of motive the 
patterned ways of framing social action in accordance with 
the norms of a institutional settings. Accordingly~ Mills 
states the perspective for further research in the following 
terms: 
Rather than interpreting actions and language as 
external manifestations of subjective and deeper 
lying elements in individuals~ the research task 
is the locating of particular types of action 
within typal frames of normative actions and 
socially situated clusters of motive. There is no 
explanatory value in subsuming various 
vocabularies of motives under some terminology or 
list. Such procedure merely confuses the task of 
explaining specific cases. The languages of 
situations as given must be considered a valuable 
portion of the data to be interpreted and related 
to their conditions. To simplify these 
vocabularies of motive into a socially abstracted 
terminology is to destroy the legitimate use of 
motive in the explanation of social 
actions. 116 
Mills's recognition of the <normative> efficacy of 
vocabularies of motive results implictly from his 
application of the "Thomas theorem" in the sociology of 
knowledge. Named after W.I. Thomas~ it is a fundamental 
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tenet in Robert Merton•s sociological work~ including, of 
course~ his work in the sociology of science: 
"If men define situations as real~ they are real 
in their consequences~" wrote Professor Thomas. 
[ ••• J The first part of the theorem provides an 
unceasing reminder that men respond not only to 
objective features of a situation. but also. and 
at times primarily~ to the meanin~ this sit~ation 
has for them. And once they have assigned some 
meaning to the situation~ their consequent 
behavior and some of the consequences of that 
behavior are determined by the ascribed 
meaning. 119 
Indeed, it appears that much of the controversy on the 
existence and efficacy of institutional norms hinges on 
whether and to what extent one wants to take into the 
account the Thomas theorem when considering the acceptable 
vocabularies of motive. The controversy on the normative 
structure of science provides a case in point. In one of the 
seminal papers for the sociology of science120 , Robert 
Merton identified four norms of science as they 
can be inferred from the moral consensus of 
scientists as expressed in use and wont~ in 
countless writings on the scientific spirit and in 
moral indignation directed toward contraventions 
of the ethos. 121 
The four norms are universalism which regulates equal access 
to the institution of science, communism which prescribes 
the shared ownership by the scientific community of 
scientific results, disinterestedness which delimits the 
system of goals and rewards that are legitimately available 
to scientists, and organized scepticism which mandates - as 
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will be shown in more detail - that scientists adhere to the 
acceptable argumentation repertoires of science and that by 
implication they do not invoke societal argumentation 
repertoires as e.g . those of religious or ideological dogma. 
Since Merton~s brand of sociology is firmly based on the 
Thomas theorem, it is a secondary issue whether these norms 
are instituted "only" as acceptable and effective 
vocabularies of motive or in addition fortified by severe 
and stringently enforced sanctions. Indeed, Merton"s later 
work explores these issues by focussing on scientists• 
ambivalence towards these norms~22 • And Michael Mulkay 
began to explore them by making explicit what is at least 
one manifestation of these norms . 
they are undoubtedly relatively standardi zed 
verbal formulations which are used by participants 
to describe the actions of scientists, to assess 
or evaluate such actions and to prescribe 
acceptable or permissible kinds of social action . 
C .. • J the standardized verbal formulations to be 
found in the scientific community provide a 
repertoire which can be used flexibly to 
categorise professional actions differently in 
various social contexts and, presumably, in 
accordance with varying social interests. 123 
With that last remark, Mulkay opens an intriguing research 
perspective which he formulates in questions such as 
How do scientists use vocabularies of 
justification inside their professional 
community? Are different vocabularies used in 
different social contexts; for example, in public 
as opposed to private media of communication? Are 
the more powerful groups and individuals better 
able to employ these vocabularies to serve their 
interests?124 
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Unfortunately~ Mulkay does not rely much on the Thomas 
theorem and is consequently rather unclear on the efficacy 
of the normative vocabulary. This leads him to juxtapose the 
idea of normative structure and <mere) ideology in a way 
which - from the point of view of the Thomas theorem 
appears rather curious~ if not entirely untenable: 
I wish to suggest~ therefore~ that scientists 
have tended to select from their repertoire of 
accounts~ those formulations original ly taken by 
the functionalist interpreters to be the central 
norms of science; and that this version was 
selected because it served the social interests of 
scientists. It fo llows that the original 
functional analysis did identify a genuine social 
reality~ but one better conceived as an ideology 
than as a normative structure. 12e 
In the spirit of Thomas, Mills and Merton , Mulkay's 
abandoned project shall now be continued at least to the 
point where the content of the argumentation repertoire 
which contains the professional norms of the scientific 
community is partially elaborated. Both the inductivist and 
demarcationist repertoires were introduced as presenting 
options to practicing scientists who would select from them 
those arguments which would support their choices among 
alternatives in science . Though these repertoires may well 
be founded upon normative theories of rationality, their use 
is fairly unc~nstrained 126 • The professionalist 
re~ertoire is also open to opportunistically selective 
employment. However, in contrast to the inductivist and 
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dema~cationist ~epe~toi~es~ appeal to the p~ofessionalist 
repe~toi~e has no~mative cha~acte~. Fo~, only as the 
institution of science is socially defined and identified by 
its self-imposed confinement to certain a~gumentation 
repe~toi~es (including ~ of cou~se , the inductivist and 
dema~cationist ~epe~toi~es), that adhe~ence is enfo~cable as 
a scientific no~m 127 • Only then, t~ansgressions of 
available ~epertoi~es become violations of p~ofessionally 
acceptable conduct, and appeal to the p~ofessionalist 
~epe~toi~e can be employed to publicly identify them as 
such. A famous and d~amatic exchange at the meeting of the 
B~itish Association fo~ the Advancement of Science at Oxfo~d 
in 1860 illust~ates this point. 
It will be ~emembe~ed that the Bishop 
CWilbe~force of Oxfo~dJ~ towa~ds the end of a long 
speech whe~e he denounced the Da~winian doctrines~ 
had tu~ned to Huxley and mockingly a s ked him 
whethe~ he ~eckoned his descent f~om an ape on his 
g~andfathe~ "s o~ his g~andmothe~"s side? - to 
t--Jhich HLt>:ley ~eto~ted: "If the question is put to 
me, would I ~athe~ have a mise~able ape for a 
g~andfather o~ a man highly endowed by natu~e and 
possessing g~eat means and influence ~ and yet who 
employs those faculties and that influence fo~ the 
me~e pu~pose of int~oducing ~idicule into a g~ave 
scientific discussion - I unhesitatingly affi~m my 
prefe~ence fo~ the ape . " 128 
One might fi~st t~y to inte~p~et the Bishop's ~ema~k as 
quite innocuous : using the ~hetorical equivalent of a 
reductio ad absurdum, the Bishop sceptically assessed a 
deductive consequence or ext~apolation of Da~win"s theo~y, 
namely an implication by the theo~y of common descent . 
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However~ no available argumentation repertoire provides for 
this sort of argument and Huxley"s response makes quite 
clear that this violates the norm of organized scepticism. 
The Bishop"s argument does not organize the technical~ 
verbal or communal resources of the scientific community. 
That is~ in support of his sceptical contBQtion Bishop 
Wilberforce did not establish technical (test->conditions~ 
he did not adhere to the available argumentation 
repertoires~ and he did not solicit the critica l scrutiny of 
other scientists. Instead~ he spoke only with the force of · 
personal authority Which does not by itself count for much 
in the context of scientific negotiation. Thus~ Huxley"s 
response articulated a communal concern with the enforcement 
of the norms governing scientific conduct. A contemporary 
account of the episode accordingly interprets the Bishop"s 
remark as a violation and Huxley•s as a defence of organized 
scepticism. 
It was sad~ indeed~ to think that the opponents 
of tHe theory [ .•• J summon[edJ to their aid a 
species of oratory which could deem it an argument 
to ask a professor if he should object to discover 
that he had been developed out of an ape. The 
professor aptly replied to his assailant by 
remarking~ that man"s remote descent from an ape 
was not so degrading to his dignity as the 
employment of oratorical powers to misguide the 
multitude by throwing ridicule upon a scientific 
discussion. The retort was so justly deserved~ and 
so inimitable in its manner, that no one who was 
present can ever forget the impression it made. 
Happy are we to be able to escape from such 
recriminations, for there is some chance of a 
satisfactory solution when we can appeal to 
physical principles. 12• 
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The norm of organized scepticism is used to enforced 
adherence to the available argumentations repertoires . As 
such~ it functions like the exclusionary clause in a 
recursive definition~ namely a definition of <contemporary) 
"scientific activity" 1 ~o: 
"Scientific activity" is <socially) defined as public 
negotiation on alternatives in science in such a way 
that 
<1> arguments from the inductivist repertoire 
c:\re permissible~ 
(2) arguments from the demarcationist repertoire 
are permissible~ 
( ... ) 
(n) arguments from repertoires other than those 
listed in (1) through <n-1) are not permissible. 
(n) is enforced by employment of the professionalist 
repertoire with appeal ' to the norm of organized scepticism. 
The professionalist repertoire (just like the inductivist 
and demarcationist repertoires) makes use of organized 
scepticism in a flexible manner. It is allows for more than 
the mechanical employment of a rule or a set of rules. 
Instead~ there are patterns of lenience and strictness in 
the enforcement of adherence to acceptable arguments. A 
variable in such patterns is e.g. a scientist's past 
performance. Darwin had scrupulously established himself as 
a diligent observer and cautious theorist before advancing 
his revolutionary theory. Indeed~ a few years after 
publication of the Origin ~ Darwin gave the following advice 
to a young scientist: 
I would suggest to you the advantage at present~ 
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of being very sparing in introducing theory in 
your papers <I formerly erred much in Geology in 
that way>: let theory guide your observations~ but 
till your reputation is well-established be 
sparing in publishing theory. It makes persons 
doubt your observations.~3 ~ 
This passage suggests that a well-reputed scientists have 
less to fear as they stress the limits of currently 
acceptable argumentation. But even Darwin who had already 
built himself a reputation continued to deliberately 
cultivate it after publication of the Origin: 
Anything said by myself in defence would have no 
weight; it is best to be defended by others or not 
at all.~32 
Darwin's attentiveness to his professional standing paid 
off : many of his critics gave weight to his arguments by 
citing his impeccable scientific stature~33 • 
The other norms of science play a role similar to that of 
•organized scepticism•. In some way or other~ they all are 
normative extensions of methodological argumentation 
repertoires . It seems that •univeralism• plays hardly any 
role when it comes to evaluating a new theory like the 
theory of •natural selection• . The merits of equal access to 
domains of thought which were previously imbedded in 
authoritarian structures were more pronounced in the 17th 
than the 19th century. The claim that Darwin transplanted 
the species-question from a hierarchically structured 
community <church and theology> into the domain of 
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egalitarian science~ would not be fair to most of Darwin's 
critics 1 ~4 • The norm of disinterestedness is also 
somewhat marginal in the case at hand. Disinterestedness is 
related to organized scepticism in analogy to the relation 
between goals and arguments in science: it regulates the 
scope of publicly statable goals~ i.e. it fends off 
scientific cynicism and compensates for the incurred loss of 
ego-satisfction. A cynical attitude might employ admissable 
arguments in an openly strategic manner~ e.g . in stating 
that such and such is the intended goal but that in regard 
to acceptable repertoires the following manner of 
argumentation will have to be adopted. The norm of 
disinterestedness thus contributes to a definition of the 
scientific persona. Also, arguments in respect to 
disinterestedness play a central role in the adjudication of 
priority-conflicts: the otherwise disinterested scientists 
deserves at least recognition where recognition is due. 
Finally~ the norm of communism enters into an explanation 
of <Ph5>. It is also employed in a variety of ways . For 
instance, Darwin notes that the general availablity of a new 
theory to a given scientific community can be appreciated 
only by that community itself: 
I believe that Hopkins is so much opposed 
because his course of study has never led him to 
reflect much on such subjects as geographical 
distribution, classifiction~ homologies~ &c . , so 
that he does not feel it a relief to have some 
kind of explanation . 1 ~e 
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This is~ so to speak~ a negative and restrictively 
qualifying use of communism as a norm: shared access to a 
new theory does not mean the same to persons at different 
locations within the scientific community. A positive use of 
that norm is manifest in the countless assertions that 
Darwin"s theory has founded a science~ that is~ that it has 
put to work in a productive manner and in a variety of areas 
the resources of science. 
Whatever opinion may be entertained of the 
speculations on the origin of species sketched out 
by Mr. Darwin [ •.• J there is no doubt that in its 
entirety his theory is one which for many yers to 
come must receive the earnest attention of the 
scientific world; for whether the law of the 
necessity of organic variation and development as 
dependent on external circumstances attendant on 
the general "struggle for life" be universal in 
application or not~ Mr. Darwin has at any rate 
opened out a new vein of reflection and 
investigation which must be followed out until the 
new theory be either disproved or proved from its 
first causes to its final results. 13b 
Reflections on science by scientists are sometimes read as 
philosophical statements. But instead of establishing 
methodological doctrines~ these utterances more often than 
not employ the professionalist repertoire in order to defend 
or attack a given choice among alternatives in science. The 
professionalist repertoire is a vital component of an 
elaborate process which transforms more or less timely ideas 
into theoretical form. By subjecting a theory <maybe~ any 
theory at all) to a sustained treatment with scientifically 
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acceptable arguments ~ that theory wi l l ultimately emerge as 
a properly scientific theory 1 37. 
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1 See above~ chapter 1~ pp. 32 and 39. 
2 This (L*) is a proper specification of the 
(anti-theoretical) law <L*> which was discussed and 
tentatively adopted in the first chapter (see above~ p . 
18>: the latter like the former rests on a presumption of 
rationality in scientific argumentation. 
3 Two features shared by many theories of science may 
be accountable for taking this limiting case as 
paradigmatic: i) the attribution of an essentially 
deductive structure to scientists' belief-systems; ii> 
the assumption that the deductive structure is a complete 
representation of these belief-systems and that e.g. 
modus tollens operates quasi-automatically within this 
structure. Kyburg (1983]~ pp . 300f gives a concise 
characterization of this jointly attributed deductive 
structure: 
First: There is a deductively closed and strictly 
consistent set of statements accepted by the 
scientist. This set may be empty (for a 
superextreme Bayesian>; or it may include 
any statements that in a given context 
are regarded as "unproblematic"; or it may 
even include the very general sorts of 
statements that characterize a paradigm or 
a research program. 
Second: There is a set of statements (axioms of 
theories, hypotheses) that are considered 
or contemplated. These are the statements 
that are up for test . They may be quite 
general~ or they may be quite specific~ 
but in any case they have empirical 
content~ and they are to be confirmed ~ in 
some sense or other, by their instances or 
consequences~ or they are to be refuted by 
counterinstances. 
Third: There is a set of statements that is 
directly testable~ statements that express 
the results of experimentation or 
observation directly and incorrigibly. 
According to this general view, scientific procedure 
consists in putting statements of this third class to 
experimental verification or refutation; the result may 
be the deductive refutation of a statement belonging to 
the second class <Popper); or the increase in the degree 
of confirmation of the hypothesis in the second class 
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<Carnap); or the general rearrangement of degrees of 
belief assigned to items in the second class (subjectivist 
Bayesian ) ; or the verification of a statement 1n the 
second class~ in virtue of general assumptions embodied 
in the first class <Lakatos~ Sneed); or the basis for a 
computation providing confirming instances of statements 
in the second class (Glymour>; or it might be the grounds 
for the rejection of a null hypothesis (for the practicing 
statistician) . 
Kyburg goes on to refute each of the three basic 
assumptions. Here they are all accepted in some version 
or another~ if only insofar as they provide a powerful 
representational device . It is proposed~ however~ that 
the general assumptions in the first class allow at best 
occasionally a unique and unequivocal verdict on the 
statements of the second class in relation to the 
statements in the third class. However~ the overall 
weight of arguments generated with the hel p of the basic 
assumption in the first class (above and beyond those 
arguments provided by the statements in the third class) 
can effect a great deal towards ultimate persuasion and 
consensus-formation . Compare Darwin's letter to G. H.K. 
Thwaites <March 21st 1860) in Darwin [1903]~ Vol. I~ p. 
145 (letter# 97>: 
As for changing at once one's opinion~ I 
would not value the opinion of a manwho could 
do so; it must be a slow process. 
A few more remarks on the problem of consensus-formation 
can be found in the conclusion. 
4 The inclusion of 'type of argument• permits a very 
liberal reading of <Phl) as it allows to consider all 
references to e mp irical evidence as one type of argument. 
<Phi) asserts that one will often find other types 
arguments besides this most prominent one~ concerning 
e .g . the beauty and simplicity~ usefulness or timeliness 
<Jf the theory. 
~ This phenomenon cannot be established here . It will 
be exemplifed by the remainder of this chapter in the 
single case of Darwin's argument for 'natural selection". 
• Again~ the phenomenon cannot be established here. 
For the case of "natural selection• consider for instance 
the following concise criticism of Darwin"s and Wallace•s 
theory by Samuel Haughton <quoted in Hull E1983J, p. 
216) : 
If it means what it says~ it is a truism ; if 
it means anything more~ it is contrary to fact . 
Q.E . D. 
And for a more puzzling formulation, see Picted [1983J, 
p . 146: 
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Thus we find ourselves in a singular 
position. We are presented with a theory which 
on the one hand seems to be impossible because 
it is inconsistent with the observed facts and 
on the other hand appears to be the best 
explanation of how organized beings have been 
developed in the epochs previous to ours. 
7 These qualifications and provisos should not be 
taken to imply that the notion of •argumentation 
repertoire• is empirically inaccessible or insignificant. 
They imply only that it takes considerable scrutiny to 
discern and establish relevant evidence in order to 
establish the efficacy of any argumentation repertoire. 
Two kinds of relevant evidence come to mind. Firstly, 
complaints about and controls over deviant scientific 
discourse constitute such evidence. For instance, 
Darwin's rare departures from sober scientifically 
acceptable argumentation did not escape notice by his 
critics. Wollaston [1983J, p. 129 paraphrases and quotes 
Darwin and then rejoinds, making use of one of the 
repertoires which will be discussed below: 
There is one point, however, according to 
Mr. Darwin's own confession, which has struck 
him much: viz . That all those persons who have 
most closely investigated particular groups of 
animals and plants, with whom he has ever 
conversed, or whose treatises he has read, are 
firmly convinced that each of the well-marked 
forms was at the first independently created. 
But, says he, the explanation for this is 
simple: from long-continued study they are 
thoroughly impressed with the distinctions 
between the several races, and they ignore all 
genet-al arguments, -r·efLISing "to sum Lip in 
their minds slight differences accumulated 
during many SLiccessive generations." BLit is 
this more, we may ask, than special pleading? 
If anybody is capable of forming an opinion on 
the origin of species, it .surely must be those 
who have most closely studied them 
Wollaston, a rather benevolent critic, proceeds by 
substituting Darwin's flawed argument for a better one 
which serves the same end . 
The true explanation seems to be this: not 
that the study of small details unfits an 
observer for wider areas of thought, but simply 
that a generalizing mind is of a higher stamp~ 
and therefore less common, than one of an 
opposite tendency; so that there are more 
collt=·c:tors in the ~'llorld than generalizers. (p. 
129f. ) 
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Notw~ to Ch&pt•r 4 
For more polemical passages on the same transgression see 
Owen [1983]~ pp. 181f. and 210. And for similar charges 
in in defence of Darwin see e.g. Hutton [1983]~ p . 293. 
Controls on deviant discourse are institutionalized in 
the refereeing system of scientific journals~ see Merton 
and Zuckerman C1973J. R second type of evidence for the 
detection of argumentation repertoires can be construed 
by taking sets of thematically correlated formal and 
informal statements as single pieces of evidence~ where 
one set or piece of evidence would include e.g. informal 
utterances in the lab~ scribbled notes to oneself~ 
letters~ statements at conferences and in discussions, 
and finally the formulation printed in a journal - all on 
the same subject-matter. The distribution of~ say, 
ad-hominem remarks in relation to arguments from evidence 
will be be gradated within each set as one moves from 
less formal to more formal communications. And this 
affords clues as to the constraints governing formal 
settings. Knorr-Cetina C1981J~ pp. 94-135 introduces and 
discusses an example of this sort of evidence at length. 
However, her very rich and fascinating example is used to 
illuminate the constraints governing public and formal 
discourse only in ·one respect. She shows how the 
published version of a paper does not tell the story of 
its genesis: the "scientific paper hides more th.:tn it 
tells on its tame and civilised surface" (p. 94)~ it 
deconte;-: tual i ses and :is "mar ked by a cons;i pi CLtOLIS 
avoidance of argLtments" (p. 113). Yet, :it shoLlld be 
equally interesting to find out what story the 
constrained published paper does tell, and why one would 
want to tell this story rather than the suppressed 
version. <For more on the argument that Knorr-Cetina•s 
approach needs to be supplemented in some such way, see 
above page 48, note 40 to chapter 1.) In Darwin's case, 
one would notice e.g. that the word 'materialism• does 
not once occur in the first edition of the Origin while 
it figures prominently in the notebooks (see Gruber 
C1981J~ esp. pp. 38-42 and 201-217). Indeed, the 
notebooks yield explicit testimony to Darwin's resolve to 
avoid that word in order to diffuse not only ideological 
and theological objections, but primarily objections 
concerning the purely scientific standing of his 
argument. Compare Notebook M, p. 57 (Darwin C1980J, p. 
16) : 
To avoid stating how far, I believe, in 
Materialism, say only that emotions~ instincts 
degrees of talent, which are hereditary are so 
because brain of child resembles parent stock. 
It should be noted that speculations concerning Darwin's 
'delay• in publishing his theory, often point to this 
effort at distilling a formulation that most nearly 
contains nothing but scientifically acceptable arguments, 
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compare for instance Richards (1983]. 
8 This discussion cannot be summarized here. It may 
suffice to list two works which evaluate the possibility 
of discerning such laws quite differently. Zilsel (1941] 
is exceedingly optimistic, while Danto (1965J hesitates 
carefully . 
9 This formulation of Hume's problem of 
been taken from StegmQller (1975]~ p. 
induction has 
17. 
It will be remembered that Peirce•s threefold 
distinction was preserved in the characterization of 
'scientific activity• in chapter 2. It was modified only 
to accomodate various kinds of inductive acceptance at 
various stages of deductive exploration (compare the 
flow-chalrt on p. 127). 
11 








Peirce [1958-60]~ 6.475. 
Peirce [1958-60], 5.375. 
It has been maintained that Popper's notion of 
"corroboration' designates a form of (inductive) 
justification in disguise. There will be a brief 
discussion of this <mistaken) impression in the upcoming 
section on the demarcationist argumentation repertoire. 
This is nicely exemplified by the index of Popper 
( 1968], 469f. The entt-y "Belief" refers the reader to 
"Conviction" and to "Belief, "rational" degree of". 
Under "Conviction" one finds "Conviction, feelings of~ 
:lrrelev.;mt to scientific discLtssion"~ followed by 9 
page-references. - Compare Popper (1975J, p. 25: 
I do not believe in belief. 
Popper [ 1975], PP• 1-31. 
Popper E1975J, p. 4. 
Popper (1976J, p. 145. 
1• Popper (1975J, p. 6. Popper does not attempt to 
justify this principle. He merely states that it is 
admittedly a somewhat daring conjecture in 
the pschology of cognition or of thought 
processes (p. 6) -
Clearly, as long as it has not been justified, Hp, 






formation of belief is not accounted for. However. given 
the curious "solution" to the logical problem of 
induction, it is not at all clear whether Popper actually 
employs his principle of transference - especially since 
towards the end of his article he takes a completely 
different~ much more plausible~ and far more limited 
approach towards the solution of HPs• 




The claim that Popper"s answer to Lz addresses 
Hume•s logical problem rests on a fallacy which cannot 
have escaped his attention. It presupposes that Popper 
is engaged in a chain of reasoning which invites 
carricature of the following kind: 
(1) L1: Do triangles have four sides? 
(2) L2: Do triangles have four sides or do 
bicycles have two wheels? 
(3) Bicycles have two wheels: L2 is answered. 
(4) L1 is answered since L2 (a 
generalization of L1) is answered. 
Popper•s trick-argument <wittily employed as such) draws 
philosophical attention to an epistemological problem 
which will be further discussed in the next section: how 
does the answer to L2 relate to the problem of 
induction - if it has not solved Hume•s problem, has it 
rendered it obsolete? 
And indeed, later one in Popper [1975J, p. 26 one 
finds the assertion: 
I do not regard the psychological problem of 
induction as part of my own (objectivist) 
theory of knowledge. 
Popper [1975]~ p. 27. 
27 Reichenbach [1961J~ p. 348: 
Is it necessary, for the justification of 
inductive inference, to show that its 
conclusion is true? [ ••• J The proof of the 
truth of the conclusion is only a sufficient 
condition for the justification of induction, 
nbt a necessary condition. 







r:;:ei chenbach [1961]~ p. 35(>. 
Rei c:henbac:h [1S161J~ p. 340. 
Reichenbach [1961]~ p. -:r C' c.-._;, ...J'-'. 
F:ei chenbach [ 1961 J ~ p. 356. 
Rei c:henbach [1961J~ pp. 351f. 
Reichenbach [1961J~ p. 353. - Some analogue to this 
"method of anticipatic:m 11 is needed to SLtpplement Popper-'s 
suggestion that belief is pragmatically justified in 
vir-tue of one's choice of the best method. Indeed~ 
Popper-'s fr-equent use of the wor-d 11 guess 11 col~r-esponds 
r-ather- neat 1 y to F:ei chenbc\ch' s "b 1 i nd posit". 
To actively anticipate r-evision of the best 
available data is not belief~ but ~uspension of belief. 
At the same time one can believe that a given value 
r-epr-esents the best data available r-ight now. While 
believing a theor-y (i.e. believing it to be tr-ue) is to 
be ready to act upon its tr-uth~ believing that some value 
is pr-esently the best available value implies only that 
one will keep looking for better- values. 
See Levi [1967]~ pp. 35f. 
'ultimate par-tition'. 
for- a definition of 
StegmGller- E1975J~ pp. 59ff. subjects Car-nap's 
earlier- wor-k to cr-iticism ver-y similar- to the one r-aised 
her-e against Popper- and Reichenbach. He concludes (p. 
62): 
It seems to me that this pr-oblem - like all 
theor-etical var-iations on Hume's problem of 
induction - is unsolvable as long as one 
follows Car-nap's or-iginal sense of purpose and 
inter-pr-ets his theor-y as a theor-y on the 
confir-mation of hypotheses. <Solange man 
Car-naps Theor-ie als eine Theor-ie der-
Best~tigung van Hypotheses inter-pretier-t~ also 
seinem urspr-Gnglichen Selbstver-st~ndnis 
folgt~ ist dieses Pr-oblem~ so scheint es mir-~ 
unl6sbar- - wie alle theoretischPn Uarianten 
des Hume-Problems unlbsbar sind.) 
The later~ lar-gely unpublished Car-nap is to have 
consider-ed inductivism as a sear-ch for- nor-ms gover-ning 
decisions under- r-isk. Since (accor-ding to StegmGller-) 
one cahnot bet on the tr-uth of natur-al laws~ it is a 
desir-able r-esult of this decision-theor-etic tur-n that no 
probability measur-es gr-eater than 0 can be established 
- 262 -
4<::> 
for natural laws Cp. 69). 
For a more complete and infinitely more detailed 
account see Levi [1980]. His somewhat ideosyncratic 
version of inductivism is presented here. 
Levi [1979]~ p. 421. 
The ensueing presentation again follows Levi [1980]. 
Having solved this problem~ he refers to his position as 
'infallibilist• and 'corrigibilist• at the same time (see 
e. g. hi :; [ 1 983 J ) • 
41 Levi [1980]~ pp. 34-40. 
4:3 
47 
As Lakatos [1978]~ p. 104 points out~ all 
philosophies of science have their "characteristic 
victo1rious" e;.:amples ·from the history of science. As of 
yet~ this particular inductivist methodology has no 
well-established paradigm example to point to. However~ 
Rudwick [1974] unwittinlgy provides one: according to his 
conclLtsion on ·pp. 177f. ~ his case-stLtdy was or-iginally 
conceived in reference to Lakatos and Feyerabend rather 
than the inductivist methodology it illustrates so well. 
Darwin [1980b]. - The following story is told in 
fascinating detail by Rudwick [1974]. 
Engelhardt and Zimmermann E1982J~ pp. 349-368 
provide a more extensive interpretation of actualism as a 
•regulative principle". 
Darwin [1903]~ Vol. 2!' p. 
Darwin [1887/1893]~ Vols. 
Darwin E1958J, p. 84. 
188 [# 524]. 
1~ pp. 68f./57. See also 
RudvJick C1974J~ p. 169. - The "alternatives~ C ••• 
etc." should be represented as a •residual hypothesis" in 
the ultimate partition: the residual hypothesis states as 
much as "none of the above". In many cases, only the 
inclusion of a residual hypothesis will supplement the 
exclusive allernatives so that an exhaustive set of 
potential answers is formed that properly constitutes an 
ultimate partition. Whether a residual hypothesis is 
needed or not is also subject to scientific negotiation. 
46 Hull E1983J~ pp. 25f. 
4
• To be sure~ it takes some idealization and 
simplification to divide the relevant problem-areas of 
the inductivist repertoire into four distinct segments. 
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For instance~ no strict chronological order and no 
clear-cut systematic distinction is implied here between 
the specification of a demand for information and the 
choice of an information-ranking function. After all~ a 
better explanation of the Parallel _Roads was in demand 
only in respect to the deficiency <in informational 
terms) of extant explanations. Levi [1979]~ p. 421 
indicates that informational value has to be fixed 
relative to demands for information and that therefore 
there can be no independent characterization of 
information-ranking functions~ demands for information 
and ultimate partitions of potential answers. An 
information-ranking 
function is an expression of a demand for 
new information in a specific context of 
inquiry. [ •. . J When demands for information 
become controversial~ this conflict is in turn 
often a manifestation of a conflict between 
different regulative ideals each of which 
specifies directions for worthwhile research. 
A similar difficulty arises when confirmational 
commitments are treated as relatively independent of 
bodies of belief: for instance~ a firm belief that 
members of some race cannot perform certain intellectual 
feats will not be challenged by scientific arguments 
which were developed by members of that race -
functioning as a confirmational commitment~ the belief in 
question effectively devalues certain kinds of evidence 
relevant to itself. 
Psychologically and as a matter of internal 
representation~ •preference among all available 
theoretical options• and 'belief• does not "feel alike" 
at all. However~ this feeling may well be due to the 
effects of centuries of belief-talk rather than to 
ascertainable conceptual differences: as long as 
•preference• and "belief" do not yield at least partially 
distinct consequences in action~ they are Con pragmatist 
grounds) conceptually indiscernible. For the purposes at 
hand~ no distinction needs to be made. Of course~ there 
is the phenomenon of grudging or reluctant preference in 
the absence of any cogent hypothesis. Reluctant 
preference~ however~ is belief in the residual hypothesis 
of the ultimate partition~ i.e. the true account is 
thought to be among the as of yet un~nown accounts 
covered b~ that residual hypothesis. - Incidentally~ in a 
domain which is held to deal with "belief" in a deep~ 
non-operational sense~ theologian Hans Rung in his 
C1980J _treats the question of belief in the existence of 
God as a matter of rational preference by eliminative 
induction among a given set of available options. 
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These questions are not pursued here any further. 
However~ they will be raised again in the conclusion. 
Darwin [1959/1962/1859/1981]~ Introduction~ 21-22 
and 26/pp. 26f./pp. 3f./pp. 66f. Huxley stated the demand 
the same matter far more bluntly in an essay on the 
reception of Darwin's theory which is included in Darwin 
[1887/1fl93J~ Vol. 2, p. 197/'v'ol. 1, pp. 550f. 
That which we were looking for~ and could 
not find, was a hypothesis respecting the 
origin of known organic forms, which assumed 
the operation of no causes but such which could 
be proved to be actually at work. We wanted, 
not to pin our faith to that or any other 
speculation, but to get hold of clear and 
definite conceptions which could be brought 
face to face with facts and have their validity 
tested. The "Origin" provided us with the 
working hypothesis we sought. Moreover, it did 
immense service for freeing us for ever from 
the dilemma - refuse to accept the creation 
hypothesis, and what have you to propose that 
can be accepted by any curious reasoner? 
See also Huxley [1906J, pp. 330f. 
There was no rival to •natural selection" in respect 
to the demand for information as specified by Darwin. 
That is~ the theory of special creation was a rival of 
the theory of evolution and thus also of the theory of 
evolution by natural selection, but not of the theory of 
natural selection. The demand for the latter theory arose 
only to the evolutionist (s·ee Hw:ley"s statement in the 
previous note). See Wollaston [1983J, p. 128 for the 
creationist•s ultimate partition and an Con inductive 
principles) certainly rational way of making a selection 
from it: 
The opinion amongst naturalists that species 
were independently created, and have not been 
transmitted one from the other, has been 
hitherto so general that we might almost call 
it an axiom. True it is that we cannot prove 
this; but then, on the other hand, we cannot 
prove the converse; and, since of two 
unproveable propositions we have a right to 
take our choice, the former has been 
universally accepted, as most in accordance 
with the i~telligible announcements of 
revelation 
See also Pictet [1983J, p. 146 <quoted above in note 6>, 
and (criticizing Darwin's construal of the ultimate 
partition) Hopkins [1983J, p. 268 and Owen [1983J, p. 
182ff., also Fawcett [1983J, p. 279f. 
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Letter (# 94) to J.D. Hooker <February 14th~ 
in Darwin [1903J, pp. 139f. 
1860) 
Darwin [1959/ 1962/1859/1981], IV, 227/p. 114/p. 
108/p. 153). See IV, 125/p. 105/p . 96/p. 142: 
as modern geology has almost banished such 
views as the excavation of a great valley by a 
single diluvial wave, so will natural 
selection, if it be a true principle ~ banish 
the belief of the continued creation of new 
organic beings, or of any great and sudden 
modification in their structure . 
With the advent of 'punctuated equilibrium•, the validity 
of Lyell's information-ranking function has been called 
into question. 
To J.D. Hooker <Dec . 24th 1858> in Darwin 
(1887/1893], Vol . 2, pp. 142f./Vol. 1, p. 498. 
Owen [ 1983], p. 209. 
Darwin [1887/1893], Vols. 2, pp. 241/36f . 
Phenomenon CPh3) can now be more poignantly 
reformLil ated as: 
(Ph3) Darwin believes the theory of natural selection 
to be true without claiming to have proved or 
demonstrated its truth. 
A cursory glance at the concordance to the Origin 
CBarrett et.al. E1981J> shows how very frequently Darwin 
in the Origin used the words 'believe' , 'belief', and 
•convinced". On the other hand, 'prove ', "proof', 
'demonstrate •, and 'demonstration ' occur only very rarely 
and often in a conditionc:tl ("if it could be proved") or 
negative ("incapable of demonstr·ation") mood. 
Hull (1983] repeatedly makes the point that 
pervasive contemporary notions of proof and demonstration 
and their role in scientific inquiry are methodologically 
and historically mistaken. That is, they are integral 
part of an acceptable argumentation repertoire even 
though they are methodologically questionable. See for 
instance pp . 272ff. as he comments on Hopkins [1983]. 
His principle of transference <see above, p. 193) 
only rules on when one is justified to believe that a 
theory is false. 
Examples for the rational adoption of what on 
Popperian analysis may turn out to be a mystery-raising 
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attitude~ need not involve relatively far-out questions 
such as whether one can rationally hold certain religious 
beliefs . The passage by Lichtenberg which was quoted 
above on p. 60 provides a splendid example from the realm 
of scientific activity~ torn as it is between abductive 
awe for a theory and weariness concerning its scientific 
status. - Compare also the reference to Kilng [1980] in 
note 50 above. 
Stegmilller [1975J~ p. 2 : 
Zwischen den Theorien Poppers und Carnaps 
bestehen ilberhaupt keine Berilhrungspunkte. 
[ ••• J Die Poppersche Bew~hrungstheorie 
betrifft die theoretische Beurteilung von 
unverifizierbaren Hypothesen. Die Carnapsche 
Theorie betrifft die Aufstellung von Normen 
fUr menschliche Entscheidungen unter Risiko. 
"Absolutely no points of contact" refers to the two 
respective programmes in the philosophy of science. To be 
sure~ that a given theory is scientific (as established 
within the demarcationist vocabulary) may enter as 
evidence into the (inductive) judgement concerning its 
acceptability. And conversely~ all arguments showing that 
one can or should believe it to be true~ make its 
construal as falsifiable and all attempts at 
falsification even more desirable. 
64 The potential of at least rhetorical conflict 
between the two repertoires and corresponding postures is 
another instance of <Ph2)~ see above p. 187. 
For Popper•s own reflections on the cultural value 
of critical rationalism~ see his (1966] . 
One can show here how the two repertoires interlock 
from the point of view of the inductivist repertoire. The 
demarcationist repertoire is needed to negotiate stronger 
minimal versions of information-ranking functions which 
make it more likely that informational val ue is 
attributed only to empirically significant hypotheses. 
Thus, the result that a theory is scientific on 
demarcationist grounds~ becomes input into the inductive 
negotiation on the acceptance of that theory. Also~ 
certain confirmational commitments will be negotiated 
within the demarcationist repertoire~ especially the 
formulation of the conditions under which one will 
contract one•s corpus of knowledge. 
Popper (1976J, pp. 79f. 
Popper C1976J, p. 104 . 
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Not•w to Ch•pt•r 4 
See e.g. Salmon [1968]~ pp. 25-29. 
70 StegmGller [1975J, p. 10: 
Poppers Vorschlag lautet nun: Man soll in 
jedem erfahrungswissenschaftlichen 
Forschungsgebiet unter den miteinander 
konkurrienden Theorien die empirisch 
gehaltvollste ausw~hlen - also diejenige mit 
den meisten potentiellen Fals1fikatoren~ d.h. 
die riskanteste oder logisch 
unwahrscheinlichste -~ aber nicht etwa, um sie 
zu akzeptieren , sondern um sie einer strengen 
Prdfung zu unterwerfen Cgenauer: der 
strengsten PrGfung, die man sich ausdenken 
kann). 




As pointed out before (see above, note 50), it is 
not possible to distinguish "believing an account to be 
true• from •preferring one account among all competing 
accounts•. Popper can maintain that there is a difference 
between •preference• (non-justified) and "belief• 
(presumably justified) only insofar as he makes somewhat 
counter-intuitive use of the term •preference•: the termd 
does not designate the mental experience resulting from 
the formation of a preference (and of the simultaneous 
adoption as true that the preferred theory is the best or 
true theory> . 
Popper (1968]~ p . 315. 
Popper [1962J, p. 218. 
For instance, to the demarcationist repertoire 
belongs all negotiation on how to construe 
"falsifiability• in respect to condition <D:> or to 
stronger condition <D*> (see above, pp . 80 and 101>. 
Also, all negotiation on the admissability of given 
ad-hoc hypotheses belongs here . It involves the 
formulation of criteria for content-increasing versus 
content-decreasing ad-hoc hypotheses. 
Popper [1968J, pp. 54f. frames the problem of 
negotiating such questions within demarcationism and 
critically employed metaphysics: 
Methodological rules are thus closely 
connected both with other methodological rules 
and with our criterion of demarcation. But the 
connection is not a strictly deductive or 
logical one . It results, rather , from the fact 
that the rules are constructed with the aim of 
ensuring the applicability of our criterion of 
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demarcation; thus their formulation and 
acceptance proceeds according to a practical 
rule of a higher type. [ •.• J not a few 
doctrines which are metaphysical~ and thus 
certainly philosophical~ could be interpreted 
as typical hypostatizations of methodological 
rules. 
Later in the Logic of Scientific Discovery Cp . 207), 
Popper presents an example: 
the doctrine that all observable events must 
be explained as macro events [ ..• J Like other 
doctrines of its kind~ this seems to be a 
metaphysical hypostatization of a 
methodological rule which in itself is quite 
unobjectionable. I mean the rule that we should 
see whether we can simplify or generalize or 
unify our theories by employing explanatory 
hypotheses of the type mentioned 
As a complement to note 66 above, one can now show 
from the demarcationist perspective wher e the inductivist 
and demarcationist repertoires interlock. The inductivist 
repertoire is needed to provide <tentative> beliefs which 
provide input (i) as critically employed metaphysics into 
the precise demarcationist (i.e . falsificationist> 
construal of parameters for the theoretical evaluation of 
rivaling scientific theories ; (ii> as science-generative 
metaphysics (positive ~euristic> into (falsifi.able> 
scientific theories g~nerated . Also <iii), <tentative) 
beliefs in certain empirical truths are required to 
establish the appropriate background knowledge that will 
render theories independently testable <s ee the 
discussion in chapter 2 , esp . p. 116). Popper need not 
and does not deny that <metaphysical> beliefs play these 
roles in scientific development: he can still maintain 
that the specific virtues of scientific discourse lie in 
the relative insignificance of belief when it comes to 
formulating, presenting, and evaluating theories . Indeed, 
Popper [1976J, p . 80 considers as a major advantage of 
his demarcation criterion that it does not render 
metaphysics nonsensical but only non-scient ific: 
It was clear to me that all these people 
[i.e. members of the Vienna Circle] were 
looking for a criterion of demarcation not so 
much between science and pseudoscience as 
between scienc e and metaphysics. [ • • • J they 
were trying to find a a criterion which made 
metaphysics meaningless nonsense, sheer 
gibberish, and any such criterion was bound to 
lead into trouble, since metaphysical ideas are 
often the forerunners of scientific ones . 







which Popper assigns to metaphysics in relation to 
science (i.e. its generative~ critical, and explicative 
functions) and on pp. 64-73 also Popper's conventionalism 
concerning the acceptance of background knowledge and 
basic-propositions . Popper [1962], pp. 238-240 emphasizes 
the role of background knowledge. And the latter part of 
Radnitzky (1979J structures the problem-areas in which 
inductivism and demarcationism interlock from the 
demarcationist point of view . 
Lakatos E1978bJ, p. 48. 
Lakatos E1978bJ, pp. 50-52. For a general discussion 
of Lakatos's 'positive heuristics• see Urbach E1978J. In 
it Urbach suggests considerations which will enter into a 
negotiated assessment of heuristic power. 
'Falsifiability in a significant sense• means 
'falsifiability in respect to condition <D*>' as opposed 
to easily satisfiable conditions <C : > and (D:> . 
Michod (1981J discusses the role of positive 
heuristics in a later phase of evolutionary biology. 
Romanes E1896J, pp. 251f. 
Ellegard [1958J, p. 17 speaks of 
one of the paradoxes of the subsequent 
development of opinion: though it is 
practically certain that the evolution theory 
would not have been established at all if 
Darwin had not been able to support it by means 
of the naturalistic theory of Natural 
Selection, yet the majority of the general 
public, and a good many scientists, refused to 
accept the Natural Selection theory, while 
allowing themselve? to be converted to 
evolutionism. 
Darwin himself stated CPh4) at least once in a letter to 
J.D . Hooker <July 28th 1868) Darwin E1903J, Vol. 1~ p. 
304 (letter# 222> : 
I am glad to hear that you are going to 
touch on the statement that the belief in 
Natural Selection is passing away. I do not 
believe that even the Athenaeum would pretend 
that the belief in the common descent of 
species is passing away~ and this is the more 
important point. This now almost universal 
belief in the evolution <somehow> of species, I 
think may be fairly attributed in large part to 





Popper [1976J, p. 171. - Note that the term 
"metaphysical' designates the non-testability of the hard 
core. Its use is not supposed to imply that the 
propositions of that hard core say nothing meaningful 
about the wot-1 d. 
Popper [1·976J, p . 171. - This point is reitet-ated by 
other Popperian interpretations of evolutionary theory . 
Compare for instance Manser [1965J, Barker [1969], and 
Lee E1969J. Manser•s reflection on the concept of 
evolution contains the following telling remarks Cp . 29>: 
It is hard to understand the notion that it 
is a property of matter to develop into more 
complex forms and ultimately into livings 
things. More seriously, it is meaningless as a 
hypothesis because no experimental test could 
be devised for it, even in pinciple. 
It is easy to agree with the first statement : it 
expresses the problem posed by disposition predicates in 
scientific explanation. However, the very difficulty of 
understanding such dispositional properties may in the 
due course of scientific negotiation yield a testable 
construal of that property. After all, the ways in which 
predicates designate properties are not immutable and 
therefore hard cores can be preserved through appropriate 
negotiation on the protective belt. It thus appears that 
critics like Manser and Barker conceive Popperian 
doctrine too narrowly. Popper's and Lakatos•s 
protestations notwithstanding, for historiographical 
purposes it appears to be to their mutual benefit if one 
reads the one in light of the other. While chapter 1 
discussed some of the relevant differences between their 
positions, the continuities in their work are manifest in 
the present construal of the demarcationist repertoire. 
In other words: Popper is not Lakatos and though he 
uses the term •research programme• he does not serious ly 
consider evolutionary biology holistically in terms of 
hard core and protective belt. Instead, he takes one by 
one the explanatory and predictive claims of the theory 
of evolution by Natural Selection, while on the other 
hand he conflates the theory of Natural Selection <as an 
explanatory account for the theory of evolution> with the 
theory of evolution. His treatment of explanatory claims 
on a one by one basis is exemplified by his of the 
examples that were just cited. His conflated view of the 
theory of evolution by Natural Selection is manifest in 
his summary of <modern> Darwinism in his C1976J, p. 170: 
(1) The great variety of the forms of life on earth 
oriqinate from very few forms , perhaps even from a single 






(2) There is an evolutionary theory which explains 
this . It consists in the main of the following hypotheses . 
<.!I ) Her ed i t y : [ ••• J 
(b) Variation: [ ... J 
(c) Natural Selection : there are var ious mechanisms by 
which not only the variations but the whole hereditary 
material is controlled by elimination. [ .•. ] 
(d) 'Variability : although variations in some sense -
the presence of different competitors - are for obvious 
reasons prior to selection~ it may well be the case that 
variability - the scope of variation - is controlled by 
Natural Selection [ ••. J 
Now~ compare this summary with the reduction sentence for 
'Natural Selection' which - translated into Popperian 
code - would read : 
C2a & 2b) => [2c <=> <1 & 2d)J 
Elaboration of the 'various mechanisms' mentioned under 
2c <as well as elaboration of the principle controlling 
2a and 2b) would result from an inquiry into "Natural 
Selection• as a placeholder term . This in turn 
investigation may yield the theory independently 
testable . As far as the purely internal relations within 
the reduction sentence are concerned~ explanation of 1 
and 2d in terms of Natural Selection <2c) does, of 
course~ appear 'merely tautological'. 
Compare Wassermann [1978] on the testability of 
Natural Selection in contemporary population genetics. 
Popper [1978J, pp. 345f . 
For a scathing criticism of Popper's [1976] 
treatment of Darwin's theory see Ruse [1981J . It appear s 
that Popper's later reflections on the theory of natural 
selection has not yet encountered similar critical 
attention. 
Hooker C1983J~ p . 85 . 
Carpenter [1983J, pp . 113f. 
Fawcett [1983J, pp. 281 and 284. 
Letter to F . W. Hutton <April 20th, l861>~ Darwin 
[1903J, Vol. 1, pp. 183f . <letter# 124) . See also the 
letter to J .D. Hooker <April 23rd~ 1861) in Darwin 
[1887/1893], Vols. 2, p. 362/p . 155 . 
He CHuttonJ is one of the very few who see 
that the change of species cannot be directly 
proved , and that the doctrine must sink or swim 
according as it groups and explains phenomena . 
- 272 -
97 
It is really curious how few judge it in this 
way~ which is clearly the right way. 
Hull [1983J~ pp . 27ff. interprets Mill's remark and 
concludes that Darwin~ Fawcett~ and Huxley overrated it 
when they took it for approval of the theory. On this 
account~ however~ it appears that Mill said just what 
they wanted to hear: the theory of natural selection is 
not a proven theory~ it is a right step towards the 
development of a new science. 
Mill [1874]~ p. 328. -Note that Mill's 'hypothesis' 
is Peirce's 'abduction'~ and that both use 'induction' 
the same manner~ i . e. as the last stage in the 
development of a theory . 
Darwin [1959/1962]~ XIV~ 183/pp . 476f. 
Here emerges a 'demarcationist' philosophy of 
in 
science which is informed by the history of science in a 
way that neither Popper's nor Lakatos's methodologies 
are. For a sketch of its outline see Shapere [1984J~ p . 
N >~ i i i : 
The development of science thus consists in 
a gradual discovery ~ sharpening~ and 
organization of relevance-relations~ and thus 
in a gradual separation of the objects of its 
investigation and what is directly relevant 
thereto from what is irrelevant to those 
investigations : a gradual demarcation~ that is~ 
of the scientific from the non-scientific . 
[ • .• J In other words, this is what we have come 
to call "scientific". In that development 
science aims at becoming, as far as possible ~ 
autonomous, self-sufficie8t , in its 
organization~ description~ and treatment of its 
subject-matter-
Lakatos [1978bJ, p. 49. 
Lakatos [1978bJ~ p. 52: 
Which problems scientists wor-king in 
powerfu l resear-ch p rogrammes r-ationa lly choos e, 
is determined by the positive heuristic of the 
pr-ogr-amme rather than by psychologically 
worr-ying (or- technologically urgent> anoma li e s . 
The anomali es are listed and shoved aside i n 
the hope that they will tur-n~ in due cour-se~ 
into corr-oborations of the programme. 
Shap i n and Bar-nes [1979J, p. 127. 
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100Young C1973J~ pp. 386f. 
101Young E1973J, p. 394. 
102Marx E1978J, pp. 65f. 
103Young E1973J~ p . 385. Young continues on p. 386 by 
elaborating the methodological foundation of the present 
remark: 
a radical approach requires that the 
s ocio-political basis and its interaction 
between the putatively autonomous scientific 
results be explored in depth and detail. He 
must make this effort in order to understand 
the role of scientific rationality and its 
technological expressions (and affiliations) in 
maintaining the established order of society 
and in sustaining the false consciousness which 
prevents men from believing that it can be 
transfo~med into a society in which the 
division of labour need not be hiera rchical and 
exploitative, one in which inegalitarian 
structures are no longer maintained by being 
mystified and justified by a spurious 
foundation in the laws of nature. 
Incidentally~ Young's political critique of science 
appears more timely now in respect to Darwin's 
socio-biologist heirs than to Darwin himself and his 
theory of natural selection . 
104Young E1971J~ p. 500. 
10eFor the latter position ~ see e . g. Pohrt [1972J. In 
this context, it may be interesting to note that Darwin's 
theory was appropriated not only by social Darwinists , 
but also by socialists . While some inferred from the 
theory of natural selection that government should not 
interfere with the beneficial economic, cultural, and 
biological struggle for existence ~ others held that 
government should interfere to remove the economically 
and culturally induced inequities in the natural , 
biological struggle towards improvement of the human 
race. On the variety of ideological appropriations of 
Darwin's theories see e.g . Kelly E1981J, p. 7 . 
1 06Shapin and Barnes [1979J , p . 128. 
107 Ibid . 
106Shapin and Barnes [1979) ~ p . 138. 
10•Ibid. 
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~ 10Shapin and Barnes [1979)~ p . 139. 
111Shapin and Barnes [1979)~ p . 136. 
~ 1 ~Ironically~ this is due to the constraints and 
heuristic power of Shapin and Barnes•s own vocabulary of 
motive. As Mills [1940)~ p. 912 observes: 
To converted individuals who have become 
accustomed to the critical terminology of 
questioning the relative institutional autonomy 
of science, all others seem self-deceptive. 
Of course, this passage is adapted to the present 
conte>: t. Mi 11 s really tal ked of i ndi vi du.:1l s "accLtstomed 
to the psychoanalytic ter·mi nol ogy of motives". 
113Mills [1940]. 
114Mills [1940]~ pp. 909f. - For a critical 
philosophical discussion of how to assess "deep 
i ntel~p,~etati ons • (as e.g. by 1"1an:i sm, psychoanalysis 
etc.), see Dante [1981J: .he provides a framework for the 
argument that deep interpretation in reference to 
(hidden) reasons is a questionable undertaking, but that 
its rejection cannot extend to the indispensable 
interpretation of human action in reference to 
surface-reasons. 
11~Mills [1940J, p. 907. In a note on the same page 
Mills clarifies that 
I am here concerned more with the social 
function of pronounced motives, than with the 
sincerity of those pronouncing them. 
This clarification establishes the consistency of his 
view on the efficacy of the vocabularies with the view on 
the impossibility of explaining social action in terms of 
what is uttered.within any such vocabulary. 
116 In this spirit, Karin Knorr-Cetina presents the 
opportunism of scientists not as mere opportunism but as 
reasoned opportunism in the first chapter of her [1981J, 
p. 23: 
In order to realise our interest in the 
scientists• "cognitive" concerns (rather than 
their social relations>, we must view actual 
laboratory activities indiscriminately. To 
grasp the meaning of those activities, we must 
engage ourselves in laboratory reasoning, which 
reveals the scientist to be a practical 
reasoner who refuses to split into social and 
technical personalities. What emerges from this 
reasoning is the practices of knowledge 
- 275 -
production, and not some abstract social or 
cognitive ingredients. The question of how 
knowlegde is produced and reproduced asks 
nothing more (and nothing less) than a theory 
of such practices. 
However, her ~doption of an ethnographic approach which 
quite discriminately chooses the laboratory (as opposed 
to e.g. the scientific journal) as the setting in which 
science takes place leads to the neglect of this 
integrative approach when it comes to analyzing the 
publicly available vocabularies of motive. On pp. 22f. 
fo r instance, the distinction between social and 
scientific as employed in the discourse of scientists is 
recognized "as a resource of strategic interaction". But 
that it is a resource of strategic interaction (i.e a 
vocabulary of motive or argumentation repertoire) is then 
used to challenge the validity of that very distinction. 
Instead, one should ask how this resource can be utilized 
by a practical reasoner in order to integrate social and 
institutional demands, to integrate personal goals and 
the constraints that have to be met if there is to be 
certifiable scientific progress tovJards obje.ctive 
knowledge. Knorr-Cetina•s ethnographic confinement to the 
setting of the laboratory leads to the following 
carricature of her work in Rom Harre's preface on p. 
viii : 
There are many surprises that await us if we 
enter a laboratory and study a group of 
scientists in this frame of mind. The idea that 
the enterprise can be defined in terms of an 
idealized epistemology, whether that of 
experimentally based inductions or of the 
conjectures and empirical refutations of the 
logicist philosophers of science, is quickly 
refuted. Logic, it seems, is not among the 
"idols of the tribe". vJhere it appears it is an 
insert in the pursuit of rhetorical advantage 
in debate. 
117Ta be sure. this is mare easily said than 
demonstrat~d. And this is where the philosophical task of 
certifying the legitimacy of scientific repertoires comes 
into play. - A few ward on this task and its relation to 
science and scientific change can be found in the 
conclusion. 
119Mills [1940), p. 913. 
11•Merton [1968J, pp. 475f. - While Merton paints out 
that the Thomas theorem has a long tradition <he mentions 
Mandeville. Marx. Hegel, Freud, and Sumner among others 
who set it.forth~, the particular challenge posed by the 
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Thomas theorem to philosophers seems to be this: not to 
see it as a mere re-iteration of notions commonly 
associated with idealist philosophies of various brands~ 
but instead to understand it as a genuinely sociological 
theorem on cumulatively effective patterns of social 
action. As such, it does not at all depend on idealistic 
(or~ for that matter, materialistic) philosophy. It may 
be useful to remember that Merton's discovery of the 
'self-fulfilling prophecy' provides the most conspicuous 
exemplification of the Thomas theorem. 
1 ~0 "The NoF·mati ve Structure of Science" in Mer ton 
[1973J, pp. 267-278. It was originally published in 1942 
under the title "Science c:md Technology in a Democt-atic 
Order". 
121 Merton [1973]~ p . 269. 
122Merton (1973J, especially pp. 383-412. 
123Mulkay (1976J, pp. 643f. and 645. 
124Mulkay [1976]~ p. 654. It should not surprise that 
these questions, and particularly the first one, are here 
labeled 'intriguing' -after all, the present study is 
trying to lay some groundwork towards answering them . 
12~To be sure, there is a deeper disagreement 
underlying this passage. It is a disagreement on the use 
of the words 'norm' and 'ideology'. Mulkay <unlike 
Merton) seems to expect that norms hold only if they 
"govern social interaction in [a) straightforward 
fashion" and if they "are institutionalised within the 
scientific community in such a way that general 
conformity is maintained'' ([1976J~ pp. 644 and 654). -
Incidentally, Mulkay•s tendency (shared with Knorr-Cetina 
and Shapin and Barnes) to discount the normative 
vocabulary as •mere ideology' and •verbalization• may be 
the reason for his failure to pursue the research 
programme which he himself suggested. Gilbert and Mulkay 
[1984] present a greatly impoverished analysis of 
scientists' discourse by simplistically relating all 
utterances to just two repertoires which are vaguely 
defined as 'empiricist' (formal~ internal> and 
•contingent• (informal, external). In a perceptive review 
of their recent work~ Shapin [1984J also laments the 
degeneracy of a research programme which looked so 
promising in Mulkay's [1976J. 
1.~6That is~ thei1~ use is only constrained by <L*) (see 
above~ p. 185) . 
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Nctww tc Ch~pt•r 4 
1 ~7This may sound trivial. It is worth exploring~ 
however~ which institutions and professional roles 
besides science are delimited by acceptable argumentation 
repertoires. Using one of Mills's examples~ one may say 
that diplomats are closely tied to the use of acceptable 
vocabularies. But in the case of diplomats, those 
acceptable vocabularies are generated elsewhere (e.g. 
'world politics', 'global conflicts', 'presidential 
politics' etc.) and in a diplomat's experience they 
belong probably to the most changeable of all variables 
(and therefore closely observed) - while the 
institutional role of the diplomat is tied only to 
certain objectives, commitments of loyalty, interests of 
state, etc. 
128This account of the episode is taken from Ellegard 
[ 1 958 J ' p . 68. 
129Fawcett [1983J, p. 284. - Fawcett's criticism of the 
Bishop"s argument which rested on (nothing but) his own 
personal authority can be juxtaposed to Fawcett's appeal 
in the same article to the personal authority of 
scientists who have a sustained record of adherence to 
organized scepticism): 
The eminently high authorities who have 
already welcomed Mr. Darwin's theory as a 
probablt hypothesis, should induce the general 
public to welcome it as a legitimate step 
towards a great scientific discovery Cp. 282) 
Fawcett's argument is drawn from the professionalist 
argumentation repertoire: clearly, it cannot Cby itself) 
be used to persuade anybody of the truth of Darwin's 
theory (and apparently is not meant to do so>, but it 
provides a cogent reason to take it seriously as a 
scientific theory (implying, as it does, that these 
authorities have subjected it to demarcationist 
considerations and judged it to be sufficiently 
scientific). Accordingly, it would be misleading to think 
that the norm of organized scepticism should outrule all 
appeals to authority. On the contrary, it validates some 
for some contexts, it outrules others in other contexts. 
CFor a differentiated account of authority in science see 
Polanyi [1964J, pp. 203ff.) 
1 ~0As oppos~d to the tentative definitions of 
"scientific activity• in chapter 2, this definition may 
hold only for limited periods in the history of science. 
One should suspect, however, that in its skeletal 
structure <which is stated here> it holds for science 
since the latter part of the 17th century. 
1~1T0 John Scott (June 6th, 1863) in Darwin [1903J, 
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Vol. 2~ p. 323 <letter# 646) . 
1 ~2To W.H. Harvey <August 1860) in Darwin (1903)~ Vol . 
1~ p. 160 <letter# 110}. -One might look at Darwin's 
correspondence as a way of making sure that those 
"others" always kne~<'J hovJ to best defend him. 
1 ~~see Hull C1983J . 
134Again~ see Hull (1983)~ and Ellegard (1958J . 
1 ~0To Asa Gray <July 22nd~ 1860) in Darwin [1887/1893)~ 
Vo 1 s. 2 ~ p. 327 I p. 120. 
1 ~•Hutton C1983J~ p. 293. 
1 ~7According to Popper (1962J~ p. 240~ it will thus 
emerge especially if it was rejected: 
De mortuis nil nisi bene: once a theory is 
refuted~ its empirical character is secure and 
shines without blemish. 
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ConcluwLon 
Aside from its methodological virtues~ the theory 
suggested and e xpounded here recommends itself as a 
progressive programme as it explains the five phenomena 
discussed in the last chapter 1 • Undoubtedly~ before the 
issues of its acceptance as a viable research-programme in 
the science of science can even arise~ a long process of 
negotiation would have to set in and it should include 
negotiations between the author and himself . These 
negotiations will focus mainly on issues and problems which 
have not so far been addressed at all. And those~ in turn~ 
fall into two categories: reflecting on the defects of the 
programme as stated so far~ there are classical 
philosophical problems which appear to have no clear 
relation to what has been said here; and reflecting the 
heuristic promise of the programme~ there are a number of 
clarifications which may emerge from a sustained exploration 
of this theory of science. 
Turning to the defect s first~ one has to note t h at the 
decision-theoretic reduction of "rationality• does not lead 
to a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of 
progress2 and consensus-formation in science~ and 
indeed ~ not even of scientific ideas during specific periods 
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in the history of science. While this theory provides a 
powerful tool for the internal rational reconstruction of 
decisions that have been made either by individual 
scientists or the scientific community as a whole~ it does 
not fully explain why a consensus concerning the adoption of 
"natural selection" has formed 3 • After all~ on the 
account given so far~ one should assume that its opponents 
made equally productive use to their ends of the available 
argumentation repertoires. The arguments put forth by Darwin 
and his compatriots obviously aimed for persuasion. And 
since in the long run they have actually succeeded in 
persuading the scientific community~ one or both of ·the 
following two accounts can be suggested. Either~ as Darwin 
him~elf predicted~ the oppohents to "natural selection" 
slowly died out and a new generation of more favorably 
inclined scientists took their place4 • Or~ at some 
point the opponents of "natural selection" found themselves 
in a situation where the price for the continued 
construction of counter-arguments became higher than letting 
themselves be persuaded. Both these hypotheses rest on a 
presupposition which has <tacitly) been made all along and 
which came to the fore at the very end of the preceding 
chapter: in principle~ human ingenuity and intelligence is 
powerful enough to indefinitely support any choice among 
scientific alternatives - even if restricted to acceptable 
arguments. Now~ if one were to adopt the view that only a 
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generational shift is ultimately responsible for the 
consensus on "natural selection•, one invites a purely 
externalist interpretaton of consenus-formation: the 
formation of consensus as well as ~ustained dissens has to 
be attributed to the distribution of various goals in the 
scientific community as the only efficacious variable in 
scientific negotiation. In contrast , the assumption that 
consensus is formed when the prize exacted for the 
construction of counter-arguments becomes too high, invites 
a mixed external/internal account of consensus-formation . 
Intuitively, it appears more plausible since it is based on 
the following two observations. Firstly ~ human ingenuity may 
indeed be boundless when it comes to providing an acceptable 
rationale for whatever c hoices one makes~ but tolerance· 
(one•s own as well as that of others> with the contrivance 
and effort required for sustained dissens is far more 
limited . And secondly, the connection between some choice 
among alternatives in science and any given goal is rat he r 
tenuous : some religious scientists may initially think that 
the truth of Darwin"s theory somehow contradicts the ir 
beliefs concerning the ex i stence of God~ and they may 
therefore tenaciously produce acceptable counter-argume nts 
but they may find t hat at some point it becomes preferrable 
to credibly realign their ideas about God in relation to 
natural law~. Whatever cons trains the tolerance of the 
scientific community and subsequently leads to a realignment 
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in the Coverall non-scientific) value-system of those who 
hitherto stood in the way of consensus, it must be some 
internal standard governing the give and take of scholarly 
exchange. For certain situations, this internal standard may 
be a simple agreed-upon rule which is quite easily 
discernible, e.g., when all parties have tacitly made the 
commitment that the outcome of some experiment shall decide 
over acceptance or rejection of a given hypothesis. In many 
other situations, however, these internal standards can at 
best be described in reference to the relative "beauty• or 
"simplicity• of the respective sets of arguments for and 
against some optionc. 
But there is another set of issues associated with 
consensus-formation and progress in science and it cuts 
across the external and external/internal proposals which 
were just presented. It concerns the (certified) 
argumentation repertoires of science. In these pages, the 
employment of arguments from a repertoire was equated with 
the temporary adoption of a methodological posture. However, 
more general epistemological postures unde~lie and generate 
these repertoires. These in turn give content to the notions 
of •truth', 'objectivity•, and •rationality•. And particular 
normative conceptions of •rationality• in relation to 
•truth" and "objectivity• are particular interpretations of 
the purely formal decision-theoretic model of rational 
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conduct. If understanding science means understanding the 
argumentation repertoires available to scientists, much more 
needs to be learned about the normative features of 
argumentation repertoires 7 • Now, normative conceptions 
of 'truth" and 'rationality• change in the course of history 
and so does the set of available argumentation repertoires. 
Thus, this deeper issue of scientific rationality 
corresponds to the historiographical task of determining the 
scope at any given time of the available argumentation 
repertoires and the changes in the set of these repertoires. 
That is, historical inquiry has to determine what at any 
time is included in the set of argumentation repertoires -
which presupposes that there are methods for ascertaining 
the scope of content of any repertoire at any time. And 
further, historical inquiry has to unearth the principles 
and conditions under which the set of argumentation 
repertoires changes8 • Answers to these questions would 
elucidate the character and efficacy of paradigms - and may 
bring "historical comprehension" into the reach of the 
science of science9 • 
The programme presented here thus needs to be amended as 
one moves from the problem of how to rationally account for 
a given decision to the problem of consensus-formation in 
science that is. from the question of how to justify a 
' . 
selection among alternatives in science to the question of 
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why most members of the scientific community end up making 
the same selection. However: when, under which conditions, 
and to what end such amendment is actually called for~ 
remains an open question. The reflections of the past four 
chapters were designed to be indifferent to the answer of 
this last question. 
And yet~ even if - for now - one rests content with a 
decision-theoretically narrowed notion of rationality~ 
fundamental issues clamor for attention. They concern 
continuities of all scientific work throughout history and 
independently of paradigm and contemporary varying 
conceptions of rationality. For instance~ it is of foremost 
interest whether one can discern in the history of science 
certain algorithms governing the choice of arguments from 
available repertoires and their use~ algorithms that are 
more specific than the law of tempered opportunism (L*>. 
But it is time to turn from the more or less pressing gaps 
or defects to the heuristic merits of the theory. In the 
course of inquiry~ a rather general image of science~ 
scientists, and scientific activity has emerged . If only 
metaphorically, it can be compared to other such images that 
are currently engaging the philosophy of science. 
Popper views scientists as submitting themselves 
heroically to the excruciatingly relentless method of trial 
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and error: never claiming victory, they never cease in their 
critical activity. Popper thus celebrates an aspect of the 
human intellect that is endemic to good philosophy and good 
politics~ and which is the prerequisite for liberation and 
change as conceived of by the Enlightenment. Inductivists, 
on the other hand, are often held to the view that 
scientists busily and tenaciously collect, sort, patch 
together and stack building block upon building block slowly 
upwards into lofty heights. The idea of progress and growth 
of knowledge is modeled on organic rather than revolutionary 
processes. A bee-hive comes to mind rather than a Faustian 
exercise in ultimate futility as one pictures the scientific 
community through inductivist rather than Popperian 
spectacles. Lacking the grand gesture towards liberation and 
enlightenment, these scientists seem a bit more phlegmatic 
and gemUtlich or petite bourgeois. Yet, here too comes to 
the fore an important feature of the human intellect, 
namely, that theories are adaptable to the world, and that 
patience and endurance <including stubborness based on 
belief rather than critical attitude) will provide reliable 
adaptations. Yet another view, however, presents scientists 
as well-disguised, deceiving and deceptive conspirators 
working to perpetuate interests and ideologies under the 
cloak of professed objectivity. Driven by class interests 
which are not reflected upon within science itself, the 
scientist satisfies those interests by instinct rather than 
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wit. Scientific method and the relative autonomy of the 
social institution of science allow scientists to express 
whatever they please in seemingly objective terms. This view 
also captures (sad but) important truths about science and 
the human intellect: namely~ the willingness to rest content 
with localized patches of liberty and ideal discourse. 
Insisting on the utmost rationality of argumentation within 
specialized scientific domains~ the institution of science 
readily concedes any decisions about science to outside 
forces which have to withstand no particular ~crutiny 
regarding their rationality. Scientists do not recognize 
their option to place decisions concerning e.g. the 
,finalization' of science within their own domain of 
rational adjudication. This most cynical and bitter view of 
science presents crazed geniuses in laboratories within 
ivory towers insulated from and blind towards a society 
which masterfully manipulates them. Science, so it seems~ 
owes its relative autonomy only to the expediencies involved 
in selective appropriation from without of autonomously 
generated results. 
Of course, there is a good deal of overlap between those 
images of science and the parties who hold them. And 
certainly, the political affiliations ascribed to them are 
by no means so very clear-cut. For instance, in historical 
terms the predicate 'revolutionary' is more accurately 
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Ccnc1uwion 
applied to some of the early positivists than to mainstream 
good liberal Karl Popper who shies back from anything 
smacking of dogma. And a cynical view about the role which 
scientists play in relation to ideology and society is 
deeply committed . to the value of critical thinking and the 
confidence that it can and will instigate political change 
after all~ the complaint of those who hold this view implies 
that matters do not have to be as they are. 
Thus~ the image of opportunistic science which emerges 
from the discussions here~ need not contradict any of the 
extant images of science. Indeed~ one might argue that it 
embodies the more important traits of the other three. 
Opportunism requires the ability to find means towards an 
end within an environment that imposes sanctioned 
restrictions on the available means. As such~ the image of 
opportunistic science celebrates the cunning of reason~ 
Mutterwitz~ and strategic thinking which simultaneously 
formulates~ questions~ and implements the rules of the game: 
that is~ the intellectual capacity to construct working 
theories of the world upon almost any foundation. Whether 
opportunism (in that respect quite like guerilla tactics in 
political 'warfare') is morally reprehensible or not~ 
depends on the chosen means and ends - it has nothing to do 
with the ability to be opportunistic which is certainly 
admirable. In the case of science and scientists~ the end 
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towards which the available means are opportunistically 
employed may~ in effect~ be nothing but the truth. And even 
if not a single scientist was individually intarested in the 
pursuit of truth~ the institution of science is presently 
set up in such a way that no particular goal can be 
effectively asserted on the institutional scale: the 
available means (i.e. the argumentative resources> are so 
constrained that •truth" as the real or professed goal is 
asserted (if only serendipitously) while the realization of 
any other (ideological etc.) goals remains epiphenomenal~ 
subject to selective appropriation by society at large. To 
explore the transformations of ideology into objective 
knowledge and the retransformation of objective knowledge 
into ideologically useful tenets is yet another task 
emerging from the course of inquiry so far. The 
3-phase-model of theory development proposed by the 
so-called Starnberg group provides an excellent backdrop for 
such an investigation 10 • It assumes that ideological 
input is largest before and during the phase of abduction 
and concept-formation. Such input may subsequently enter 
into the (actual) adoption of an attitude towards a newly 
introduced dispositional concept~ but it cannot enter into 
the communal and public process of justifying that choice. 
Thus~ external influence is small in the second phase of 
theory-development . The third phase begins when scientific 
work on a given concept or theory is done, at least for the 
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time being. Here, external forces come into play to the 
extent that scientists cease to be interested in controlling 
the use of the concept, i.e. as far as the potential use of 
that concept leaves the realm of autonomous science and 
becomes subject to selective appropriation by societal 
forces. In this phase of 'finalization', science sets free 
into the power-oriented public market-place of ideas an 
artifact which was at first infested by the ideology of its 
creators, but then much purified and distilled during 
tightly constrained scientific adjudication as to become 
void of all political character. Objective and innocent~ it 
is now an ideal prey for almost any sort of appropriation. 
This conjectural scheme for the varying interplay between 
ideology and scientific objectivity, between the public 
forum and the largely autonomous institution of science will 
have to be tested and elaborated. And the story of 'natural 
selection• as it traversed these different stages will have 
to be told in full. 
The image of science that emerges from the preceding 
chapters pays tribute to the extraordinary achievements of 
the human intellect, especially in science, without 
discounting the very real historical pressures which surely 
left their mark on science as on the products of any other 
human institution. Within the context of the philosophy of 
science~ Paul Feyerabend seems to have expounded a view most 
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similar to this one 11 • He~ too~ stresses the continuity 
between everyday and scientific decision-making: there is no 
such thing as "scientific rationality" which could claim a 
special status of excellence vis-a-vis folk-opportunism. And 
the characteristically scientific constraints an the 
available means in the pursuit of ends~ and the specifically 
scientific way of framing alternatives are historically 
contingent. It seems that Paul Feyerabend would not try to 
therefore write them off as merely contingent. For surely~ 
science may well owe its remarkable achievements to these 
constraints on argumentative means and theoretical 
alternatives. If Feyerabend has prescribed a path which this 
study has followed only to this limited extent~ it is for 
the moral dimension of his thought which poses a challenge 
to the philosophy of science that the present work is not 
ready to address: he seems to say that - given our talent 
for opportunistic reasoning a dogmatic 
institutionalization of a certain set of preferred 
constraints (as~ for instance~ in science) is unjustified~ 
debilitating~ and reactionary. Concerning science he would 
then say firstly that philosophers overestimate the 
historical efficacy of these constraints~ and secondly that 
one would be better off by either relaxing the hold of 
science on society (i.e. by proliferating institutions that 
would rival science) or by relaxing the constraints on 
permissible arguments within science itself. He may be 
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right. In order to decide this~ at the very least one would 
have to investigate the extent to which science progresses 
in virtue of sanctioned and effective <though mutable and 
flexible) constraints on the argumentative means and ends 
which are available to scientists at any given time 12 • 
But here again~ there are two rather different approaches to 
be taken. That is~ one might firstly conjecture that the 
very same features which set apart the scientific 
institutional system of knowledge-acquisition from any other 
such system also validate scientific knowledge. However~ one 
might alternatively suggest that the following three issues 
should carefully be held apart~ i.e. the issues (i) of what 
makes science a unique institution at any given time in 
history~ Cii) of how and why scientific knowledge appears to 
be outstandingly excellent~ Ciii) of how science progresses. 
Philosophers of science have followed these approaches and 
provided more or less tacit answers to these questions. 
Their proposals need to be evaluated in the framework of the 
theory expounded here. But to be sure~ much more will have 
to be done if one wants to fully meet and maybe deflate 
Feyerabend's challenge . 
For now~ the institution of science was considered only as 
a historical artifact. As such~ it was presented as an arena 
in which the cunning of reason becomes most successfully 
manifest : in the growth of objective knowledge . But whether 
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there is a lesson to be learned from this, and what it tells 
us ~ we will have to see. 
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Not•• to Conc1uwion 
1 Six phenomena~ really~ if one counts the brief 
discussion in the first chapter of priority disputes in 
science (~ee above~ pp. 34f.). And even seven~ if one 
counts <see above~ p. 120> the possibility of rational 
reconstruction of non-referential scientific theories 
such as phlogistic chemistry. 
2 Here~ that term pertains to the overall progress of 
science throughout history. Of course~ there is no 
difficulty accounting for progress in relation to the 
aims of research programmes on the basis of the preceding 
investigation. 
3 The problem of how to account for 
consensus-formation in science has been posed and 
dissected most recently and in grand style.by Laudan 
[1984) . However~ his presentation confirms the suspicion 
that at present only tentative approaches towards the 
solution of that problem are in sight. 
~ Compare Darwin's declaration towards the end of the 
Origin <Darwin [1959/1962/1859/1981)~ XIV ~ 191-195/p. 
453/pp. 481f./pp. 477f) 
Although I am fully corivinced of the truth 
of the views given in thi~ volume under the 
form of an abstract~ I by no means expect to 
convince experienced naturalists whose minds 
are stocked with a multitude of facts all 
viewed~ during a long course of years~ from a 
point of view directly opposite to mine. It is 
so easy to hide our ignorance under such 
e>:pressi ens as the 11 pl an of creation~ 11 11 Uni ty 
of design~ 11 8<c. ~ and to think that we give an 
explanation when we only restate a fact. Any 
one whose disposition leads him to attach more 
weight to unexplained difficulties than to the 
explanation of a certain number of facts will 
certainly reject my theory. A few naturalists~ 
endowed with much flexibility of mind, and who 
have already begun to doubt the immutability of 
species~ may be influenced by this volume; but 
I look with confidence to the future~ to young 
and rising naturalist~, who will be able to 
view both sides of the question with 
impartiality. Whoever is led to believe that 
species are mutable will do good service by 
conscientiously expressing his conviction; for 
only thus can the load of prejudice by which 
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this subject is overwhelmed be removed . 
~ Concerning inter alia Darwin's theory Young E1973J~ 
p . 350 takes precisely this 
to be the central preoccupation of the 
participants in the debate: a fundamental 
reorieHtation of the conception of the 
relations between man~ God~ nature and society. 
As the work progressed~ this reorientation 
became more closely defined as a change from 
mechanistic analogies employed within an 
explicitly theistic natural theology to the use 
of organic analogies based on secularized~ 
implicit natural theology . 
6 A far more general and thorough epistemological 
theory is needed to fill in the blanks left by the 
preceding remarks. For the sake of this theory of science 
the following constraint on any such theory is highly 
desirable: epistemological theories should construe the 
notions of •truth' and 'objectivity' in such a way that 
any consensus emerging from rational negotiation in 
science is taken to express objective truth. So-called 
realist theories do not meet that constraint <unless they 
employ a very restrictive notion of 'rationality'). And 
yet~ it seems that presently the terms 'objective' and 
"true' have been appropriated for the exclusive use of 
realists to whom the view expounded here must appear 
hopelessly 'relativistic'. -Compare the end of chapter 4 
(pp. 254f.). 
7 These normative conceptions of rationality (and the 
concomitant views on the aims of science) are manifest in 
the arguments which are drawn from any particular 
repertoire. However~ they tend to evade empirical inquiry 
since they become discernible only as one investigates 
the illocutionary force of scientific arguments <see 
above~ note 41 to chapter 1 on pp. 48f.). 
8 Here one would expect to find evidence supporting or 
disconfirming the view that paradigm-change in science is 
global or revolutionary rather than local or gradual. 
9 Compare the quotation from Mittelstrass [1974J in 
note 10 to chapter 1 on p. 42 above (and note 16 on pp. 
43f.). The philosophical and histor ical in~estigation of 
those negotiat i ons which determine the content of 
scientific argumentation repertoires for any given time 
may well be conducted within the constructivist research 
programme envisioned by Mittelstrass. Aside from the 
previously cited passages see pp. 116f.~ 144, and 
especially p. 136: 
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a theory of the history of science must be 
conceived as part of a theory of historical 
experience. In contrast to other parts of such 
a theory~ it pertains to a kind of knowledge 
which during all historical eras functions in 
praxis-stabilizing ways - praxis-stabilizing 
not only in ~espect to methodology but also in 
respect to teleology. (eine Theorie der 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte [mussJ als ein Teil 
einer Theorie der historischen Erfahrung 
begriffen werden. Im Unterschied zu anderen 
Teilen einer solchen Theorie betr~fe sie ein 
Wi~sen~ das in jeder historischen Phase 
praxisstabilisierende Funktionen hat~ und zwar 
nicht nur unter methodologischen~ sondern auch 
unter teleologischen Gesichtspunkten.) 
Mittelstrass's very abstract considerations bring the 
history of science back into the fold of the philosophy 
of history as conceived in the nineteenth-century. Other 
post-Kuhnian philosophers of science have embarked upon a 
similar course. Staying clear of epistemological 
dogmatism on the one hand~ (relativistic) rational 
reconstruction in terms of ever-changing methodological 
rules on the other~ StegmUller [1979J and Shapere [1984J 
utilize highly complex and sophisticated theories on the 
dynamics of science in order to uncover the efficacy of 
reason in history. While it is easy to agree with 
Mittelstrass~ StegmUller, and Shapere (especially 
Shapere)~ their ideas are most properly construed as 
regulative ideals for what the philosophy and 
historiography of science should at some point achieve: 
but for the immediate purposes of the science of science, 
the philosophy of history has to take the backseat to an 
empirical interest in the methodology of historiography. 
10 Bohme et.al. [1972J~ Bohme et.al. (1973J~ and 
Sch~'lfer [1978J. 
11 It does not come as much of a surprise that 
Feyerabend has indeed used that term as a label for 
scientists. Compare his [1981]~ p. 321: 
A scientist is not a high-priest guarding 
the preservation of basic laws; he is an 
opportunist who twists the accomplishments of 
the past to suit once this and then another end 
-if he pays attention to them at all. <Ein 
Forscher ist nicht ein Hohepriester, der Uber 
die Erhaltung grundlegender Gesetze wacht; er 
ist ein Opportunist~ der Errungenschaften der 
Vergangenheit bald fUr diesen~ bald fUr jenen 




He supports the use of that label in this passage by 
referring once again to a statement by Albert Einstein 
which he had already cited in his [1975J~ p . 18 : 
The external conditions which are set for 
(the scientist] by the facts of experience do 
not permit him to let himself be too much 
restricted~ in the construction of his 
conceptual world~ by the adherence to an 
epistemological system . He therefore~ must 
appear to the systematic epistemologist as a 
type of unscrupulous opportunist •... 
The qualification "at the very least" should be 
noted here. For~ any such investigation would at best 
provide the factual basis on which a moral or political 
decision has to be made . Into that political decision 
(and further complicating the issue) would have to enter 
a construal of "progress' which is not relativized to the 
goals of research programmes but determined by what is in 
the interest of humanity . 
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